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Introduction
What does "negligence" mean? The formal answer, derived from
appellate opinions and collected in hornbooks, provides certain con-
tours. These include the overall structure for approaching the negli-
gence decision: a rule-element analysis consisting of duty, breach,
causation, and injury.' Appellate law also establishes guidelines for
1. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at
164-65 (5th ed. 1984). A complete formal legal analysis of the negligence case, of course,
would also include affirmative defenses such as contributory negligence and assumption of
risk, as well as rules governing burdens of proof.
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determining specific elements of the rule, such as the cost-benefit defi-
nition of "reasonable" behavior.2
In the majority of negligence cases that are tried, however, the
jury's verdict decides liability. And in these cases, negligence and its
component concepts of causation and reasonableness would seem to
have a less determinate meaning.3 Within the very broad range de-
2. This is the Learned Hand test, generally attributed to his decision in United States
v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see KEETON Er AL., supra note 1,
§ 31, at 173 & n.46. For the cost-benefit analysis of negligence law and tort law in general,
see RCHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 147-97 (3d ed. 1986). Research in
cognitive psychology indicates that lay attributions of responsibility for accidents may track
the Learned Hand calculus. Marylie Karlovac & John Darley, Attribution of Responsibility
for Accidents: A Negligence Law Analogy, 6 Soc. COGNITION 287, 296-98, 301-07, 313
(1988). These findings may be consistent with at least some of the other phenomena re-
ported in this Article; for instance, the prototypes of reasonable behavior that attorneys
offer to jurors (see infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text) may very well include the
weighing of the costs and benefits of possible courses of action. But note that in the re-
search of Karlovac and Darley, subjects (unlike actual jurors) were not provided informa-
tion about the outcome of the target person's behavior, and thus were not susceptible to
the "hindsight bias," discussed infra note 193; see also infra note 259 (discussing research of
Karlovac & Darley in terms of severity effect).
3. Reasonableness, causation, and responsibility may very well have explicable sub-
stantive meanings if negligence law is considered as a body of rules. For instance, instru-
mentalists of the law and economics school insist that negligence law serves (or ought to
serve) the social goal of overall accident cost reduction, and therefore, that reasonableness
and other concepts ought to be understood in light of this goal. See POSNER, supra note 2.
Other goals posited for negligence law (descriptively and prescriptively) include fairness,
deterrence, compensation, and loss distribution. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning
and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 607-08
(1992). Another view is that reasonableness has a more or less determinable meaning that
depends on the whole of the law, including our collective decisions about who should be
burdened by accident costs and norms located elsewhere in the law. See Gumo CALA-
BRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTrUDEs, AND THE LAW 69 (1985). Negligence law may be
"reckonable" to practitioners' satisfaction even if it is conceived of, not as a body of rules,
but as decisions by appellate judges constrained by tradition and craft. See KARL N. LLEW-
ELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 19-61 (1960) (discussing four-
teen "steadying factors" that make appellate law broadly predictable).
It is, however, difficult to see how reasonableness, causation, and responsibility, as
decided by juries, could possibly have the determinate, consistent meanings that instru-
mentalists and holists posit. The jury's distinctive function is generally said to be that it
brings its sense of equity to the case. See, e.g., MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY Picus, THE DE-
BATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE: OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT ASBESTOS CASE 60-61
(1987) (observing, without passing judgment, that "[jiuries may deviate from but not en-
tirely disregard the judge's instructions" in order to give substantive or individual justice in
the individual case, a kind of modified nullification); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the
CivilJury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1065-66, 1070-72 (1964). Marc Galanter, in The Regulatory
Function of the Civil Jury, in VERDICT:. ASSESSING Tm CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 88-90 (Robert
E. Litan ed., 1993), explains that the value of the jury is its injection of substantive commu-
nity morality, via nonprofessional, discontinuous decision-makers, into what would other-
wise be a routinized system in which professionals bargain to resolve disputes, without
regard to substantive values. For other functions of the jury, see, e.g., George Priest, Justify-
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fined by appellate law, a (reasonable) jury can decide either way,4 and
generally need not give reasons for its decision.5 Both the jury's deci-
sion-making latitude6 and the insulation of its rationales from public
scrutiny7 arguably serve worthwhile purposes. But both obscure the
meaning of negligence law in action.
ing the Civil Jury, in VERDICT, supra, at 103 (listing three major purposes of civil juries as
bringing community standards to cases involving difficult or complex value judgments, pro-
tecting citizens from state power, and educating citizens in civic duties) (citing Kalven,
Calabresi & Bobbitt, and de Tocqueville); Michael Saks, Blaming the Jury, 75 GEO. L.J.
693, 702-04 (1986) (reviewing VALERIE P. HANs & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY
(1986)) [hereinafter Saks, Blaming] (among the "latent" functions of the jury are to keep
the law comprehensible to laypeople and to fine-tune legislation to individual cases to pre-
vent government overreaching). In the negligence case, the jury's function has been de-
scribed, a la Kalven, as the application of dominant social expectations and practices to the
particular controversy, rather than the implementation of "Scientific Policymaking" such as
cost-benefit analysis. Michael Wells, Scientific Policymaking and the Torts Revolution: The
Revenge of the Ordinary Observer, 26 GA. L. REv. 725, 732-33 (1992).
It is unclear how any goal such as deterrence, accident cost reduction, or compensa-
tion, however defined, could rationally be furthered by such a wide-open and unarticulated
process as decision-making by nonprofessional, discontinuous bodies that need not give the
public reasons for their decisions. See ic at 731-37; Kenneth S. Abraham, What is a Tort
Claim? An Interpretation of Contemporary Tort Reform, 51 MD. L. REv. 172, 175 (1992)
(submitting negligence cases to juries means that "at least in principle every negligence
case is unique, for the law makes no effort to treat it as a member of a general category
governed by a legal rule"; however, modern tort law has been modified by the inclusion of
some features of nontort compensation systems). Likewise, with respect to Calabresi's "'ho-
list" understanding of negligence law, cited above, it seems problematic to infer the exist-
ence and relative weight of the norms that law supposedly reflects from a process designed,
in part, to conceal what the norms are and how they are weighted. See CALABRESI, supra,
at 88. In all of these respects-the jury's lack of professional expertise, its lack of a tradi-
tion of craft, and its lack of public accountability, as well as its lack of any need to project
its decisions onto future disputes-the law juries make would not appear to be "reckon-
able" in the way the law of appellate judges is. Cf. LLEWELLYN, supra, at 19-61 (appellate
law more predictable).
4. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 33, at 193 ("The application of [the]
standard of reasonable conduct is as wide as all human behavior."); id. § 38, at 235-38
(discussing the jury's role in determining breach of duty).
5. Special verdicts or interrogatories accompanying the usual general verdict provide
occasional, partial exceptions to the rule. They tell us how the jury decided each essential
element of the law, including the allocation of comparative fault when relevant; they tell
us, e.g., whether the jury found a party negligent, but not necessarily the jury's reasons for
finding that party negligent. See, e.g., FED. R. Crw. P. 49 (special verdicts and interrogato-
ries); CONNECTICUT PRACrICE BOOK § 312 (1994) (jury interrogatories).
6. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 33; for a classic justification of jury discretion
in these "intermediate" cases, see Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 657, 664 (1873).
7. Some argue that the jury's insulation from rule-application and public justification
is good because it allows jurors to reach compromises between abstract and concrete, case-
specific notions of fairness, or between the various conceptions of fairness held by different
jurors. See Steven D. Smith, Rhetoric and Rationality in the Law of Negligence, 69 MINN. L.
REv. 277, 301 (1984); Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic
Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MicH. L. REv. 2348, 2390-95, 2402-08 (1990). It is
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Most judges seem to believe that jurors understand and apply the
law of negligence well, and leading commentators concur that juries
decide competently.8 Yet studies have repeatedly shown that jurors do
unclear how these scholars can know, under the circumstances, whether or how the notion
of reasonableness provides a "common vocabulary" for the jurors' task, see Smith, supra at
296-99, or that the decision reached is a "correct" one, since it would appear that within the
contours of appellate law, anything goes. Perhaps the most that can be said about the
system's refusal to subject jury determinations to the scrutiny of public reason, and ulti-
mately to a regime of rules, is that "the [jury's] equity is too subtle to be codified." Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J.
158, 168 (1958).
GUIDO CALABR.SI AND PHr= BonBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 57-58 (1978), argue that
the opacity of juries' determinations of responsibility for accidents helps us as a society to
avoid confronting openly the "tragic choice" between life (or the reduction of the risk of
death and serious injury) and alternative allocations of scarce resources which the negli-
gence case forces upon us. See infra note 195 (discussion of cognitive schema of responsi-
bility for accidents in terms of Calabresi and Bobbitt's analysis); see also Saks, Blaming,
supra note 3, at 702-04 (giving important decisions to different, anonymous juries diffuses
responsibility for controversial choices on which public consensus is lacking).
George Priest, however, argues on the basis of empirical research that most cases de-
cided by civil juries do not concern the sorts of complex or conflicting social values to
which Calabresi and Bobbitt and Saks refer. Priest also shows that most cases decided by
civil juries do not involve the assertion of government power against individuals, and that
very few citizens serve on juries. See Priest, supra note 3, at 117-24. He concludes that
"[tihere are no grounds that justify exempting the jury from giving reasons for its deci-
sion." Id. at 125.
8. For judges' views of how well jurors understand the law, see, e.g., Valerie P. Hans,
Attitudes Toward the Civil Jury: A Crisis of Confidence?, in VERDICr, supra note 3, at 261-
63 (reporting a 1987 Louis Harris poll indicating that only 24% of federal and 31% of state
judges believe that jurors fail to apply the law because they don't understand it); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View From the Bench, 26 GA. L. REv.
85, 113, 117, 138 (1991) [hereinafter Sentell, Bench] (89% of responding state court judges
believe jurors follow instructions and 94% believe jurors "generally experience[ ] no diffi-
culty in understanding the negligence case"). It is possible that judges have a personal
stake in professing a high opinion of juror competence; such a view would tend to reflect
that the judges themselves are doing a satisfactory job of instructing jurors on the law.
For scholarly agreement about juror competence, see, e.g., VALERI P. HANS & NEn.
VIDMAR, JUDGING Ta JURY 245-51 (1986) ("Jurors take their responsibilities seriously,
and the prime determinant of verdicts is the weight of evidence .... [The jury system]
serves the cause of justice very well."); REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE T=s JURY 230-31
(1983) (contrasting juries' competent fact-finding with their problems in understanding and
applying law); Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from
Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 727, 744-45 & n.106-11 (1991) (quoting representative
views from recent scholarship); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or
Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124, 1152-53 & nn.68-72 (1992)
(citing literature on jury competence); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything
About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1147, 1236-39 (1992) [hereinafter Saks, Do We Really Know?] (examining the high degree
of judge-jury agreement and research correlating evidence and jury decisions, and conclud-
ing that "juries are one of our society's most reliable decision-making institutions").
A leading indication that juries often decide "correctly" is the relatively high rate of
agreement between judges and juries. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE
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not comprehend much of the law they are supposed to apply.9 How
AMERICAN JURY 63 (1966) (judge agrees with civil jury 78% of the time); Hans, supra, at
263 (reporting a 1987 National Law Journal poll of state and federal judges, indicating that
more than three-quarters said they disagreed with no more than 10% of civil jury verdicts);
Sentell, Bench, at 99, finding that 87% of Georgia state judges believed that they agreed
with jury's decisions at least as often as the figure reported by Kalven and Zeisel). This
agreement rate of about 80% compares very favorably with the rates of agreement among
independent decision-makers in other professions, e.g. physicians, especially when we con-
sider that the easiest 80-95% of cases have already been removed by settlement or by
injured people's decisions not to sue. Saks, Do We Really Know?, supra, at 1236 & n.316
(citing research of Shari Seidman Diamond).
Attorneys' views of juror competence are more mixed. Compare R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View From the Trenches, 28 GA. L. REv. 1, 27-42
(1993) (80% of plaintiffs' lawyers and 71% of defendants' lawyers believe jurors follow
instructions; 86% and 79%, respectively, believe jurors understand the case in general)
with Hans, supra, at 265-67 (noting the lack of comprehensive studies, but citing a Federal
Judicial Center report indicating that 72% of attorneys think that a judge would be more
likely than a jury to apply the law correctly and that about a third of attorneys think a jury
would understand their argument as well as a judge would and be as likely to decide fairly).
See also Clermont & Eisenberg, supra, at 1149-52 (suggesting that judges, lawyers, and
policy makers tend to think, incorrectly, that jurors are not competent).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, more than 80% of jurors in two surveys said that they under-
stood the law well, although in one survey some 45% believed that their fellow jurors did
not. Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citizens
Who Serve as Jurors, in Verdict, supra note 3, at 295; cf. infra note 92 (most people think
they are more intelligent and fair-minded than the average person).
9. The ability of jurors to comprehend and apply instructions on negligence law or
anything else is problematic at best. One study of actual jurors indicates that the jurors
understood fewer than half of the instructions given, and that they did not understand the
substantive criminal law better than uninstructed members of the same jury pool. Alan
Reifman et al., Real Jurors' Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 539, 539-45, 547, 553 (1992); see also AMIRAM ELwORK ET AL., MAKING JURY
INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE § 1-3, at 12 (1982) (reporting several studies finding that
jurors understood less than half of instructions); Elizabeth C. Wiggins & Steven J.
Breckler, Special Verdicts as Guides to Jury Decision Making, 14 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 1,
32 (1990) (finding juror comprehension of instructions "fairly poor" using both special and
general verdict forms).
Considerable research using mock jurors indicates a rather complex and imperfect
relationship between instructions and juror judgment, with some indication that clarifying
the language of instructions, giving instructions before as well as after trial, and putting
instructions in writing may lead jurors to understand and apply the law more accurately.
See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict
Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 513, 557-58
(1992) (observing that mock jurors were more likely to properly follow instruction not to
let an automatic trebling rule in antitrust cases affect the size of damages they award when
the justification for this automatic trebling rule was included in instruction); Amiram
Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, 1 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 163, 163, 165-76 (1977) (rewriting instructions in more comprehensible language
did not improve jurors' ability to apply the appropriate legal criteria to the facts when
jurors were already familiar with criteria through personal experience, but did improve
jurors' ability to understand unfamiliar legal rules); Vicki Smith, Prototypes in the Court-
room: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 857,
[Vol. 47
can we account for this discrepancy? What is a juror's conception of
negligence if it is not exactly negligence doctrine, yet something that
satisfies most participants in and observers of the legal system as do-
ing the work that the doctrine is supposed to do? 10
Much research has been conducted into how juries make law.
"[W]e know more about jury decision-making than about any other
858 (1991) [hereinafter Smith, Prototypes] (reviewing literature indicating that "jurors' un-
derstanding of the law is quite poor," but that clarifying the language of instructions or
giving instructions before as well as after trial increases juror comprehension somewhat).
Post-verdict interviews with some actual jurors also indicate reasoning and decisions
strikingly variant from the instructions. Consider, for instance, the account of the 1981
Washington Post libel trial, in which William Tavoulareas won a $2.05 million verdict
largely because the foreman stubbornly clung to and convinced his fellow jurors of a
wholly incorrect notion of libel law as it applied to public figures. See Steven Brill, Inside
the Jury Room at the Washington Post Libel Tria4 AM. LAW., Nov. 1982, at 1, 89-94. This led
the trial judge in a later important defamation case to require separate, seriatim verdicts on
the issues of defamatory meaning, falsity, and actual malice. See Abraham Sofaer, Jury
Management in Sharon v. Time, Inc., 8 U. BRMGEPORT L. REv. 445,445-49 (1987). See also
LITIGATION SECTION, A.B.A. SPECIAL Comm. ON JURY COMPREHENSION, JURY COMPRE-
HENSION IN COMPLEX CASES 43-52 (1989) [hereinafter A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM.] (catalogu-
ing jury confusion about instructions for complex cases); Selvin & Picus, supra note 3, at
52-54 (reviewing the Washington Post and other cases in which juries deviated significantly
from the instructions). For evidence to the contrary from posttrial juror interviews, see, e.g.,
Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business Liability in Tort
Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 85, 104-06,
110-11 (1992) (jurors in tort cases against businesses report deciding in accordance with the
law even when their feelings dictated the contrary or when they disapproved of the law,
though authors suspect that jurors dealt with discomfort by reducing awards). For criti-
cisms of reliance on the essentially anecdotal information of a few high-profile cases as a
basis for inferences about jury behavior generally, see SAUL M. KASSiN & LAWRENCE S.
WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL. PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECrrES 208
(1988); cf Robert M. Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis: Common Sense,
Hegemony and the Great American Liability Insurance Famine of 1986, 11 STUD. L., POL.
& Soc'Y 95, 104-08 (1991) (unmasking the "argument by anecdote," in the form of popular
reports of supposedly outrageous jury awards, which insurers used to blame the legal sys-
tem for sharp increases in liability insurance); Saks, Do We Really Know?, supra note 8, at
1158-62 (criticizing reliance on anecdotal information for inferences about tort liability
system).
The somewhat critical evidence of juror comprehension of the law should be placed in
a broader context of jury competence, especially with regard to fact-finding and responsi-
ble deliberation. See sources cited supra note 8.
10. The discrepancy probably cannot be fully accounted for by differences between
the criteria used by the social scientists and the practitioners to evaluate juror understand-
ing of the law, although the vagueness of the latter prevents precise comparison. A social
scientist typically measures (mock) juror comprehension of the law by administering a
questionnaire setting forth brief hypotheticals and asking respondents whether each repre-
sents a true or false statement of the law. See Reifman et al., supra note 9, at 544-45. By
contrast, judges and attorneys may simply be asked whether they think jurors understand
the law or not. See, Sentell, Bench, supra note 8.
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aspect of the legal process."'" Our necessarily indirect 12 knowledge
comes from several sources, including posttrial interviews with actual
jurors, studies of "shadow" or surrogate jurors, mock jury experi-
ments, jury verdict research, field experiments, and combinations of
these. All provide valuable, but limited, information. 13
11. Saks, Do We Really Know?, supra note 8, at 1235. It should be noted that much
more is known about criminal than civil juries. ROBERT J. MACCOUN, GETTING INSIDE
THE BLACK Box: TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF CIVIL JURY BEHAVIOR [here-
inafter MACCOUN, GETTING INSIDE] 18 (1987).
12. An exceptional direct report of jury deliberations is Frontline: Inside the Jury
Room (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 8, 1986) [hereinafter Frontline]. The first research
program of the University of Chicago Jury Project, in 1954, included tape recordings of
deliberations in civil trials; federal and most state legislatures responded by prohibiting
further observation of or eavesdropping on juries. KASSIN & WRIGI-rTSMAN, supra note 9,
at 13-14. Actual deliberations in the Frontline case and a second case are analyzed in John
F. Manzo, You Wouldn't Take a Seven-Year-Old and Ask Him All These Questions: Jurors'
Use of Practical Reasoning in Supporting Their Arguments, 19 LAW & Soc. INOUIRY 639,
642-62 (1994).
13. For brief surveys of methods of jury research, see KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra
note 9, at 12-19; MACCOUN, GETTING INSIDE, supra note 11, at 5-17; Robert J. MacCoun,
Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking by Civil
Juries, in VERDICT, supra note 3, at 140-47. For an extensive bibliography, see WALTER F.
ABBOTT ET AL., JURY RESEARCH: A REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY (1993). A summary of
the strengths and limitations of these methods with respect to the topic of this Article
follows.
INTERVIEWS WITH ACTUAL JURORS. Both popular and scholarly works on jury deci-
sion-making have utilized interviews with jurors. For examples of scholarly work relevant
to this Article that is based on juror interviews, see, e.g., SELVIN & PICUS, supra note 3;
Hans & Lofquist, supra note 9.
Cognitive psychological research indicates that juror interviews may be very limited as
a source of accurate information about how the jurors decided. See Richard Nisbett &
Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental
Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231 (1977) (reviewing research and concluding that people
generally lack direct introspective access to their higher-order cognitive processes; when
they attempt to report on those processes, they base their reports instead on a priori im-
plicit causal theories); see generally RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 205-23 (1980) (reporting Nisbett's
and others' research on people's imperfect ability to attribute the causes of their own be-
havior and discussing criticisms of that research). In particular, jurors may be motivated to
respond to researchers' questions in ways that the jurors think will put them in a favorable
light. Hans & Lofquist, supra note 9, at 107-08 (acknowledging and briefly responding to
the relevant literature).
"SHADOW" OR SURROGATE JURORS. In this method, people with demographic charac-
teristics similar to those of the actual jurors observe a trial; researchers may interview them
as the trial proceeds, record their deliberations, or both. See, e.g., WALTER F. ABBOTT,
SURROGATE JURIES 1-21 (1990) (overview of methods and research findings); MACCOUN,
GETTING INSIDE, supra note 11, at 9-10; Donald E. Vinson, The Shadow Jury: An Experi-
ment in Litigation Science, 68 A.B.A. J. 1242 (1982) (describing author's use of shadow jury
to assist I.B.M. in its defense of antitrust litigation); Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Dia-
mond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Fed-
eral District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 508-10, 518-31 (1978) (testing effectiveness of
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attorneys' use of peremptories by retaining excused jurors as shadow jurors; finding signifi-
cant effects in five of twelve trials studied). Shadow jury studies have the advantages of
using an actual trial as the stimulus material and, by comparison with postverdict inter-
views with actual jurors, of not relying exclusively on jurors' after-the-fact analyses. The
major shortcomings include the expense of having shadow jurors sit for what may be a
lengthy trial and the fact (as in mock jury studies) that shadow jurors are aware that their
decisions do not affect actual litigants. See MACCOUN, GErrrNG INSIDE, supra note 11, at
10.
MOCK JURY RESEARCH. This is probably the most extensively used scholarly method
for learning about how juries decide. See MAcCOuN, GETTrNG INSIDE, supra note 11, at 12-
14. The literature is vast. The great advantage of the mock jury method is that it allows
researchers to manipulate any aspect of the presentation of the case or the conditions of
deliberations in order to measure the effect of discrete variables on subjects' decisions. The
major limitations of mock jury research concern its external validity: experimental design
often varies significantly from actual trial conditions; experimental subjects are typically
undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses at one of the researchers' institutions, a
substantially different population than that of most actual jury pools; and subjects know
they are deciding a simulation, not a real case, and therefore that their decision will not
affect real parties. For an important discussion of the methods of mock trial and other jury
research, see ROBERT M. BRAY & NORBERT L. KERR, Methodological Considerations in
the Study of the Psychology of the Courtroom, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM
287-323 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982).
JURY VERDICr RESEARCH. The statistical analysis of jury verdicts compares the char-
acteristics of actual cases-type of litigants, claims, etc.-with outcomes, searching for cor-
relations over a large number of cases. Important statistical analyses of verdicts that are
relevant to this Article include AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP PocKETS,
EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS (1985) (studying more than
9,000 civil trials) and James K. Hammitt et aI., Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 751, 753-58 (1985) (finding certain systematic biases in damage awards). See
generally MACC6UN, GErrING INSIDE, supra note 11, at 7-8 (noting pioneering work in the
"archival approach" to studying juries). The major limitations of this valuable method of
jury research are that studies usually do not include all relevant variables that might affect
jury decision-making, and that the results, which are in the form of statistical correlations,
may tell us much about the outcomes of jury deliberations but not about why juries decide
as they do. See id. at 8.
FIELD EXPERIMENTS. In two studies, researchers have experimentally manipulated the
conduct of actual trials to isolate and test the effects of individual aspects of the process,
such as pre-instructing jurors on the law or permitting jurors to take notes. Larry Heuer &
Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment with Written and Preliminary
Instructions, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 410-28 (1989); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod,
Increasing Jurors' Participation in Trials: A Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and
Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 232-36 (1988). Limitations of this research
method include the difficulty of obtaining court permission to conduct the experiments and
the ethical problems of varying trial conditions among otherwise similarly situated litigants.
See MACCOUN, GETTING INSIDE, supra note 11, at 10-11.
COMBINATION OF METHODS. Certainly the most famous of jury studies based on a
combination of methods is KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 8, at 33-117 (study of more than
8,000 criminal and civil trials based on analysis of outcomes and questionnaires sent to
judges, revealing extent of and reasons for divergences between judge and jury). For recent
extensive studies employing observation of alternate jury deliberations, posttrial interviews
of jurors, attorneys, and judges, and written juror questionnaires, see A.B.A. SPECIAL
COMM., supra note 9 (analysis of juror performance in six complex cases); Valerie P. Hans,
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This Article attempts to add to our knowledge of what negligence
means to jurors by studying how advocates try to persuade jurors to
reason about accident cases. From the words lawyers use in their clos-
ing arguments, we can make at least qualified inferences about jurors'
"common sense" of negligence: how their cognitive frameworks, their
habits of judgment, and the contexts in which they decide affect the
way they process the judge's instructions. We can ask what must be
true about jurors' thinking in order for what the lawyers say to make
sense.' 4 Thus, by inquiring directly about trial advocacy, this Article
indirectly examines the psychology of juror decision-making.
Robin Hood Myth Challenged, NAT'L L.J., June 6, 1994, at C1, C6-C8 (reporting some
results of research project including public opinion polls, mock jury experiments, and inter-
views with jurors in trials involving corporations).
PROFESSIONAL AND POPULAR KNOWLEDGE. Other sources of information about how
jurors think include the professional wisdom of practicing attorneys, as well as legal and
popular media reports of jury trials. See generally Galanter, supra note 3, at 72-80 (how
participants in the legal system learn about jury behavior). (Note that some of this infor-
mation is based on posttrial interviews with actual jurors and is subject to the limitations
inherent in that source; see id.) It has been observed that a good number of attorneys and
others who think they know how jurors think are probably mistaken. See id. at 83-86 (trac-
ing sources of misinformation about jury behavior); Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 8,
at 1149-55 & nn.62, 68-82 (citing widespread professional misperception of juries as incom-
petent and biased toward plaintiffs and summarizing empirical research to the contrary);
Saks, Blaming, supra note 3, at 693.
14. The project thus follows efforts in many fields, including linguistics, anthropology,
and the philosophy of language, to identify the implicit frameworks that speakers and lis-
teners must share in order to understand each other. One classic work in the philosophy of
language is PAUL GRICE, Logic and Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 22
(1989). Grice explains that in ordinary conversation, people often mean something other
than what they literally say. "Implicature" of this sort occurs when a speaker blatantly
violates maxims governing ordinary conversation (e.g., to be relevant), while apparently
continuing to observe the "Cooperative Principle," the listener's assumption that the con-
versation is a cooperative effort to further the particular purposes of the conversation.
When this happens, the listener must figure out how to reconcile the speaker's violation
(e.g., an ostensibly irrelevant remark) with the speaker's presumed continued observance
of the Cooperative Principle, and in order to do so supplies the additional meaning the
speaker has left implicit. Id. at 22-31. Grice's analysis of conversation and meaning has
generated a large scholarly literature. See Pragmatics (Steven Davis ed., 1991) (readings on
Gricean analysis); see also sources cited infra note 142 (application of Gricean analysis to
causal attribution).
Recent work in linguistics also seeks to articulate the cognitive frameworks implicit in
our ordinary discursive practices-how we categorize things and people and how we use
metaphor in ordinary conversation and explanation-and thus to identify what participants
in the culture assume in order for what they say and do to make sense to themselves and to
each other. See, e.g., CULTURAL MODELS IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT (Dorothy Holland
& Naomi Quinn eds., 1987) [hereinafter CULTURAL MODELS]; GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN,
FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987);
EVE E. SWEETSER, FROM ETYMOLOGY TO PRAGMATICS: METAPHORICAL AND CULTURAL
ASPECTS OF SEMANTIC STRUCTURE (1990). Similarly, modern legal anthropology has iden-
[Vol. 47HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Research in social and cognitive psychology and linguistics indi-
cates that jurors are likely to reason about an accident case as they
would about questions of categorization and judgment in ordinary life:
by using various knowledge structures and judgmental habits or
heuristics. 15 This Article describes the structures and heuristics that
tified different styles of discourse that ordinary people use to argue their cases in small
claims court and the implicit conceptions of justice that correspond to each. JOHN M. CON-
LEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF
LEGAL DiscouRSE 1-57 (1990). This Article may be thought of as an extension of this
ethnography to the discourse of lawyers to ordinary people in court.
These studies in the philosophy of language and linguistics indicate that we may infer
from what attorneys say, assuming that they are making sense to the jurors, the implicit
frameworks that the attorneys and jurors share. It does not indicate whether and how the
jurors act upon their understandings of attorneys' speech. For all we know, jurors in the
cases studied understand perfectly well the implicit arguments, and then decide on entirely
different grounds. See infra note 20 (problems in inferring juror thought from attorney
speech). This Article, therefore, assumes, without attempting to prove, that there is a con-
nection between how the attorneys implicitly try to persuade jurors and how the jurors in
fact think through the case. Proof of the connection must await further, controlled
experimentation.
Note also that the present research does not distinguish between juror and jury think-
ing. I speak throughout of juror thinking, because the data are limited to what the attor-
neys say; a linguistic analysis of jury thinking would have to include what jurors say to each
other during deliberations. The direct study of deliberations would thus seem to be re-
quired to test hypotheses about jury, as opposed to juror, decision-making. See, e.g.,
Garold Stasser et al., The Social Psychology of Jury Deliberations: Structure, Process, and
Product, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CouRTRooM, supra note 13, at 221 (reviewing re-
search that focuses on the jury's collective decision-making process); MAcCouN, GETrING
INSIDE, supra note 11, at 30-32 (reviewing studies of juror cognition and commenting that
the research programs need to be extended to the study of mock jury deliberations).
Knowledge about how jurors think is worthwhile if the criterion of worth is effect on trial
outcomes. Research indicates generally that most juries decide in favor of the initial major-
ity, as determined by informal polling at the beginning of deliberations. See HANS & VrD-
MAR, supra note 8, at 110 & n.23, 112; Sarah Tanford & Steven Penrod, Jury Deliberations:
Discussion Content and Influence Processes in Jury Decision Making, 16 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 322, 323, 342 (1986); Christy Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of
Evidence; 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 2 (1987).
15. To the extent that the purposes and contexts for deciding causation, fault, and
responsibility in ordinary life differ from those that shape the jurors' task in deciding acci-
dent cases, results from psychological research may not generalize unproblematically to the
courtroom. See Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Ordinary Man and the Psychology of Attributing
Causes and Responsibility, 42 MOD. L. REv. 143 (1979) [hereinafter Lloyd-Bostock, The
Ordinary Man] (summarizing relevant attribution research and discussing differences be-
tween attributions in legal and nonlegal contexts). The same author, however, notes the
close relationship between legal and nonlegal attributions of causation and responsibility.
Id. at 168. Elsewhere she discusses the complementary use of tort standards to guide social
cognition inquiries and invites legal scholars to engage in the type of analysis illustrated in
this Article. See Sally Lloyd-Bostock, Attributions of Cause and Responsibility as Social
Phenomena; in ATrRBUTION THEORY AND RESEARCH: CONCEPTUAL, DEVELOPMENTAL
AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 261, 267 (Joseph Jaspars et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter Lloyd-
Bostock, Attributions]. For examples of social psychologists who have used legal criteria for
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seem most relevant to juror judgments about responsibility for acci-
dents, 16 and explains how the attorneys' rhetoric reflects jurors' use of
these habits of thought.17
assigning responsibility as a guide to the formulation of psychological criteria for the attri-
bution of responsibility in ordinary life, see KELLY G. SHAVER, THE ATTRIBUTION OF
BLAME: CASUALTY, RESPONSmILIY AND BLAMEWORTHINESS 64-70 (1985) (constructing a
psychological definition of responsibility based on leading legal notions of responsibility
from Hart and Holmes); Frank D. Fincham & Joseph M. Jaspars, Attribution of Responsi-
bility: From Man the Scientist to Man as Lawyer, in 13 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SO-
CIAL PSYCHOLOGY 81, 96-106 (L. Berkowitz ed., 1980) (explaining relevance of Hart and
Honore's definition of legal causal responsibility for psychological theory of attribution of
responsibility).
Social scientists have urged that the results of cognitive psychological research be
tested in the context of juror decision-making. See MACCOUN, GETrING INSIDE, supra note
11, at vi, 29-31. The legal literature includes several applications of knowledge structures
and judgmental heuristics to juror decision-making. See, e.g., J. ALEXANDER TANFORD,
THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICs AND ETHIcs 14-15 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter
TANFORD, TRIAL PROCESS] (briefly summarizing cognitive heuristics and biases of juror
decision-making); Victor Gold, Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of Psychological
Persuasion Techniques in the Courtroom, 65 N.C. L. REV. 481 (1987) (arguing that lawyers'
use of psychological principles to persuade jurors threatens to undermine proper delibera-
tive processes); Edward Green, The Reasonable Man: Legal Fiction or Psychosocial Real-
ity?, 2 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 241, 242-45 (1967) (early empirical effort to ascertain lay
understanding of "reasonableness" using simple, written case simulation and question-
naire); James A. Holstein, Jurors' Interpretations and Jury Decision Making, 9 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 83 (1985) (focusing on jury deliberations and the schemas jurors articulate
to convince other jurors of their interpretations of the case); Albert J. Moore, Trial By
Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REV. 273 (1989) (illustrating how
jurors use cognitive schemas and heuristics to decide questions of fact); Michael J. Saks &
Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial By Heuristics, 15
LAw & Soc'Y REv. 123, 126-45, 156 (1980) (discussing how factfinders at trial process
quantitative information using intuitive heuristics); J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford,
Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L.
REV. 741 (1988) (responding to Gold, supra, and arguing that criticisms of use of psychol-
ogy in the courtroom are based on incorrect assumptions about psychology, the legal pro-
cess, and the relationships between the two); Richard L. Wiener, Social Analytic
Jurisprudence and Tort Law: Social Cognition Goes to Court, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 503
(1993) [hereinafter Wiener, Social Analytic Jurisprudence] (applying social cognition the-
ory to negligence and reporting experiments on effects of counterfactual thinking on attri-
butions of fault and responsibility); Stephen W. Mysliwiec, Note, Toward Principles of Jury
Equity, 83 YALE LJ. 1023 (1974) (applying "equity theory" and attribution theory to sug-
gest five principles that constitute jurors' sense of equity; primarily concerned with crimi-
nal law).
16. As the title of the Article indicates, I focus on how jurors assess responsibility for
accidents, and how they think about the components of responsibility, fault, and causation.
I do not address, except incidentally, the fascinating and arguably related topic of how
jurors think about damages.
17. In examining the cognitive significance of attorneys' speech, this Article engages
in discourse analysis. For a brief summary of the principles of discourse analysis, see Mar-
garet Wetherell & Jonathan Potter, Discourse Analysis and the Identification of Interpreta-
tive Repertoires, in ANALYZING EVERYDAY EXPLANATION: A CASEBOOK OF METHODS 168
(Charles Antaki ed., 1988).
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The rhetoric of torts indicates that, to a considerable extent, ju-
rors try to achieve justice by comparing what happened to something
else. Advocates seem to presume that jurors compare the parties' con-
duct to prototypes of how reasonable people behave, and that jurors
contrast what happened to counterfactual scenarios in which the acci-
dent did not occur in order to decide whether some act or omission by
one or both of the parties caused the accident. Doing justice by com-
paring the specific facts of the case and general models of behavior to
one another is what has been described as pragmatic or practical rea-
soning.' 8 This Article explores the particular forms that jurors' prag-
matism may take-how lawyers persuade jurors to reconcile specific
notions of fairness or justice with the law of negligence in individual
cases.19
Jurors' uses of everyday cognitive tools often produce decisions
that conform to the textbook law of negligence. This is not surprising,
because that law regulates everyday life and is administered by human
beings. But sometimes jurors' reliance on these cognitive tools leads
to judgments that depart from what the law dictates; even when the
use of these tools is consistent with the law, examining them shows
how jurors are likely to fill in the very wide gaps that elements of the
law like "reasonableness" leave open. By analyzing only the lawyers'
arguments, I cannot prove the extent to which jurors think the way
lawyers argue.20 But the lawyers' rhetoric does suggest how jurors'
18. See, eg., M. Wells, supra note 3. Jury decision-making in negligence cases is prag-
matic not only in its dialectic of concrete and general, but also in other respects: in its
practical, purposeful context-jurors assess responsibility in order to award (or decline to
award) damages-and in its inclusion of community values and practices. For the Aristote-
lian sources of what we would today call pragmatic reasoning about ethics, see MARTHA C.
NUSSBAuM, THE FRAGILIrY OF GoODNFSS: LuCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND
PHmOSoPHY 249-63 (1986). On pragmatism and legal reasoning, see Symposium, On the
Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569 (1990).
19. A close study of lawyers' rhetoric indicates that jurors' pragmatism is not, as some
have claimed, simply a concealed negotiation of conflicting visions of fairness. Cf. Smith,
supra note 7, at 301 (discussing jury's latitude of discretion as a central function in achiev-
ing corrective justice goals); C. Wells, supra note 7, at 2390-92 (suggesting that a jury is the
ideal institution for bridging the gaps between the formal concept of "reasonableness" and
the defendant's actual conduct).
20. Support for the very general point that jurors use both "common knowledge" and
legal rules to decide cases, based on a microlinguistic analysis of actual jury deliberations,
is provided by Manzo, supra note 12, at 657 (studying transcripts of deliberations in one
criminal and one civil case, author observes that "jurors have two sources of experience
from which to obtain support for their views: from their everyday lives, and from the rules,
evidence, and legal lexicon they obtain from the trial and the deliberation").
The presumption that what attorneys say is strongly and specifically connected to how
jurors think is problematic. See Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of
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Closing Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 55, 111 & nn.143-44 (1992) (sug-
gesting the need for more empirical study of the impact of differing stories in closing argu-
ments upon jurors' thinking). First, attorneys' rhetoric may suggest knowledge structures
and judgmental heuristics that jurors do not employ. Rhetoric is multidimensional and
multivalent, and one rhetorical device may indicate various, even conflicting, patterns of
thought. Moreover, plaintiffs' attorneys may increase jurors' ability to resist persuasion by
forewarning them of defense attorneys' anticipated arguments. See Daniel Linz & Steven
Penrod, Increasing Attorney Persuasiveness in the Courtroom, 8 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 1,
17-26 (1984). It is therefore possible that an advocate may reduce the impact of the oppo-
nent's rhetorical implications of knowledge structures and judgmental heuristics by point-
ing them out to the jurors. There is not yet any research specifically on this point, although
Vicki Smith has shown that instructions that explicitly address jurors' prior prototypes of
crimes improve jurors' ability to identify as crimes those events that meet the legal defini-
tion but not the prototype. See Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide, 17
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 507 (1993) [hereinafter Smith, Prior Knowledge]. Note, however,
that implicit strategies may be more difficult to locate and forewarn jurors about. For an
illustration of forewarning in a negligence case, see Roe, infra note 161, at R. 38.25-41.9,
71.5-17 (plaintiff's attorney's attempt to counter what he characterizes as the "blame the
victim" contributory negligence argument).
Second, jurors may think in ways not prompted or encouraged by the attorneys' argu-
ments. Cf Brill, supra note 9, at 89-94 (jurors in Washington Post libel trial swayed by one
juror's incorrect understanding of the law); Frontline, supra note 12 (jurors in Frontline
trial argued legally irrelevant issues). Mock jurors have also been shown to schematize the
same, relatively simple scenario in a great variety of ways. See Holstein, supra note 15, at
90 (15 schemas observed during 48 mock deliberations). This research suggests that how-
ever many schemas the advocates' arguments imply, jurors are likely to be ready with
more. And without a comprehensive examination of deliberation transcripts and accurate
postverdict polling, it may not be possible to know which of the schemas implied by the
closing arguments matched or triggered the most common or important or deeply held
schemas of the jurors. The attorneys, limited by the nature of the case or their own knowl-
edge and imagination, may argue in language that fails to trigger important juror knowl-
edge structures and inferential heuristics. And if there is reason for caution when drawing
inferences to juror thinking from jurors' own speech during mock deliberations, see Hol-
stein, supra note 15, at 85, 89, considerably more caution would appear appropriate in the
effort to infer what jurors think from what attorneys say to them.
Yet it seems reasonable to presume that the ways in which attorneys try to persuade
jurors are strongly related to the ways jurors think. James Holstein, for instance, observes
on the basis of mock jury deliberation research that attorneys and witnesses attempt to
structure information in ways that will appear coherent to the jury. Id. at 90. This presumes
that the juror schemas those attorneys and witnesses try to address are shared, social con-
structs, not purely idiosyncratic ideas of the jurors. Without directly observing actual delib-
erations, we cannot test this, as we can when a judge writes an opinion incorporating
portions of counsel's brief. But it would surely be odd if there were no significant connec-
tions-if the speech acts of trained professionals, highly motivated to make just those con-
nections and reputed for their success in making them, were instead irrelevant to the
speakers' goals. And there is evidence that the lawyers whose arguments are studied in this
Article are experienced, successful advocates. Reputations for success in persuading juries
are often based largely on anecdotal evidence, so more objective, albeit more indirect,
evidence of the attorneys' competence may be helpful. Of the eight attorneys represented
in the closing arguments examined in this Article, 4 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAw DIREC-
TORY (1992 ed.) provides some relevant professional data concerning six. At the time of
their respective trials, their average length of practice was 26 years; five of the six were
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cognitive tools may combine with doctrine to create a common sense
of negligence.
I. Rhetoric and Cognition in Accident Cases
A. Overview: How an Attorney Argues
The data this Article studies are transcripts of closing arguments
in several accident cases.2' For the sake of clarity, I will focus on one
members of one or both of the American Trial Lawyers Association and the Connecticut
Trial Lawyers Association; two (plaintiffs' attorneys in Butler, infra note 22, and Roe) were
or had been leading members of those organizations; and one was an adjunct professor of
trial practice.
This Article, therefore, follows in the long tradition of rhetorical analysis which
presumes that what advocates say may reflect and guide, if not determine, what their audi-
ences think. See, eg., ThoMAS M. CONLEY, RHEroRic IN T=E EUROPEAN TRADmON 4-7
(1990) (teaching of rhetoric flourished in Greece beginning in 5th century B.C. partly to
help citizens argue their cases in newly created popular courts); see also EDWARD P.J.
CoRBETr, CLAssIcAL RHETORIC FOR T=E MODERN SrtmENr 136 (3d ed. 1990).
21. The research is based on four Connecticut negligence cases, two tried in federal
court and two in state court. Each was argued to a jury on a negligence theory, and tran-
scripts of the complete trial, including closing arguments and instructions, were available
for each. Three of the transcripts were provided in response to the author's solicitation of
local attorneys; the fourth had been used as an exercise in a torts course and was already in
the author's possession.
Transcripts of closing arguments might appear to provide a limited database for an
analysis of trial advocacy and juror cognition. It is, therefore, appropriate to discuss and
place in perspective some of the possible limitations of this research.
TRANSCRIPTS OF CLOSING ARGUMENTS AS DATA. The analysis of transcripts alone ap-
pears to miss much of what goes on in a jury trial. First, the analysis omits much about the
context of the cases, including details about the parties, attorneys, jurors, and judges in-
volved. Second, to examine only the words the attorneys use, and in transcript form at that,
is to leave out intonation, accent, pace of speech, and other features of spoken and unspo-
ken communication. Third, by studying only closing arguments, the analysis omits all the
other phases of the case in which attorneys try to persuade jurors, such as voir dire, open-
ing statements, and witness examination.
Nevertheless, transcripts of closing arguments provide much valuable information
about trial advocacy and hence about the rhetoric of negligence in particular cases. First,
the failure to consider the demographic characteristics of the jurors or the parties does not
undermine the project. Most research has failed to show any strong correlation between
jurors' demographic characteristics or general attitudes and their decisions. To be sure,
some studies (as well as the jury selection firms that have flourished in the last fifteen
years) have claimed that jurors' demographic characteristics, such as race, class, age, and
occupation, and their relevant attitudinal biases (e.g., authoritarian versus egalitarian), sig-
nificantly affect their decisions. See; eg., Brian H. Bornstein & Michelle Rajki, Extra-Legal
Factors and Product Liability: The Influence of Mock Jurors' Demographic Characteristics
and Intuitions about the Cause of an Injury, 12 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 127, 130-31, 143-44 (1994)
(surveying research on effect of juror characteristics on decisions and reporting experiment
showing some effect of jurors' race and socioeconomic status on verdicts). The expert con-
sensus, however, is that jurors' personal characteristics are not controlling in most cases.
See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in INSIDE THE JUROR
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42 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) ("Most research that has attempted to predict verdict prefer-
ences on the basis of stable juror characteristics, such as attitudes and personality traits, has
found that individual differences among jurors... account[ ] for only a small proportion of
the variance in verdict choices."); HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 8, at 89-92 (questioning
effectiveness of "scientific jury selection"); MACCOUN, GETTING INSIDE, supra note 11, at
19 & nn.19-20, and sources cited; Martin F. Kaplan, Cognitive Processes in the Individual
Juror, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM, supra note 13, at 204-06 (mock trial
research shows personal bias significant only in cases where evidence relatively unreliable);
Visher, supra note 14, at 3 ("research suggests that jurors' personal characteristics are sub-
stantively insignificant in affecting trial outcomes"). Moreover, while there is some evi-
dence indicating that characteristics of the parties may bias juror decision-making, see
generally Francis C. Dane & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Effects of Defendants' and Victims'
Characteristics on Jurors' Verdicts, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM, supra note
13, at 84-88 (reviewing relevant research); see also CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 13, at v-x
(effects of litigant characteristics on outcome, including liability and verdict, based on anal-
ysis of more than 9,000 civil jury trials; concluding, among other things, that black litigants
and deep pocket defendants received less favorable outcomes), the research consensus is
that jurors are not ordinarily swayed by racial prejudice or by emotion. See TANFoRD,
TRIAL PROCESS, supra note 15, at 14 & n.8. Professor Visher also notes that much of the
research on the impact of parties' characteristics may be flawed because of experimental
design. In some, subjects were presented with descriptions of only one of the parties (in a
real trial, jurors would have access to both, of course). In others, researchers' manipula-
tions of the information (in order to isolate variables) diverged from the way in which
actual jurors use that information. In most, insufficient attention was paid to the state of
the evidence in the case. Visher, supra note 14, at 3-5; accord Tanford & Tanford, supra
note 15, at 755-56 & n.92.
Second, it is true that features of spoken communication other than content are im-
portant to ethnographers and discourse analysts. See RESPONSIBILITY AND EVIDENCE IN
ORAL DISCOURSE 1-22 (Jane H. Hill & Judith T. Irvine eds., 1993); cf. John M. Conley et
al., The Power of Language: Presentational Style in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1375
(whose subjects evaluated oral, not written, speech); Janet Sigal et al., The Effect of Presen-
tation Style and Sex of Lawyer on Jury Decision-Making Behavior, 22 PSYCHOL. 13, 17
(1985) (strongly encouraging use of videotape rather than transcripts in simulated jury re-
search). Moreover, non-verbal features of the lawyer's presentation (e.g., posture, position
in the courtroom, and physical appearance), as well as other elements of the performance
(e.g., the use of visual aids, the spectators, and the courtroom itself), may very well be
important to persuasion. See, e.g., Conley et al., supra, at 1379-86 (discussing effects of
"powerful" versus "powerless" speech); Sigal et al., supra, at 16-17 (use by defense counsel
in mock criminal trial of "passive" presentation style-low amount of eye contact, hesita-
tions, slowness of speech, and "general lack of assertiveness"-correlated with low acquit-
tal rate; no correlation between attorney's sex and conviction rate, regardless of
presentation style); Donald Vinson, Juries: Perception and the Decision-Making Process, 18
TRIAL 52, 54-55 (Mar. 1982) (suggesting that presentational factors such as pace of speech,
visual aids, etc. important in gaining and holding jurors' attention). Psychological research
has associated persuasiveness with, for instance, the speaker's credibility, attractiveness,
and power. See Linz & Penrod, supra note 20, at 29-45 & nn.98-156. The greater the credi-
bility of the communicator, the less counterarguing the listener will do, hence the more
uncritically the message will be accepted. Attractiveness obviously cannot be gleaned from
a transcript, and some of the determinants of perceived credibility, such as perceived ex-
pertise and trustworthiness, as well as such overt behaviors as pace of speech, usually can-
not be either. On the other hand, the more involving an issue, the less important the
credibility of the source; involved listeners will generate counterarguments, see Linz &
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Penrod, supra note 20, at 21, 23 (citing research of Richard Petty and John Cacioppo). Cf
Martin Fishbein & Icek Ajzen, Acceptance, Yielding and Impact: Cognitive Processes in
Persuasion, in COGNrvE RESPONSES IN PERSUASION 339-59 (Richard E. Petty et al. eds.,
1981) (demonstrating how message content is the most important factor in persuasion; few
reliable findings correlate factors such as message source (Le., credibility) or receiver (Le.,
self-esteem) with persuasiveness).
The words lawyers use, however, remain significant. Research indicates that "high-
involvement" listeners tend to focus on the quality of the argument rather than on noncon-
tent stimuli (see John A. Bargh, Automatic and Conscious Processing of Social Information,
in 3 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 31-33 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds.,
1984); see also Linz & Penrod, supra note 20, at 20-22 (citing research showing that inter-
ested listeners will process a message more diligently)), although it is unclear whether ju-
rors should be considered high-involvement listeners. See infra note 291 (noting ambiguity
of definition of "high-involvement" for purposes of applying literature on active cognition
to jurors). Furthermore, in many cases the persuasive effect of nonverbal factors may be
roughly balanced between the two sides; in other cases, a factor favoring one side may be
cancelled out by a different factor favoring the other. Thus, the verbal content of the argu-
ments is likely to remain important.
Third, closing arguments are an essential component of advocacy. Research indicates,
to be sure, that first impressions often have a lasting effect, reducing the incremental effect
of the summation. See Linz & Penrod, supra note 20, at 10-16 (discussing limits and qualifi-
cations of "primacy effect," with special application to the courtroom); see also Thomas A.
Pyszczynski & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The Effects of Opening Statements on Mock Ju-
rors' Verdicts in a Simulated Criminal Trial; 11 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL 301 (1981) (find-
ing that mock jurors are heavily influenced by first strong persuasive statement: a lengthy
prosecution opening coupled with a brief defense opening tended to yield guilty verdict,
while brief prosecution opening coupled with lengthy defense opening tended to yield not-
guilty verdict); H.P. Weld & E.R. Danzig, A Study of the Way in Which a Verdict is Reached
by a Jury, 53 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 518 (1940) (approximately one-quarter of jurors in mock
trial reached definite decision early in the trial; for most jurors, degree of certainty oscil-
lated throughout trial according to testimony and lawyers opening and closing statements).
But the closing argument is when the attorney brings the entire case together for the
jurors, in light of the evidence actually presented rather than that which she expected to be
presented. See RICHARD D. RIEKE & RANDALL K. STUTMAN, COMMUNICATION IN LEGAL
ADVoCACY 202 (1989) (importance of closing argument); TANFORD, TRIAL PROCESS,
supra note 15, at 369-70 (same); Valerie P. Hans & Krista Sweigart, Jurors' Views of Civil
Lawyers: Implications for Courtroom Communication, 68 IND. L.J. 1297, 1315-17 (1993)
(observing that both openings and closings are important because they create frameworks
for jurors to understand the case); see also sources cited in BETIYRUTH WALTER, THE
JURY SUMMATION AS SPEECH GENRE 7-8, 38 (1988) (76% of trial attorney respondents
thought that summation was "extremely important" in trial process; remaining 24% con-
sidered it important); but see HERBERT J. STERN, TRYING CASES TO WIN 129-32 (1991)
(opening arguments more important than closing arguments); E. Allan Lind & Gina Y. Ke,
Opening and Closing Statements, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCE-
DURE, at 232-33 (Saul Kassin and Lawrence Wrightsman eds., 1985) (suggesting that dis-
proportionate attention has been paid to closing statements at expense of opening
statements). Closings represent ways of conceiving of the case that the attorneys believe
the jurors may accept. It does not matter whether summations change jurors' minds about
the outcome; they would provide insight into how jurors evaluate the negligence case even
if they simply confirm the views many or all of the jurors already hold at the close of the
evidence. To be sure, actual jurors surveyed tend to say that closing arguments play little
role in their decisions. See, e.g., A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM., supra note 9, at 54 (8% of jurors
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surveyed in four complex cases believed that closing arguments changed their minds about
the outcome); Hans & Sweigart, supra, at 1314 (80% of jurors asked said that closing argu-
ments did not draw them to one side or the other). These jurors may have responded as
they did, however, in order to conform to the judges' admonitions that their decisions were
to be based on the evidence and the law and not on the arguments, see WALTER, supra, at
205-08; or, more generally, the jurors may simply not have been aware of the effect of the
closing arguments on their thinking. Cf. Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 13 (reviewing evi-
dence that people cannot reliably report on their higher-order cognitive processes).
The present research, moreover, has been guided by a practical concern. In Connecti-
cut federal district courts, as a matter of practice rather than local rule, attorneys are usu-
ally not permitted to make opening arguments; therefore, only closing arguments are
available.
SAMPLE SIZE. The present research is largely qualitative, not quantitative. I have not
examined enough transcripts to offer generalizations about, say, the average rate at which
attorneys use rhetorical questions in closing arguments. See infra notes 294-313 and accom-
panying text (quantitative analysis of microlinguistic events in closing arguments). But in-
terpretive validity itself is valuable. Discourse analysis (like much of history, anthropology,
and other sciences of unique human events) depends largely on interpretation. See Wether-
ell & Potter, supra note 17, at 161 ("For discourse analysts the success of a study is not in
the least dependent on sample size" because a small sample may generate a large number
of interesting and important linguistic patterns); cf. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 29 (1984) (in lexicographic practice, a word may be added to a new edition of
the dictionary on the basis of a handful of confirmed uses; "[t]here is no magic number of
citations that guarantees entry."). The study of specific lawyering practices in context may
not even be amenable to broad sampling. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling Stories and
Stories About Them, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 9 (1994) (offering an example and defense of
interpretive study of narratives in a single case); see generally THE RHETORIC OF LAW
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1994) (including several rhetorical analyses of
single cases or other events). In any event, initial interpretive forays such as the present
research may provide guidelines for more comprehensive samplings of legal discourse in
the future.
The sample of cases, although small, also does not appear to be biased in any ways
that are significant for the present research. Cases decided by juries are certainly atypical,
accounting for only two to five percent of all cases filed. See Galanter, supra note 3, at 74 &
nn.37-38 (finding that percentage of federal cases tried to juries declined from 5.1% in 1961
to 2.0% in 1991; similar figures apply to state courts); Priest, supra note 3, at 128 & n.54
(2% to 4% of cases filed in Cook County from 1959 to 1979 tried to juries); Saks, Do We
Really Know?, supra note 8, at 1230 & n.294 (noting that juries decided 1.6% to 4.7% of
state court tort cases in 1988, based on National Center for State Courts report). It is true,
moreover, that transcripts are ordinarily available only if the case is worth enough for at
least one of the parties to order daily copies, or if the case is appealed, which also tends to
occur in accident cases only if the case is worth a substantial amount. In three of the four
cases studied, the damages sought or awarded exceeded $1 million. But this does not bias
the sample with respect to any of the cognitive dynamics examined other than the severity
effect. See infra notes 258-84 and accompanying text. And even though the sample includes
few if any nonsevere injuries, if the attorneys' discourse in these cases does not suggest that
jurors are subject to the severity effect, the research would provide evidence refuting the
effect, which would itself be a worthwhile finding.
THE IMPORTANCE OF RHETORIC. The project of studying attorneys' rhetoric seems to
run up against the observation of J. Alexander Tanford, who has written that "jurors are
not swayed by extralegal tricks, techniques and rhetoric of lawyers," but instead "base
their decisions on the merits of the case as filtered through their common sense."
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case, Butler v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.,7 referring to others as
appropriate.
Butler is a fairly simple case. George Butler, a truck driver, was
sent by his company to pick up a load of industrial machinery at Re-
vere's plant and take it back to be fixed at his company's shop. Re-
vere's employees loaded the machinery onto Butler's truck with a
crane. Butler then tried to put a tarpaulin over the load; he fell,
landed on his head, and was seriously injured. There was no evidence
of how he fell: no one saw him fall, and he did not remember what
happened.
The facts, for the most part, were not in dispute. But causation,
reasonableness, and responsibility were very much in dispute. The ac-
cident might have been Butler's fault, or the fault of Revere's employ-
ees who did not help him with the tarpaulin, or the fault of no one.
What sort of thinking by jurors do lawyers seek to promote in such a
case?
TANFORD, TRiAL PROCESS, supra note 15, at 15 & n.10. My response to this observation is
twofold. First, although research based on posttrial interviews and simulated trials has
shown that the evidence is the single most important determinant of jury decisions, id. at
15; Visher, supra note 14, at 13-14; cf. Linz & Penrod, supra note 20, at 34-35 (who poiit
out that trial preparation, the major determinant of perceived expertise, is an overriding
factor in persuasiveness), it is not the only one. Rhetoric would be especially important in
the considerable range of cases in which the evidence is fairly evenly balanced. Cf Barbara
F. Reskin & Christy A. Visher, The Impacts of Evidence and Extralegal Factors in Jurors'
Decisions, 20 LAW & Soc'y REv. 423, 434-36 (1986) (in "strong" cases in which prosecu-
tion presented more hard evidence, jurors' decisions were not affected by extralegal factors
such as parties' personal characteristics; in "weak" cases, jurors were heavily influenced by
their own values and by parties' characteristics, and in weak cases "in which the defend-
ant's guilt was ambiguous because the prosecution did not present enough hard evi-
dence .... jurors-forced to arrive at a decision-were apparently swayed by their own
values and reactions to the defendants and victims"). In the negligence cases examined in
this Article, the dispositive issues are ones like "reasonableness," with respect to which the
evidence often does not dictate the result, even when the observable "what happened" is
not in dispute. Note also that in cases tried under comparative negligence where both par-
ties are arguably at fault (as in all of the cases studied in this Article), the exact apportion-
ment decision is likely to be a close call even if the evidence of each party's fault is clear.
Second, it may be that Tanford, at least as indicated by the quotation above, has too
narrow a view of "rhetoric" and too simple a view of "common sense." Rather, it is pre-
cisely the way lawyers argue that may provide insights into that "common sense"-how
jurors think when they're "at their best," not obviously swayed by emotion or prejudice.
See NiSBETr & Ross, supra note 13, at 12-13, 228-31 (on "cold" cognition); see also CLuF-
FORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 85 (1983) ("common sense" is how we think when
we're not thinking about it).
22. No. Civ. N-87-476 (WWE) (D. Conn. 1990). All citations to the transcripts are as
follows: a letter indicating the case (e.g., "B" for Butler, "G" for Giulietti), page number,
line number. All references to Butler are to the transcript of proceedings dated April 27,
1990, unless otherwise indicated.
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Here is how Butler's attorney begins his summation:
George Frederick Butler, he should be an inspiration for all of
us. He got on the stand and told you about how he tries to do the
best he can do with what he has left. That's something that we
should all aspire to and, I don't know about you, but when he was
answering those questions I felt it was something that I would like
to aspire to and that we hope we all do and it sort of made me a
little ashamed of the times that maybe I complain about the little
things that go wrong in my life because the little things that go
wrong in our lives don't nearly compare to what Mr. Butler has
gone through. He's beaten all the odds. He told you he continues to
fight. "I want to reach that highest plateau," I think is the word that
he used, and he wants to reach a higher and higher plateau.23
Butler's attorney then spends more than forty percent of his
argument in chief detailing his client's skull fracture and its conse-
quences-impaired memory, hearing loss, headaches, severe depres-
sion, and more-even though the medical evidence is undisputed.24
Yet he disclaims any intention to play to the jurors' sympathy:
[Butler is] here not asking for your charity, simply because he's
not a person who ever asks for that. What he's asking you to do is
give him what he's legally entitled to, what the law says he should
have. He was injured because of what Revere did and that makes
them legally obligated to compensate him for what they did.25
The lawyer then tells the story of the accident:
Now, let me tell you why they are legally responsible. On Janu-
ary 20, 1986, [Butler's] life changed and it didn't have to be changed
this way.... Robert Brown [Butler's supervisor] told you ... that
the original order for the equipment to be picked up at Revere
was ... some kind of generator, some other kind of device. When
George got up to the plant, somebody at Revere told him, "You got
all these things to put on." Other things [in addition to the original
order] to put on the truck. George said, "Let me call back and I'll
see what happens." He calls up Bob Brown... [who] says, "Look,
they are a good customer. Do the best you can." And George is the
type of person, I think we all know by now, he's going to give his
best shot and he did, and he directed the crane operator at Revere
and they managed to get all of the equipment on the truck. Revere
wasn't satisfied with that, and you can look at the various changes in
the invoices. ...
Revere wants it tarped. Now, Bob Brown doesn't understand
why they want it tarped and I don't understand why they want it
tarped but they want it tarped. Bob Brown told you when those
generators come in, they are steam washed so what difference does





"Look, if they want them on the truck upside down, do whatever
you can." And George, being the type of person he is, says, "I'm
going to try to do it." George takes a... tarp that weighed two
hundred pounds, approximately, and he starts tarping that load.
And he's got a heavy load, equipment that weighs thousands of
pounds, and he's climbing up on the equipment trying to pull that
tarp all by himself, and at least three [Revere employees], and we
had to read these depositions to you because those people weren't
here .... said they saw him struggling with that tarp. He was having
trouble-that equipment is not the nice square little packages or
round packages. All sort of jagged edges, so it's getting caught on all
the edges. Al Brockway [one of Revere's employees] talks to him
for up to ten minutes while he's putting the tarp on, watching him
struggling .... [L]et me just read two questions and answers [from
Brockway's deposition] to you because I think they are the essence
of what Revere did wrong.
My next question, "Is a part of your job to, say, take measures
that will prevent people from being injured?"
Answer, "Yes, sir."
What did Mr. Brockway do? Mr. Brockway didn't lift a finger
to help him with that canvas. Mr. Brockway, like everyone
else... who was in the area, went on their 5:30 coffee break because
they weren't going to do anything. It was coffee break time. "And
we're going to have our coffee break and good luck, George, with
the canvas. Goodbye. We're going to have our danish and our coffee
and we don't care what you're doing." ... [L]ater on in his deposi-
tion, I said, "Mr. Brockway, tell me again how come you didn't help
him?" He said, "Well, maybe, morally, I should have." Well, yeah,
you should have. But he didn't. And I even went so far to ask him,
"Mr. Brockway, did you think it was a one-man job?" No, sir. He
knew it wasn't a one-man job, but he did nothing, absolutely noth-
ing. What would it have taken to walk to the edge of the truck,
straighten out the canvas a little bit, so that George could pull it a
little easier?...
It's that kind of attitude, it's that kind of carelessness that re-
sulted in this injury. Wouldn't have taken very much. Mr. Brockway
told you it was his job. And he didn't do it. He didn't do it for the
sake of a cup of coffee.26
In the remainder of the argument in chief, nearly a quarter of it,
counsel speaks to the jurors about damages:
Now, when you go in and deliberate, the Judge will give you
instructions on the law and I'm sure he'll talk about the testimony
and the evidence. You're ultimately going to come down with the
responsibility of trying to figure out how to evaluate this case.
26. B. 24.4-27.24.
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Now, how to award damages to Mr. Butler, and that's a very
difficult chore and there is no formula....
•.. I don't envy your task. It's a difficult, very difficult task.
Now, you hold his only chance. This is the last place, the only
place he can come. You're the only people who can attempt to
make him whole, as far as money can do it. Granted, money really
can't do it .... How can you compare [the damage figure the attor-
ney suggests] to what Mr. Butler has gone through since 1986 and is
going to have to continue to go through for the rest of his life? I
don't know. But it's a job that you've been chosen to do and I have
full confidence that you'll make your best effort to do.27
Just what are we to make of this kind of talk? Much of it may
sound perfectly unremarkable, even cich6d. But why should a lawyer
who knows that jurors will be instructed28 to consider all elements of
27. B. 27.25-28.6, 30.4-23.
28. The judge's instructions in Butler (B. 40.3-71.11) are nearly half again as long as
both closing arguments combined. The instructions on the elements of the prima facie case
and comparative negligence occupy about forty percent of the total (B. 52.5-65.23). Ex-
cerpts follow:
Okay. Here's where we go to the law. I'll tell you about the law in this case.
You've got to take the law from me. If you think the law is wrong and ought to be
changed, you go to Congress or try to persuade the Courts through really law
journal articles that are written, things like that, to change the law, but the law is
as I give you the law.
In this case, the plaintiff is claiming money damages to make him whole....
The theory of the plaintiff is that the defendant was negligent. Now, to prevail in
this case, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence [the judge
has already explained this concept] that the defendant was negligent and that
such negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries to the plaintiff.... The
claim of the plaintiff here is that the defendant, through the defendant's employ-
ees, was negligent in leaving the plaintiff to tarp the cargo of that truck on his
own, and that negligence is what caused his injury. There are two essential ele-
ments to the claim. One, that the defendant's employees were negligent in a man-
ner specified by the plaintiff and that their negligence was a proximate cause of
the injuries to George Butler. If the plaintiff fails to prove either one of those
elements by a preponderance of the evidence, then you must find in favor of the
defendant, Revere.
Negligence is a breach of the duty that one party owes to another party. It is
the doing of some act that a reasonably prudent person would not do under simi-
lar circumstances, or the failure to do something that a reasonably prudent person
would do under similar circumstances. In other words, it's the failure to use ordi-
nary care under the circumstances. Ordinary care is never an absolute. In decid-
ing whether a person has used ordinary care in a given situation, you must
consider the person's conduct in light of all of the surrounding circumstances
shown by the evidence in the case. Ordinary care is not necessarily the care which
you personally think ought to have been used, but that care which a reasonably
prudent person would have used. The standard is that of a reasonably prudent
person, not a careless person, not an ultra-careful one, but a reasonably prudent
one.
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That standard must be considered in light of the obligation of George Butler
to assure himself that his load was safely secured before driving the truck. Now,
you've heard that the control here is not disputed, the responsibility and contract
for loading the truck was clearly on the plaintiff....
One test of the extent of a duty of ordinary care is to be found in the foresee-
ability that harm may result if that care is not exercised....
In assessing whether an entity charged with negligence has or has not used
ordinary care, you must consider all of the surrounding circumstances, and cir-
cumstances of slight danger, a slight amount of care might be sufficient to consti-
tute ordinary care under the circumstances, while in circumstances of great
danger, a corresponding higher degree of care would be required .... In other
words, I say to you that one thing you could consider is a pilot in an airplane has
to take a little bit more care in his daily operation of that airplane than perhaps
the driver of a subway train on prescribed tracks has to exercise....
All right. The plaintiff must prove that the defendant, through its employees,
was negligent by a preponderance of the evidence, as I've described that term.
There is never a presumption that just because someone has been injured that
anyone was negligent or that anyone was at fault in causing that injury.
The plaintiff must do more than prove the negligence of the defendant. The
plaintiff must prove that the negligence was a proximate cause or a substantial
factor of causing injury to George Butler. Proximate cause, as we use that phrase
in the law, means that cause or act which, as a natural sequence, produces the
injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. In other words, the
defendant's conduct, if found to be negligent, must be a substantial factor in pro-
ducing the injury and not a mere condition of or incident to the injury.
This does not mean that the law recognizes only one proximate cause, con-
sisting of only one factor or thing, or the conduct of only one person causing the
harm. On the contrary, many factors or things, or the conduct of more than one
person, may operate at the same time, either independently or together, to cause
harm; and in such case, each may be a proximate cause....
If the plaintiff should prove the defendant to have been negligent through its
employees, but should fail to prove that such lack of proper care was a material or
essential cause of the plaintiff's injuries, then the plaintiff would not be entitled to
recover and your verdict would be for Revere. So, let's discuss this comparative
negligence situation.
The defendants allege that the plaintiff was negligent in his own conduct. The
defendant says in effect that if the plaintiff was injured, it was because of his
negligence and not because of negligence or omissions on the part of the defend-
ant's employees. The plaintiff was under the duty to use the same standard of care
for his own safety and to avoid suffering injury as a reasonably prudent person
would under the circumstances... and the defendant has a right to assume that
the plaintiff will take this ordinary care for his own safety. ... This is exactly the
same kind type of duty I told you about as being incumbent on the defendant....
Now, what do you do if you find that there is comparative negligence in this
case? If you find that the plaintiff, George Butler, was comparatively negligent,
then you must consider what we call in Connecticut the comparative negligence
rule. That rule provides that in a cause of action based upon negligence, the plain-
tiff's negligence shall bar recovery if such negligence was equal to or greater than
the negligence of the defendant. If the plaintiff's negligence was less than the
November 1995]
the prima facie case spend only the few paragraphs quoted above on
the highly contested issues of duty, breach, and causation, and the
largest portion of his argument on the undisputed issue of his client's
injuries? Why should characterizing George Butler as a "fighter" be at
all relevant to jurors' determination of who is responsible for the acci-
dent? Defendant Revere's attorney uses a rather lengthy analogy to
explain why his client's employees had no duty to help Butler with the
tarpaulin; is this likely to lead jurors to conclude that Revere was not
responsible? 29 Is it significant that lawyers sometimes discuss the case
by addressing jurors in the second person? And what, if anything,
does drawing jurors' attention to their responsibility for deciding have
to do with how the lawyers want them to decide? In short, what are
advocates presuming about how jurors think about responsibility for
accidents, if so much of the argument apparently has so little to do
with the legal doctrine of negligence on which the jurors are
instructed?30
negligence of the defendant, then any damages allowed shall be diminished by the
proportion of the negligence attributable to the plaintiff.
And I'll explain that as follows: if you combine every act and omission of the
plaintiff and the defendant which you find contributed to the plaintiff's inju-
ries,then you have a total of 100 percent of the negligence involved. You must
then determine how that 100 percent is to be apportioned between these parties.
That is, you assign a percentage figure to each party that represents the degree of
negligence you find applicable to that party....
B. 52.5-54.3, 54.13-15, 54.22-55.8, 55.17-22, 56.12-57.3, 57.10-58.4, 58.22-59.15. The judge
then instructs the jurors on damages (60.9-65.23), how to complete the interrogatory or
special verdict form (59.16-19, 65.24-69.3), and the deliberation process (69.4-71.11). An
hour into deliberations, the jurors asked to hear the full definition of negligence again, and
the judge repeated his charge on all items other than damages (74.21-82.4).
29. Revere's attorney argues:
Let's bring it down to something that all of us are familiar with. Let us as-
sume that a piece of equipment in our own home, a combination ice box/deep
freeze for example, breaks down. We call a repair person. They say, "We've got to
take it to our shop." He can't fix it in your kitchen. It's heavy. I wouldn't expect
one of you ladies to help him, but one of the gentlemen being at home might
willingly assist that driver in putting the equipment, a refrigerator/freezer on the
driver's truck and then you walk away. You go back about your business. It isn't
your job to secure or do anything further with respect to that load. And then
while that truck is parked in your driveway, the driver, for some unknown reason,
falls from the truck and is injured. Does that make you legally liable? Does that
oblige you to pay compensation to this truck driver? Certainly not. It would be
ridiculous. And that, on a larger scale, is exactly what the situation was in this
case.
B. 33.22-34.13.
30. Persuasion, of course, encompasses more than an appeal to reason. Classical rhe-
torical theory includes appeals to the character of the speaker (the ethical argument) and
the emotions of the listener (the pathetic argument) as well as to reason (the logical argu-
ment). See ARISTOTLE, RHETORIc bk. 1, ch. 2, at 1356 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., 1954);
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
Several knowledge structures and inferential habits-a collection
rather than a formal model-help us to answer these questions.3 1 The
first is prototype theory, which posits that we organize what we know
about people and situations into categories oriented around proto-
types. Jurors' prototypes of the "reasonable person," for example,
may consist of exemplars or best instances of "reasonable behavior
under the circumstances," often in narrative form, or a summary of
features abstracted from individuals they perceive to be reasonable.
When asked to decide whether a party behaved reasonably, jurors,
according to the prototype theory, would compare features of the per-
son and the person's conduct to the characteristic features of the pro-
totype, and classify the party's conduct as "reasonable" if it
sufficiently resembles the prototype.3 2
The second relevant tool of ordinary judgment is the simulation
heuristic. When asked to identify the cause of an outcome, especially a
negative one (e.g., an accident), people tend to imagine how things
might have turned out otherwise. They mentally simulate a
counterfactual scenario that does not contain the accident; they do so
more easily when they believe the actual events leading to the acci-
dent are unusual. Jurors employing the simulation heuristic would se-
lect as the cause of the accident the actual event preceding the
accident that most stands out as deviant or unusual, because that is the
event that can most easily be imagined to have occurred otherwise-
the event that can most readily be mentally "undone" so as to avoid
the accident.33
CoRBETT, supra note 20, at 37-94 (discussing the three modes of persuasion). Some of what
we find in closing arguments certainly reflects ethical and emotional appeals, but this does
not undermine this Article's presumption that the logical appeal is crucial to the persua-
siveness of summations.
More specifically, the logical arguments attorneys make to jurors may be understood
in terms of the classical rhetorical model of the enthymeme. The enthymeme differs from
the deductive syllogism in that (1) it is based on a major premise whose truth is probable
rather than certain, and (2) the major premise is usually implicit. Enthymematic argument
is peculiarly suited to rhetoric because the truths of human behavior, the subject of foren-
sic advocacy, are generalizations, not the certainties of classical geometry or physics. See
CORBETr, supra note 20, at 59-66. My effort to describe some of the cognitive frameworks
attorneys think jurors will bring to bear in the accident case is thus analogous to the search
for the implicit major premises in enthymematic argument.
31. I do not contend that these are the only structures or heuristics relevant to jurors'
decision-making in general or in negligence cases in particular. For discussions of other
relevant cognitive psychological processes, see sources cited supra note 15. Nor are all of
these cognitive dynamics equally important, or even necessarily present, in every accident
case.
32. See infra notes 60-139 and accompanying text (prototype theory).
33. See infra notes 140-81 and accompanying text (simulation heuristic).
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A third inferential habit jurors may employ is the fundamental
attribution error. People tend to attribute other people's behavior and
its (negative) consequences to those people's enduring dispositions or
traits, while attributing their own behavior and its (negative) conse-
quences to the circumstances. In other words, "I acted as I did be-
cause anyone in that situation would have behaved similarly; but he
acted as he did because he is that kind of guy." Jurors who commit the
fundamental attribution error when determining responsibility for an
accident would tend to think that at least one of the parties must be at
fault, and would attribute that fault based on a perception that one of
the parties is the sort of person who deserves blame. 34
A fourth judgmental habit is described by the severity effect. Peo-
ple's assessments of responsibility for negative outcomes tend to be
biased by the severity of the harm: the more serious the victim's inju-
ries, the more at fault the person who caused those injuries is judged
to be. That is, the gravity of the harm influences not just the damage
award (as it ought to), but also the attribution of responsibility, to
which it ought to be irrelevant. The severity effect indicates that jurors
may hold defendants in negligence cases liable for reasons other than
proof of legal fault.35
In addition, jurors may cognitively "frame" the case in different
ways. They may conceive of the evidence and the arguments as a de-
scription of an objective reality-of events that took place in a world
"out there" and that dictate the assignment of responsibility. But ju-
rors may participate more actively in the creation of legal reality; in
this cognitive frame, assigning responsibility is a performance rather
than a passive "read-off' of reality.36
This collection of judgmental tools leads us to expect certain pat-
terns in the ways that lawyers try to persuade jurors to reason about
fault, causation, and responsibility. In general, we would expect each
attorney to offer the jurors counterfactual scenarios in which the other
party took some precaution that prevented the accident. At the same
time, the attorney would try to describe the actual accident story so
that her client's conduct matches prototypes of good behavior under
the circumstances and the other party's conduct deviates from those
prototypes. We would also expect the lawyer to describe the personal-
ities of the parties in ways that lead jurors to conclude that the client is
the type of person who acts in conformance with prototypes of reason-
34. See infra notes 182-257 and accompanying text (fundamental attribution error).
35. See infra notes 258-84 and accompanying text (severity effect).
36. See infra notes 285-313 and accompanying text (cognitive framing).
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able behavior (i.e., in such a way as not to cause accidents like the one
at issue in the case at bar) and that the other party is the sort of per-
son who acts irresponsibly. Finally, we would expect the lawyer who
believes that the client would be disadvantaged by a passive approach
to the case to engage jurors as more active decision-makers.
In this Part, I will begin with a general description of knowledge
structures and judgmental heuristics. I will then examine in greater
detail the specific structures and heuristics we would expect jurors to
use. For each of these, I will briefly survey the leading research and
then apply those findings to the attorneys' arguments. In Part III, I
will conclude by summarizing what the cognitive analysis of rhetoric
can teach us about negligence in action.
B. Knowledge Structures and Judgmental Heuristics
Jurors who decide a negligence case must make judgments. Ac-
cording to doctrine, the most important of these are typically: did this
defendant and this plaintiff behave reasonably? And if not, did the
defendant's or the plaintiff's carelessness (or both) cause the plaintiff's
injuries? What makes these judgments difficult, even under the best of
decision-making conditions, is that they are uncertain. The juror may
know to a greater or lesser extent what the defendant did, but not
whether to characterize it as blameworthy; the juror may know more
or less "what happened," but not why it happened. The juror must go
"beyond the information given," in Jerome Bruner's famous phrase,37
to infer a conclusion.
People make judgments under conditions of uncertainty all the
time; they classify, predict, and attribute causal responsibility on the
basis of imperfect information. 38 Which candidate for the job should I
hire? Can I trust what this person is telling me? Why did that person's
marriage break up? In these and countless other instances, people
make inferences from the limited information available to them.
Cognitive and social psychology indicate that people intuitively
use two general sorts of tools to make such judgments. People define
and interpret information in terms of knowledge structures, and use
judgmental heuristics to make inferences from what they know to
what they do not know.3 9 Without these knowledge structures,
37. JEROME BRUNER, BEYOND THE INFORMATION GIVEN (1973).
38. The classic work is JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
39. See generally NiSBETF & Ross, supra note 13, at 6-8 (discussing the intuitive tools
of "knowledge structures" and "developmental heuristics").
November 1995] THIE RHETORIC OF TORTS
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
thought would be nearly inconceivable; our mental life would be anar-
chic and unintelligible.40 Judgmental heuristics reduce complex infer-
ential tasks to relatively simple, feasible operations.41 Together, these
ways of organizing and using information allow people to make the
innumerable interpretations and decisions necessary for everyday
functioning without psychic overload. They are useful whether the ob-
ject of knowledge is nonsocial or, as in the case of juror judgments
about fellow human beings, social.42 And while people typically em-
ploy these judgmental tools to make relatively rapid, even "auto-
matic," judgments, they are also involved in the more deliberate
processes of juror decision-making. 43
People perceive, store, and retrieve what they know in terms of
knowledge structures such as theories, schemas, scripts, and cultural
40. SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 97 (2d ed. 1991).
41. NISBETT & Ross, supra note 13, at 7.
42. There is some disagreement among social and cognitive psychologists whether
cognitive processes differ for social and nonsocial objects of knowledge. See, e.g., Thomas
M. Ostrom, The Sovereignty of Social Cognition, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION,
supra note 21, at 1, 7-17 (contrasting social and nonsocial knowledge). For a list of differ-
ences between social cognition and nonsocial cognition generally, see FISKE & TAYLOR,
supra note 40, at 18-19.
Note that the juror judgments with which this Article is concerned differ from many
social judgments in ordinary life in at least three ways. First, jurors have the opportunity to
ponder; they are not expected to make the sorts of snap judgments often required of us
when we, for instance, engage in a conversation. But see infra note 43 (discussing automatic
versus deliberate information processing and heuristics). Second, jurors confer with one
another, and this group decision-making may mitigate an individual juror's erroneous use
of structures or heuristics. See NISBE-r & Ross, supra note 13, at 266-67 (but note that the
best predictors of jury decisions are the jurors' initial views at the start of deliberations; see
supra note 14). Third, jurors are not engaged in interaction with the object of their judg-
ment, as is the case in much social cognition; rather, they are mere observers (even if jurors
"frame" the case actively rather than passively (see infra notes 285-313 and accompanying
text), they cannot adjust their judgments based on feedback from the parties).
43. For the position that jurors tend (or would be expected) to process information
using conscious, systematic strategies rather than intuitive heuristics, see Tanford &
Tanford, supra note 15, at 751-52 and nn.63-68; cf Steven J. Sherman & Eric Corty, Cogni-
tive Heuristics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNMON, supra note 21, at 189, 245-46 (not-
ing that the more important the task, the greater the decision-maker's reliance on formal,
systematic reasoning rather than heuristics). But cf. Galen V. Bodenhausen & Meryl Lich-
tenstein, Social Stereotypes and Information-Processing Strategies: The Impact of Task
Complexity, 52 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 871 (1987) (showing that the more com-
plex the judgmental task, the greater the reliance on heuristics, specifically stereotypes). It
seems to me that even though jurors are likely to conceive of their task as important, to a
great extent they lack systematic, normative models for reasoning: Le., there is no rule-like
way to determine "reasonableness," at least not according to the standard jury instructions.
See infra note 86 and accompanying text. And prototype analysis suggests that jurors are
likely to override the formal reasoning method (rule-element analysis) when determining
liability. See infra notes 67-74, 78-79 and accompanying text.
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models. These structures are used to describe how the world is and
how it works.44 For instance, people have a schema for "dog" which
contains certain features. This schema allows them to decide whether
the source of a given, potentially ambiguous set of stimuli is a dog.
And if they decide that it is, that decision creates a set of expectations
and inferences about other, as yet unknown features of the animal.45
A script, similarly, is a structure for a social event or series of
events. By prescribing one or more scenarios for how things typically
happen, and thus defining the social roles of the people involved, the
script guides how people perceive and remember actual events, class-
ify and understand the participants' behavior, and judge whether that
behavior is normal or deviant. It also guides how people infer missing
information from what is explicitly provided.46 For instance, if some-
one says only that "John went to a restaurant. He asked the waitress
for coq au vin. He paid the check and left," the "restaurant script"
allows the listener to infer that John ate the food he ordered-an
event not actually mentioned in the account.47 A cultural model for a
complex concept like "marriage" may combine schemas (for what
constitutes a marriage) and scripts (for how marriages are supposed to
proceed) into an implicit framework that allows people to make sense
of marital successes, difficulties, and dissolutions.48
44. See NANCY CANTOR & JOHN F. KniLSTROM, PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL INTELLI-
GENCE 78-106 (1987); Fis, E & TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 96-179; NISBETr & Ross, supra
note 13, at 28-35; Keith J. Holyoak & Peter C. Gordon, Information Processing and Social
Cognition, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note 21, at 39, 47-51; David E.
Rumelhart, Schemata and the Cognitive System, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL. COGNITION,
supra note 21, at 161; Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Sallie E. Gordon, The Cognitive Representa-
tion of Social Information, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNmON, supra note 21, at 73.
For a survey of the literature, especially as it relates to personality, see Jerome L. Singer &
Peter Salovey, Organized Knowledge Structures and Personality: Person Schemas, Self
Schemas, Prototypes, and Scripts, in PERSON SCHEMAS AND MALADAPTIVE INTERPER-
SONAL PATTERNS 33-79 (Mardi J. Horowitz ed., 1991).
45. NISBETr & Ross, supra note 13, at 32-33. "[U]pon deciding on the basis of a par-
ticular animal's appearance that it is a 'dog,' one makes the inferential leaps that it is
trainable, capable of loyalty, able to bark, and likely to chase cats but is unlikely to climb
trees, purr, or wash its coat." Id at 33. On the contrast between the "classical" view of
schema classification or category membership and the prototype view, see infra note 60 and
accompanying text.
46. A classic work is ROGER C. ScRANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS,
GOALS AND UNDERSTANDING (1977); see also FisKE & TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 119-20;
NisBErr & Ross, supra note 13, at 34-35 (describing various scripts).
47. See SCHANK & ABELSON, supra note 46, at 36-68 (discussing applications of the
restaurant script).
48. See Naomi Quinn, Convergent Evidence for a Cultural Model of Marriage, in CUL-
TURAL MODELS, supra note 14, at 173-92.
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These sorts of knowledge structures, as noted above, are neces-
sary for thinking and understanding, but they can also lead to errors
when used inappropriately.49 If a person thinks he sees a cat in the
49. The use of knowledge structures and heuristics does not in and of itself entail
judgmental bias or error (see infra notes 52, 55-57 and accompanying text). Scientists as
well as laypeople use knowledge structures and heuristics. Hence, NISBETr AND Ross,
supra note 13, at 3, call laypeople "intuitive scientists." (See infra for a discussion of the
appropriateness of positing this as a norm for the inferential processes of ordinary people.)
But laypeople tend to differ from professional scientists by using structures and heuristics
inappropriately. See NisBErr & Ross, supra note 13, at 7-10, 17-18.
Although Nisbett and Ross are concerned with inferential error (as the subtitle of
their book indicates: "Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment"), they take pains to
explain that it may be perfectly sensible for laypeople to use the cognitive structures and
heuristics they describe. As noted supra text accompanying notes 40-41, some structuring
and employment of heuristics is absolutely necessary to get on with life at all. Moreover, it
is often quite rational for people to rely on such heuristics rather than to take the time and
expense to gather and analyze information to the extent that would be required to make
inferences according to professional scientific standards. See NIsBE-rr & Ross, supra note
13, at 254-55 (noting the benefits of intuitive heuristics); FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 40,
at 13 (finding that ordinary people are "cognitive misers" who make pragmatic use of lim-
ited cognitive capacities); id. at 395-97 (general evaluation of processes of social inference);
see also David M. Messick, Equality as a Decision Heuristic, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES ON JUSTICE 11, 12-13 (Barbara A. Mellers & Jonathan Baron eds., 1993) (arguing
that decision heuristics often are efficient and roughly as successful as normative decision-
making procedures); Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past
Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 323-24 (1990) (explaining
that hindsight bias (discussed infra note 193) "represents the dark side of successful learn-
ing and judgment," and may even be optimal in many judgment tasks).
Even so, reviewers of Human Inference have responded that Nisbett and Ross have
drawn an unduly negative picture of human inferential skills. Elizabeth Loftus & Lee Roy
Beach, Human Inference and Judgment. Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 939 (1982). For instance, it has been argued that the research Nisbett and Ross pres-
ent is based on static, individual inferential tasks, while in real life decision-making is dy-
namic, occurring in sequences of tasks over a period of time, and in the course of this
ongoing decision-making we receive feedback, are able to correct for earlier misjudgments,
and are usually able to "keep things generally on track." Id at 955. This may be true in
general, but it does not apply to juror determinations of reasonableness and responsibility,
in which the evidence is presented, the attorneys summarize it for the jurors. and the jurors
decide; thus juror decision-making, although complicated, takes place without the benefit
of feedback (cf. Galanter, supra note 3, on jury as discontinuous decision-maker). In any
event, this Article does not need to take a position on the half empty/half full question. (It
may be of interest to note that in the years since the publication of Human Inference,
Nisbett and others have conducted research indicating that laypeople may improve their
inferential practices by learning and using rules of statistical, causal, and cost-benefit rea-
soning instead of the heuristics and biases identified in earlier research. See RULES FOR
REASONING (Richard E. Nisbett ed., 1993).)
For an argument that cognitive habits that appear to reflect bias or error when people
are conceived of as "intuitive scientists" may be quite rational if people are conceived of as
"intuitive politicians" who make decisions under conditions of accountability to various
constituencies, see Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and
Choice: Toward a Social Contingency Model in 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 331, 352-56 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992) (discussing how preconceptions can
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yard and accordingly approaches it with the intention of petting it, he
will be unpleasantly surprised if the animal turns out to be a raccoon
and he does not adjust his schema appropriately.
People also use judgmental heuristics to go from the information
they have to a needed classification, prediction, or attribution.50 Two
of the most important are the availability and representativeness
heuristics. Using the availability heuristic, people judging the fre-
quency or predicting the likelihood of certain events, or judging the
causal relationship between events, tend to be influenced by the acces-
sibility of the events to their perception, memory, or imagination.51
Where the most accessible events are also the most frequent, prob-
able, or causally efficacious, the availability heuristic will lead to cor-
rect inferences. For example, if asked to estimate whether more words
begin with "R" or "L," people would answer by sampling their mem-
ory rather than by counting entries in a-dictionary. Finding words be-
ginning with "R" easier to recall, they would be likely to guess that
such words are more frequent than words beginning with "L"-and
they would be correct.5 2 But the most accessible information is not
always the most frequent or probable.5 3 In such cases, using the avail-
ability heuristic can lead to mistakes. For instance, people estimate the
number of words beginning with "R" to be greater than the number of
words with "R" as the third letter, even though the latter are much
more numerous, because it is easier to recall words beginning with
Using the representativeness heuristic, people classify unfamiliar
objects by "assess[ing] the degree to which the salient features of the
object are representative of, or similar to, the features presumed to be
characteristic of the category."55 "[T]he representativeness heuristic is
a legitimate, indeed absolutely essential, cognitive tool, ' 56 and often
create judgmental biases and offering several methods to limit their effect). Tetlock's ob-
servations may have some limited relevance to juror decision-making, because jurors usu-
ally will have to explain their positions to one another during deliberations, although
collectively they are not accountable to the public (see supra note 7 on jury's insulation
from public scrutiny).
50. See FisKE & TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 381-91; NISBETr & Ross; supra note 13, at
17-28; Sherman & Corty, supra note 43.
51. NISB=r & Ross, supra note 13, at 18-23.
52. Id- at 23.
53. Our perception, storage, and retrieval of information are biased by such factors as
how striking the information is (its salience) and the subjective features of our knowledge
base. See id. at 19-23.
54. Id. at 19, 21.
55. Id. at 24.
56. Id. at 27.
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yields correct classifications. For instance, people tend to believe that
outcomes resemble the process that produced them, so that a random
process should yield results that look random. People are therefore
correct to suspect that an all-white or all-male jury is more likely to
have been the result of biased selection than is a jury that represents
the general population more proportionately.57 But like other cogni-
tive tools, the representativeness heuristic can lead to error when used
inappropriately. For example, people tend to believe that any sample
of outcomes, however small, generated by a random process must it-
self appear random; hence the "gambler's fallacy" that after a run of
heads, the next flip of the coin is more likely to be tails because a
sequence including heads and tails better matches the random process
of flipping the coin.58 The representativeness heuristic also underlies
the belief that causes must resemble effects: for instance, the wide-
spread prescientific belief that the cause of (or the cure for) an illness
must resemble the symptoms or their opposites (e.g., the belief that
drinking milk is good for an upset stomach because it "coats" the "ir-
ritated lining" of the stomach).59
These basic concepts will appear throughout the following discus-
sion of the cognitive habits most relevant to jurors' evaluation of acci-
dent cases. Prototype theory, for instance, develops the concepts of
schemas and scripts as knowledge structures. The availability and rep-
resentativeness heuristics are involved in lay judgments about causa-
tion and fault. And a good deal of advocates' rhetoric may be
understood as an effort to make favorable facts, schemas, and proto-
types as available as possible to jurors.
C. Prototype Theory: The Structure of Juror Judgments
Research in cognitive psychology and linguistics indicates that ju-
rors think about responsibility for accidents by using intuitive models
or prototypes of how stories go and how people should behave. This
way of thinking differs from, but is largely consistent with, the rule-
element thinking prescribed by negligence law; the law's elements are
sufficiently general to accommodate jurors' use of prototypical stories
and behaviors. An analysis of lawyers' rhetoric reveals exactly how
57. Id.
58. Id. at 24-25.
59. See iL at 26-27, 113-38; FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 59; THOMAS GILO-
VICH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T SO 133-36 (1991); see also infra note 156 (noting the
general belief that "big" effects, e.g., severe injuries, must have "big" causes, i.e., egregious
misconduct).
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they invoke specific prototypes and for what strategic purposes they
choose or decline to do so.
(1) Theory and Research on Prototype Use
(a) Generally
Prototype theory explains how people categorize knowledge. Our
concepts about people and situations are not organized according to
classical set theory, as lists of those qualities or characteristics neces-
sary and sufficient for a person or thing to be a member of the set.
Instead, social concepts are "fuzzy sets," structured around proto-
types.60 The prototype may be represented by exemplars or best in-
stances of the category (e.g., the category "national political figure" as
exemplified by Ted Kennedy), or by a summary consisting of features
abstracted from individual instances (e.g., long experience in office,
well-established political machine, actual or potential personal scan-
dal).61 Prototype theory then posits a judgmental heuristic: when con-
fronted with the task of classifying a person or event, the person
making the judgment will compare features of the person or event to
the characteristic features of the prototype and will classify the person
or event as a member of the category if it sufficiently resembles or
corresponds to the prototype.62 Classification on the basis of proto-
types is thus an instance of the representativeness heuristic.
63
The common law reasoning of appellate judges, according to
some, displays the operation of prototype theory. Edward Levi wrote
that "[t]he basic pattern of [common law] legal reasoning is reasoning
by example." 64 Levi famously described how the liability of sellers of
products for injuries caused to third parties who did not buy the prod-
ucts from the sellers developed through the accretion and subtraction
60. CANTOR & Kn-HSTROM, supra note 44, at 90-94 (discussing "fuzzy sets" in social
psychology); LAKOFF, supra note 14, at 5-57 (surveying same idea in linguistics and its
origins in philosophy of language and cognitive psychology).
61. CANTOR & KniLSTROM, supra note 44, at 90-91. Cantor and Kihlstrom explain
that the organization of person prototypes is more complicated than this; e.g., people may
represent some categories by exemplars and others by feature sets, and may shift from one
mode of representation to another depending on their relevant knowledge. Id at 91-92.
62. Id. at 107-14; LAKOFF, supra note 14, at 39-57. These processes of comparison and
clarification need not be conscious.
63. See CANTOR & KIHLSrROM, supra note 44, at 111-12 (discussing how use of repre-
sentativeness heuristic meshes with prototypical structure of fuzzy concepts); NiSBETr &
Ross, supra note 13, at 37 (describing the role of the representativeness heuristic in the
selection of schemas). On the connection between schema theory and prototype theory, see
Rumelhart, supra note 44, at 163.
64. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODucriON TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (1949).
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of examples of products held to be (or not to be) sufficiently or "in-
herently" dangerous. More generally, Karl Llewellyn argued that the
appellate judge should seek to identify the "situation-type" repre-
sented by the facts at bar and then uncover the law "immanent" in
that sort of situation.65 Thus, if jurors decide responsibility for acci-
dents by relying on prototypes, they would, at least to some extent, be
reasoning the way appellate judges do,6 6 although not necessarily in
the rule-element fashion prescribed by the instructions given to them.
Research using simulated criminal cases confirms that mock ju-
rors reason by using prototypes: they judge guilt or innocence on the
basis of how the evidence corresponds to their preexisting prototypi-
cal conceptions of the offense, rather than by strictly adhering to the
verdict categories the law defines.67 Mock jurors' prototypes partially
conform to the law, 68 and to that extent jurors would reach the same
results whether they use prototypes or legal definitions; where the two
diverge, however, mock jurors seem to rely on prototypes. In a series
of experiments, Professor Vicki Smith began by showing that people
have naive or lay conceptions of various crime categories. They organ-
ize these conceptions prototypically rather than in terms of necessary
and sufficient elements; i.e., people are more likely to classify a given
event as a crime the more features characteristically associated with
that crime the event contains. 69 Professor Smith next showed that, in
most cases, scenarios more closely corresponding to the layperson's
prototypical crime yielded higher conviction rates than did less proto-
typical scenarios.70 Finally, she showed that subjects who heard the
judge's instructions on the actual elements of the crime before reading
the fact scenarios reached the same verdicts as those who did not.7'
Thus the mock jurors relied on their preexisting prototypes instead of
65. LLEWELLYN, supra note 3, at 44, 122.
66. This is not to imply that jurors would necessarily rely on the same prototypes as
appellate judges would.
67. Smith, Prototypes, supra note 9.
68. Cf. infra note 76 and accompanying text (Pennington and Hastie's "story model,"
in which crime verdict categories partially conform to lay conceptions of intentional
behavior).
69. Id. at 859-63. For instance, two experimental scenarios might each equally satisfy
the legal definition of "robbery" as the taking of property from the victim by force or
threat of force, yet one contains more features popularly associated with robbery-say,
that the perpetrator is armed. Smith showed that the more such features in the scenario,
the more subjects identified the scenario as a robbery.
70. Id. at 863-65.
71. Id. at 865-68.
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the judge's instructions in determining guilt.72 Smith's more recent re-
search has largely confirmed that mock jurors rely on these proto-
types, although she has found that instructing jurors that certain
features of the prototype are not legal elements of the crime does im-
prove judgment in atypical cases.73
Jurors in accident cases will not have a preexisting prototype of
negligence in general, in the way that they have prototypical concep-
tions of burglary and other crimes. Instead, as I will discuss below,
they are likely to think in terms of prototypical scenarios for events
like those leading to the accident and images of reasonable behavior
under the circumstances. Prototype theory leads us to expect that ju-
rors will determine liability by comparing the evidence to these proto-
types of responsibility for accidents, rather than by analyzing each
element of the prima facie case (i.e., the verdict categories). To the
extent that an attorney does not present an element-by-element argu-
ment, he invites jurors (by default, as it were) to think about the case
in terms of prototypes-to take a global approach to responsibility for
accidents, and then to retrofit their conclusions into the proper legal
categories. 74
72. Cf. Bert Pryor et al., An Affective-Cognitive Consistency Explanation for Compre-
hension of Standard Jury Instructions, 47 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 68 (1980) (jurors' prior
attitudes toward the law affect their ability to understand the law; hearing standard instruc-
tions slightly reduces misunderstanding).
73. Smith, Prior Knowledge, supra note 20; see also Richard L. Wiener et al., The
Social Psychology of Jury Nullification: Predicting When Jurors Disobey the Law, 21 J.
APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL 1379, 1396-97 (1991) (finding that mock jurors based rape trial
verdicts on attributions independent of jury instructions; the more familiar jurors were
with instructions, the more heavily they weighed their own attributions and the less heavily
they weighed instructions).
74. Of course, in some sense it is not merely unsurprising that jurors do not follow the
law precisely in reaching judgments. It is the very purpose of turning some decisions over
to jurors that those decisions be based on extralegal values. See Kaplan, supra note 21, at
210; see also supra note 3 (jury's function is to bring substantive community morality to
bear on legal decision-making). Those values are supposed to be those of the community in
the sense that the jurors "represent" the community rather than that the jurors are sup-
posed to identify what their community's values are. See Stanton D. Krauss, Representing
the Community: A Look at the Selection Process in Obscenity Cases and Capital Sentencing,
64 IND. L.J. 617, 654-56 (1989).
Particular prototypes, e.g., those of causation and fault described below, may be un-
derstood as mediators between jurors' general notions of fairness and justice and their
decision in the individual case. That is, jurors make the case come out "right" by the way
they construe fault and causation. Cf. Jonathan D. Casper et al., Juror Decision Making,
Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291, 302-03 (1989) (noting that
jurors' attitudes affect their decisions through mediation of their interpretations of evi-
dence); see also KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 8, at 165 ("[T]he jury does not often con-
sciously and explicitly yield to sentiment in the teeth of the law. Rather it yields to
sentiment in the apparent process of resolving doubts as to the evidence."). The criminal
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(b) Prototypical Narratives as Knowledge Structures
Jurors in a negligence case are asked to evaluate an accident-an
event or series of events. We might, therefore, expect them to employ
prototypes in the form of scenarios or stories.75 That is, the relevant
cognitive schemas for reasonableness and responsibility may include
narratives about "how accidents like this typically occur," as well as
category exemplars (e.g., "the careless driver is one who resembles my
teenaged son") and rule-like propositions (e.g., "the careless driver is
one who poses unreasonable risks to others").
Indeed, considerable psychological research indicates that jurors
typically organize complex evidence into narrative form, and that
their judgments and the confidence with which they hold them depend
on the ease with which they can generate acceptable stories from the
data.76 This may be due to the general tendency for people to organize
their experience in terms of stories.77 And because narrative arguably
jury observed in Frontline, supra note 12, provides an example of how jurors may "read
back" into the appropriate legal categories a conclusion derived from other considerations.
Many jurors, having decided that it would be unfair to convict the defendant, determined
that he didn't "know" he had a gun (one of the elements of the crime charged). Note that
this example is not entirely consistent with Kalven and Zeisel's generalization; most jurors
in the Frontline case seem to have been quite conscious that "sentiment" (or fairness or
justice) pulled in the opposite direction from the ostensible meaning of the law.
75. See, e.g., CANTOR & KIHLSTROM, supra note 44, at 100-07 (describing "in-
terdomain" organization of social concepts: person prototypes are understood in terms of
prototypical situations and episodes in which those prototypical persons act); see also
LAKOFF, supra note 14, at 380-415 (explaining common-sense understanding of anger
based on implicit prototypical scenarios of how people become angry and how they deal
with the anger); Quinn, supra note 48 (discussing common sense understanding of mar-
riage based on various implicit prototypical scenarios). Conversely, prototypical concep-
tions of social situations take the form of "person-situations," consisting largely of typical
person-action combinations, Le., the general personality types as well as the prototypic
behaviors associated with those situations. Nancy Cantor et al., A Prototype Analysis of
Psychological Situations, 14 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 45 (1982).
76. The leading work is that of Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie. See, e.g., Nancy
Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror
Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992); Nancy Pennington &
Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO
L. REV. 519 (1991) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Story Model]. See also W. LANCE
BENNETr & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM 7-10
(1981) (explaining the central importance of stories to legal judgments); TANFORD, TRIAL
PROCESS, supra note 15, at 14 (discussing importance of stories to juror cognition); Linz &
Penrod, supra note 20, at 6 (describing importance of storytelling to jury comprehension).
77. See, e.g., JEROME BRUNER, AcTs OF MEANING 77-78 (1990) [hereinafter BRUNER,
AcTs] (noting that narrative is so basic a discourse form that it guides the child's acquisi-
tion of grammatical forms); Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation
of Reality, in ON NARRATIVE 1-2 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1980) (discussing how narrative is
the fundamental way in which we "translate knowing into telling").
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represents a mode of thinking that is distinct from rule-element analy-
sis,78 its use would seem to encourage further departures from the sort
of thinking that the instructions prescribe, even though the elements
of doctrine may themselves be drawn in part from people's concep-
tions of how stories go.79
From the extensive literature on narrative and social judgment in
the law, a few points are particularly relevant. First, W. Lance Bennett
and Martha Feldman have argued that it is the internal structure of
the story that people find credible or not, rather than its correspon-
dence to external evidence. Specifically, audiences find stories that
vary from their expectations, that leave gaps or contradict their "stock
scripts" or prototypes, to be dubious. The more a story departs from
the prototype, the more ambiguities and gaps at crucial junctures, the
less credible the story is.80 Hence, we would expect to find advocates
organizing information about the case and the world into stories that
conform to the stock scripts they expect the jurors to bring with them
to the courtroom.8'
78. See JEROME BRUNER, ACrUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 11-14 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter BRUNER, AcrUAL MINDS]. Although Bruner remarks on narrative generally, I do not
mean to suggest that there is only one narrative mode of thought. On the varieties of
narrative, see, e.g., ON NARRATrvE, supra note 77.
79. According to Pennington and Hastie's "story model," for example, jurors impose
order on the evidence by constructing stories from it during the trial; learn the verdict
categories; and then reach a decision by matching the accepted story to the verdict catego-
ries and deciding if the fit is sufficient. The "story model" involves prototypical reasoning
at the story construction stage, in that the choice of the best story involves, among other
things, a judgment of coherence, which includes an intuitive comparison of the story to
prior knowledge of how stories are supposed to go. It also involves prototypical reasoning
at the last stage, in which the test is whether the accepted story fits well enough with the
best-match verdict category. Obviously, legal rules, the elements of the crime, figure in
both the second and third stages of this model. Moreover:
The classification process [in the last stage of the model] is aided by relatively
direct relations between the attributes of a verdict category (crime element) and
components of the episode [or part of a story] schema .... The law has evolved so
that the main attributes of the decision categories suggested by legal experts-
identity, mental state, circumstances, and ctions-correspond closely to the cen-
tral features of human action sequences represented as episodes-initiating
events, goals, actions, and states. This is not a coincidence; rather, it is a reflection
of the fact that both stories and crimes are culturally determined generic descrip-
tions of human action sequences.
Pennington & Hastie, Story Model, supra note 76, at 530-31.
80. BENr-rr & FELD AN, supra note 76, at 66-90; cf White, supra note 77, at 23
(noting how modern historiographical convention that "real history" should be written as
narrative reflects desire to impose upon reality the moral coherence of the story form).
81. See Lind & Ke, supra note 21, at 239-40 (recommending that attorney should in-
voke familiar scripts so that jurors will fill in the gaps with inferences favorable to the
client); Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 20, at 104-10 (discussing criminal lawyers' uses of
November 1995] THE RHETORIC OF TORTS
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Second, the role of narratives in accident trials is not limited to
matching events to prototypes; it also includes establishing differences
between the two. Stories of accidents are likely to correspond to the
stock scripts of everyday life, with one salient deviation: the accident
itself. To explain the accident persuasively, the narrative must account
for this deviation. Research in story comprehension indicates that
readers will try to explain a deviation from a prototypical story (or
script) by searching for another deviation and then by trying to make
a causal connection linking them.82 Hence, we might expect each at-
torney to construct a plausible "normal" or background scenario in
which the accident does not occur, and which differs from the actual
events by including something the other party did not do, or by omit-
ting something he did do. Each attorney would thereby emphasize
that his or her client behaved normally, but that the other party acted
"outside the script" in some respect. The attorneys would then play to
the jurors' tendency to link the two deviations causally, thus attribut-
ing causal responsibility for the accident to the other party.8 3
Third, and conversely, stories are the ideal form for justifying de-
viant behavior within cultural norms, because stories allow us to un-
derstand intentions within contexts; they show us the actor's reasons
for acting in a way that reconciles the aberrant with the normative.84
We would, therefore, expect attorneys to craft stories to persuade ju-
stock scripts); Steven Lubet, The Trial as a Persuasive Story, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 77
(1990) (noting that attorney needs to tell a story that is consistent with jurors' common
sense and with the evidence); Philip N. Meyer, "Desperate for Love": Cinematic Influences
upon a Defendant's Closing Argument to a Jury, 18 VT. L. REv. 721 (1994) (analyzing
criminal defense attorney's manipulation of stock scripts in closing argument); Richard K.
Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47
STAN. L. REV. 39 (1994) (analyzing how director of The Thin Blue Line plays with audi-
ence's stock conception of how corrupt police and district attorneys frame innocent
defendants).
82. John Black et al., Comprehending Stories and Social Situations, in 3 HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note 21, at 56 (citing unpublished research of Mio and
Black); see also Stephen J. Read, Constructing Causal Scenarios: A Knowledge Structure
Approach to Causal Reasoning, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 288, 296-97 (citing to
same research).
83. Attribution research, discussed infra notes 141-54 and accompanying text, leads to
the same conclusion. In making causal attributions, perceivers engage in counterfactual
analysis: they tend to imagine another scenario that differs from the actual series of events
in some respect, and to identify the "deviant" action as the cause of the accident.
84. BRUNER, ACTS, supra note 77, at 47-50. For an example of a layperson's use of
narrative in this fashion, see Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the
Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 93, 114-15 (1986). Sarat and Felstiner
record the conversation of a divorce client who, in order to justify her resignation to the
attorney's settlement strategy, against her inclination to continue fighting a restraining or-
der and her husband generally, breaks into a narrative about Nez Perce Indian Chief Jo-
[Vol. 47
rors that their respective clients' apparently aberrant behavior actu-
ally conformed to social norms and thus was not culpable.
There is, finally, reason to expect that narrative argument would
not be distributed equally in any given case. We might in general ex-
pect plaintiffs' attorneys to tell stories; by contrast, defendants' attor-
neys should lead jurors to think in rule-element terms, because the
plaintiff's failure to establish any one element should (as the jurors
will be instructed) result in a decision for the defendant.85 On the
other hand, a plaintiff's attorney with a strong case on the evidence
might let doctrine organize the argument; conversely, a defendant's
attorney with a weaker rule-element case would be best advised to
make broader use of narrative.
(c) The Evocation of "Reasonable Person" Prototypes
Even insofar as jurors' attention is directed to the single element
of breach of duty, they are likely to reason by means of prototypes.
The standard jury instruction asks jurors to determine whether the
party in question acted as would a reasonable person under the cir-
cumstances.86 Jurors are likely to address this question by using a
seph, who after many battles with U.S. government troops decided he would "fight no
more." Id. at 114.
85. Additional experimental evidence suggests that plaintiffs receive more verdicts in
their favor when complex tort trials are structured to allow the presentation of all issues in
one proceeding before the jury is required to reach any decisions (unitary trial), as op-
posed to separated trials in which one or more issues are argued and decided separately.
Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of Procedural
Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 269 (1990).
86. The standard instruction defines "negligence" as
the doing of some act which a reasonably prudent person would not do, or the
failure to do something which a reasonably prudent person would do, when
prompted by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human af-
fairs. It is, in other words, the failure to use ordinary care under the circumstances
in the management of one's person or property, or of agencies under one's
control.
HON. EDwARD J. DEvrr ET AL., 3 FEDERAL JURY PRACrICE AND INSTRUCrIONS: CIVIL
§ 80.03, at 133-34 (1987). "Ordinary care," in turn, is defined as "that care which reason-
ably prudent persons exercise in the management of their own affairs, in order to avoid
injury to themselves or their property, or the persons or property of others." Id § 80.04, at
135. The instruction on contributory negligence similarly refers to the plaintiff's failure to
use ordinary care. Id. § 80.22, at 178. For the instructions in Butler, see supra note 28.
Appellate opinions elaborate on the standard instruction's extremely abstract defini-
tion of reasonable care. For summaries of and variations on the "reasonable person" stan-
dard, see, eg., CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 22-23; KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 32, at
173-75; Fleming James, Jr., The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16
Mo. L. REv. 1 (1951); M. Wells, supra note 3, at 732-33. For a feminist critique and refor-
mulation of the standard, see Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and
Tor4 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 20-36 (1988).
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"person-situation" prototype of the reasonable person under the cir-
cumstances.87 Because there is often no evidence of this (aside from
evidence about custom 8 8), the attorneys would be expected to evoke
prototypes for the jurors. Next, jurors must determine what the plain-
tiff or the defendant actually did.89 They must then decide whether
there is sufficient "fit" between the conduct and the prototype to per-
mit them to classify the party's behavior as "reasonable." 90
We might expect counsel for both sides to evoke prototypes of
the reasonable person and to characterize the evidence in ways that
enhance the fit for the client and the divergence for the opposing
party. The availability heuristic suggests some obvious applications.
First, counsel would be expected to make available for the jurors a
prototype of reasonableness that favors the client.91 Jurors are likely
87. See Cantor et al., supra note 75. As discussed below, attorneys may also depict the
parties in ways that fit general personality prototypes-e.g., of the good or deserving (or
bad or undeserving) plaintiff-to make it easier for jurors to commit the "fundamental
attribution error" and assess fault or responsibility on the basis of the kind of person they
think the plaintiff (or defendant) is. See infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
There may be systematic differences in what the "reasonable person" means as ap-
plied to different sorts of parties. For the proposition that jurors hold, and should hold,
injurers to a higher standard of care than victims, see James, supra note 86, at 2 (arguing
that relaxed standard for victims only better conforms to moral sense that actors should be
held responsible in accordance with their subjective capabilities, but avoids increase in
accidents and failure to compensate that relaxed standard for injurers would yield). James
cites no empirical authority for his assertion that this double standard "probably prevails"
in fact "because ... juries, by and large, tend to resolve doubts ... in favor of plaintiffs."
Id.; cf Rossman v. La Grega, 270 N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1971) (discussing double standard).
Research indicates that jurors hold corporations in general to higher standards of re-
sponsibility than they hold individuals. One justification jurors offer for this is that corpora-
tions can be expected to devote greater resources to acquiring information about safety
and can develop and maintain relevant expertise. See Hans & Lofquist, supra note 9, at
102-04; see also Valerie P. Hans, Lay Reactions to Corporate Defendants (unpublished
paper on file with author) (mock jurors hold corporations to higher levels of responsibility
than individuals, but not because they regard corporations as "deep pockets").
88. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 33, at 193 (discussing how evidence of custom-
ary conduct of others in similar circumstances is normally relevant and admissible). Of the
closing arguments studied in this Article, however, only the plaintiff's attorney in Giulietti
v. Providence & Worcester Co., Civ. Nos. 81-7453 & 81-7625 (D. Conn. 1981), affd without
opinion, 688 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1982), relied on evidence of custom. See also infra note 191
(relationship between customary conduct and reasonableness).
89. In the cases analyzed in this Article, the central facts are mostly not in dispute. Cf.
Moore, supra note 15 (exploring cognitive heuristics and cognitive filtering in fact-finding).
90. I do not mean to imply that jurors proceed sequentially through these steps. The
process of "fitting" data to prototypes, involving as it does the use of several "shortcuts" or
heuristics, is probably not linear. See generally CANTOR & KIHLSTROM, supra note 44, at
107-14 (discussing interpretive rules for social classification).
91. Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., The Role of Category Accessibility in the
Interpretation of Information About Persons: Some Determinants and Implications, 37 J.
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to define reasonableness in terms of the way they like to think they
would behave-an ideal, but based on their own experience as they
perceive it.92 Hence trial attorneys might be expected to construct
prototypes by telling stories and making analogies that match the ju-
rors' ideas of their own experience. 93 Second, because the process of
classifying the case (or relevant part of it) as an instance of the prof-
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL 1660 (1979) (observing, among other things, that the more
a category for classifying social information is activated, the more likely the perceiver will
use that category to classify new, ambiguous information); see also Green, supra note 15, at
249:
Since judgment involves a comparison, implicitly or explicitly, between two or
more stimuli, and since standards of comparison for judgments in negligence
cases are likely to be indistinct, victory will reward the side that most effectively
defines the situation for the jurors. Counsel would, therefore, be well advised to
attempt to insinuate into the minds of the jurors a scale of precautionary stan-
dards which throws the best possible light on his client's case. The counsel for the
plaintiff should convey in his argument a scale calibrated so that the precaution
taken by the defendant will fall below the mid-point of the range. The counsel for
the defendant, conversely, will seek to implant a scale the mid-point of which lies
considerably below the point representing the care exercised by the defendant.
92. This point is, of course, recognized by practitioners. See, e.g., 6 AM. JUR. TRIALS
§ 41 (1967) (suggesting that plaintiff's attorney encourage jury to define contributory negli-
gence standard in terms of their own ordinary experience); response by attorney Steven
Errante to author's inquiry (copy on file with author).
Research shows that "a large majority of the general public thinks that they are more
intelligent, more fair-minded, less prejudiced, and more skilled behind the wheel of an
automobile than the average person." Gn.ovbcH, supra note 59, at 77. The last observation
receives some confirmation from a major survey conducted by the Institute for Civil Jus-
tice, which indicates that 91% of people involved in two-car automobile accidents believe
that the other driver was mostly at fault. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION
FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURiES IN T=E UNITED STATES 159 (1991). Thus, when jurors are led
to refer to their conception of their own behavior to derive the standard of "ordinary
care," they may be induced to define a higher standard of conduct than their actual behav-
ior would warrant.
93. Response by attorney Dominick Esposito to author's inquiry (copy on file with
author). Even when apparently not prompted by the attorneys, jurors during deliberations
"frequently draw analogies or suggest parallel accounts that liken the situation in question,
and jurors' interpretations of it, to more familiar, or better understood, events or circum-
stances." Holstein, supra note 15, at 98 n.17.
Another reason to tell stories or propose prototypes that tap into the jurors' precon-
ceived notions is that persuasiveness decreases dramatically, regardless of the speaker's
credibility, when the speaker advocates a position quite discrepant from the listener's. Linz
& Penrod, supra note 20, at 34; cf Donald E. Vinson, Psychological Anchors: Influencing
the Jury, LrrIG., Winter 1982, at 20, 22 (advocating use of "anchors" consonant with jurors'
basic beliefs to orient their views on crucial issues).
Note that this tactic may cut the other way, or even be beyond the advocate's control.
Hans & Lofquist, supra note 9, at 95-96, report that some jurors in tort cases voted for
reduced awards for the plaintiffs, reasoning that they had been in similar situations to those
the plaintiffs claimed were dangerous, yet had not themselves sued (e.g., "if the job's dan-
gerous, quit"); why should the plaintiff recover substantial damages?
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fered prototype involves matching the salient features of the case (or
part of it) to those of the prototype, 94 we should expect advocates to
make more available, through repetition, vivid description, prominent
placement, or otherwise, those features of the case that would yield a
classification favorable to the client.
(2) Prototypes and Stories in the Arguments
(a) Argument Structure and Narrative
The arguments in Butler support the hypothesis that the lawyer
for the party who would be disadvantaged by a straight rule-element
analysis will argue the case in prototypical form. Both attorneys in
Butler begin in traditional fashion,95 by praising the jurors for their
time and attention, thus securing the audience's good will by appeal-
ing to its worthy values and establishing the attorneys' own good char-
acter.96 Both follow by emphasizing what they consider to be the
strongest aspects of their respective cases, and both conclude by re-
94. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (prototype judgment and the represen-
tativeness heuristic).
95. This sort of introduction or proem is literally textbook technique, recommended,
e.g., in FRED LANE, LANE'S GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE §§ 9.40-9.89 (3d ed. 1984); see
CORBETr, supra note 20, at 309-10 (discussing use of introduction in classical rhetorical
style to ingratiate oneself with the audience). Some more recent commentators, however,
advise attorneys to avoid platitudinous introductions. See, e.g., MARK A. DOMBROFF, DY-
NAMIC CLOSING ARGUMENTS 311-12 (1985) ("[Sjtatements such as, 'Ladies and gentlemen
of the jury, thank you for your attention' ... are rather superficial statements which can be
made . . . at any point during the body of the closing argument"; author nevertheless
presents as exemplary an argument that begins by thanking jurors (id. at 904)); THOMAS A.
MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 287 (3d ed. 1992) ("[M]ost trial lawyers
today avoid the traditional introductory comments.., and get immediately to the argu-
ment."); TANFORD, TRIAL PROCESS, supra note 15, at 393 (stating that traditional introduc-
tion is "safe and inoffensive, but is also boring, insincere and misleading").
96. This is what Aristotle refers to as the ethos. Aristotle, supra note 30, bk. 1, ch. 2, at
1356. Butler's lawyer begins with a pathetic appeal: Butler "should be an inspiration for all
of us" (B. 17.14-15). By identifying himself with the plaintiff (plaintiff's effort to answer
questions is something that "I would like to aspire to" (B. 17.19-20); "I'm proud to repre-
sent him. I'm proud to know him" (B. 18.3)), and embracing the jury within the same
sentiment (plaintiff's effort something "that we hope we all do" (B. 17.20)), the lawyer tries
to secure the jury's good will in a triangle of identifications: lawyer with jury with plaintiff.
See infra note 232 and accompanying text (same).
Revere's counsel begins his rather brief summation by identifying himself with jury:
"[P]art of the privilege all of us have of living in this wonderful country is the right to vote
and the right to sit on juries" (B. 31.2-4), and then segues into the jury's duty to decide
properly (B. 31.5-6). This requires putting aside sympathy and speculation, and bringing in
a fair, just, and impartial verdict based exclusively on testimony (B. 31.7-12, 31.16-18).
Counsel establishes his own good character by acknowledging that Butler is "a fine and
admirable person" who "deserves sympathy" (B. 31.15-16; see also B. 35.25-36.1).
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minding the jurors of their task.97 But Butler's attorney encourages
prototypical thinking by emphasizing one feature of the case-the
plaintiff's injuries-and by centering the argument on a story of the
accident. In contrast, the structure of defense counsel's argument re-
lies more on rule-element or verdict-category analysis.
After his introduction, Butler's lawyer describes his client's inju-
ries.98 This is by far the most extensive part of the argument (espe-
cially when counsel's advice regarding the calculation of damages is
added in99), and it is prominently placed.100 The rhetorical significance
of this emphasis is all the more striking in light of the fact that the
defendant, Revere, did not dispute any of the medical evidence.' 0'
The structure of this argument tells jurors that, come what may, this
case is about a severely injured accident victim. George Butler's inju-
ries engulf the individual elements of negligence.
Counsel for Revere, by contrast, organizes his argument between
introduction and conclusion in rule-element fashion. First he recites
the elements of a prima facie negligence case. 0 2 Then, instead of tell-
ing a story of his own, he analyzes the accident in terms that empha-
size the plaintiff's lack of proof of the required elements. First, he
explains that Revere owed no duty of care to Butler: it was the
driver's duty, not the defendant's, to secure the load.10 3 This is the
longest portion of his summation. Second, he argues that there is no
proof of causation. o Finally, he emphasizes issues over chronology
by going back to the beginning of the incident and refuting the plain-
tiff's argument that the defendant "switched the job" on the
plaintiff.'05
97. Butler's lawyer concludes by appealing to the jury ("you hold his only chance" (B.
30.6)) and expressing confidence in their judgment (B. 30.22-23). Moreover, the lawyer's
statement that he has "full confidence that you'll make your best effort" to determine
damages (B. 30.21-23; emphasis added) echoes the terms in which he initially praises the
plaintiff: Butler "tries to do the best he can with what he has left" (B. 17.16; emphasis
added). Thus the lawyer again links the jurors with Butler.
Revere's counsel concludes by repeating his introduction: we're all sympathetic to the
plaintiff, but the jurors' oath requires a verdict based on law, not sympathy (B. 35.25-36.9).
98. B. 18.6-23.22.
99. B. 27.25-30.5, 30.12-21.
100. For an analysis of the primacy effect in legal advocacy, reviewing relevant psycho-
logical literature, see Linz & Penrod, supra note 20, at 8-25.
101. B. 31.12-15.
102. B. 31.19-32.1. Counsel also repeats the elements later (B. 35.2-5).
103. B. 32.7-34.13.
104. B. 34.14-35.5.
105. B. 35.6-24. Butler's lawyer had argued that Butler had gone to work expecting to
pick up a certain load, and that Revere changed the job after he arrived at Revere's plant.
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Revere's counsel reinforces the rule-element pattern of thinking
through metaphor. His major metaphoric theme is that the jurors' task
is to construct a verdict. Just as the relevant legal rule is fixed, certain,
and composed of all the elements counsel has discussed in order, a
verdict is something fixed, stable, and measurable, to be built using
certain discrete parts (evidence) and setting aside others (sympathy
and speculation). 106
Narrative is crucial to the arguments, especially that of Butler's
lawyer. To persuade the jurors about causation and breach of duty, he
tells a story that evokes a "normal" (and, by implication, accident-
free) scenario for the loading and covering of the machinery, and em-
phasizes the conduct of Revere's employees, especially Brockway, as
deviant, and hence presumptively at fault.'0 7
See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text (how Butler's attorney uses allegedly
changed work order to argue causation).
106. Revere's attorney commands the jurors to "set aside all feelings of sympathy" (B.
31.8; see also B. 31.17), treating feelings as objects that can be "set aside" (on sympathy as
object, see also B. 31.17-18: "the sympathy that all of us ... have"). He also commands
them to "bring in a verdict" (B. 31.9, 36.6), treating the verdict as an object. And the
verdict to be brought in must be "based wholly and solely on the testimony" (B. 31.10-11,
36.7). All of these metaphors from the proem and the conclusion describe the verdict as an
object-a well-supported object. Like a well-constructed building, the verdict must be
"based" on a firm foundation of testimony; "feelings of sympathy" are not part of that
foundation and must be "set aside." Note also how the verdict as a stable, well-constructed
building contrasts with Butler's lawyer's primary metaphoric image, the journey (see infra
notes 218-23 and accompanying text): something fluid, not stable and fixed. Thus Revere's
attorney takes all of his opponent's rhetoric about the sort of person Butler is, wraps it all
up as "feelings of sympathy," and tells the jurors to put it aside.
Revere's attorney even uses a metaphor to flag the contrast between what he is asking
jurors to do and what Butler's lawyer is asking them to do: our sympathy "cannot translate
into a jury verdict awarding money damages" (B. 36.2-3). Translation is fluid and two-
directional, in contrast to building, which deals with "concrete" facts; translation deals with
mere words, not objects like (metaphorically speaking) verdicts. The building metaphor,
added to the images of measurement and quantity Revere's attorney uses to discuss his or
the jurors' efforts to understand the case (summarizing the evidence on duty, he says "I
tried to reduce [the evidence] to something that I could understand" (B. 33.20); introducing
his analogy on the same point, he says, "Let's bring it down to something that all of us are
familiar with" (B. 33.22-23); and concluding the story, he says, "[T]hat, on a larger scale, is
exactly what the situation was in this case" (B. 34.12-13)), yields the metaphoric theme:
jurors' task as architects or builders of a fixed, stable, quantifiable verdict.
All of these metaphors are clichds, of course, so much so that we may barely notice
them as metaphors. All the more reason, then, that they may reflect an intuitive pattern of
imagining the decision-making process.
107. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (understanding causal connections
in stories).
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Jurors cannot be expected to be familiar with how machinery like
this is usually loaded onto trucks like Butler's. 08 Yet Butler's attorney
does not build his normal scenario using evidence of the custom of the
workplace. 0 9 Rather, he implies a customary scenario by the way he
describes what happened. Recall the story. It amounts to this: George
Butler tries to do the job he's told to do, and struggles to put the tarp
on the machinery; Brockway and his men, having loaded the machin-
ery and now seeing Butler struggle, go on their coffee break instead of
helping. The implicit normal scenario is: working people are supposed
to do their jobs; one who begins to help someone else with a difficult
physical job at the workplace continues to help until the job is done, if
he can do so without significant inconvenience to himself." 0 That's
108. Hence, in Schank and Abelson's terms, jurors lack a script for the loading and
tarping of machinery. This activity is not so familiar to them that they would carry around a
highly articulated understanding of how it usually goes, the way the "restaurant script"
structures their knowledge of what goes on in restaurants. Schank and Abelson posit that,
in situations for which we lack specific scripts, we make sense of stories by drawing on
more general knowledge of actors' goals, their "plans," or typical goal-oriented sequences
of behavior, and the "expectancy rules" that shape goals. SCHANK & ABELSON, supra note
46, at 69-130. The "normal scenario" for loading and tarping suggested in the text may be
thought of as a narrativized expectancy rule governing workplace conduct. Cf infra note
110 (Butler's attorney's argument may be understood in terms of implicit contract rule of
reciprocity).
109. The trial record does not specify whether loads like Butler's were usually tarped
or not. Robert Brown, Butler's manager and supervisor, testified that loads picked up at
Revere were sometimes tarped, sometimes not (B. 30.14-23 (transcript of proceedings of
Apr. 24, 1990)). The record also does not specify whether Revere employees typically
helped drivers like Butler put tarpaulins on their loads. Brockway testified that it was not
his personal responsibility to help with the tarping (B. 68.25-69.5, 78.24-79.2 (Apr. 24,
1990)), but this does not establish whether he or others actually did so on other occasions.
Another Revere employee, Jerry Stedman, testified that he had no knowledge of Revere
employees helping drivers tarp their loads (B. 108.10-17 (Apr. 24, 1990)). A third Revere
employee, Jerry Wall, testified that drivers pulled their own tarps on "all the time," but
that "someone in the area" might help if asked (B. 29.6-9 (Apr.24 1990)). Butler didn't ask.
110. Another implicit normal scenario that may apply derives from the contract norm
of reciprocity described by Ian Macneil, Values in Contract" Internal and Externa; 78 Nw.
L. REv. 340, 347-49, 374-75 (1983). This norm is "the principle of getting something back
for something given." Id, at 347. It could apply to Butler because there was a contract
between Revere and Schultz Electric, Butler's employer, even though it did not, of course,
prevent Butler from suing in negligence for personal injuries. According to the norm of
reciprocity, if Butler was asked to do something different from what was agreed to under
the contract (e.g., load other equipment or put a tarp on the load; see supra text accompa-
nying note 26 (Butler's attorney pointing out changes in work order)), his doing it amounts
to a favor to or accommodation of Revere; Revere's employees then owe a reciprocal duty
to help him, even if that, too, is outside the contract terms (ie., under the contract they are
not responsible for helping the driver put a tarp on the load). In this respect, a finding that
Revere's employees breached a duty to make a reasonable effort to help Butler is consis-
tent with an implicit rule of contract law. (I owe this observation to Sandy Meiklejohn.) For
the notion that reciprocity may represent a more general norm of social ordering, see ROB-
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the way things ought to happen. Butler behaves according to this sce-
nario. We can understand why he would undertake the difficult tarp-
ing job alone-he always gives his best-but we can also understand
that normally, Revere's employees would help him. Brockway's con-
duct, on the other hand, deviates from the normal story. Indeed, the
coffee break is a prototypical image for not working at the workplace.
Butler's lawyer expects jurors to link the deviations from the nor-
mal-the failure to help and Butler's fall-and thus to hold Revere
responsible for the accident."'
Butler's attorney uses narrative to assign responsibility, but he
also offers jurors hooks to attach their judgment to doctrine. Causa-
tion opens the narrative-"On January 20, 1986, his life changed and
it didn't have to be changed that way"-and both breach of duty and
causation conclude it: "it's that kind of carelessness that resulted in
this injury." The elements of negligence are integrated into the attor-
ney's conception of the case, but they do not govern it.112
ERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 164-66, 225-29 (1991) (discussing "tit-for-tat"
and similar strategies of reciprocity as welfare-maximizing solutions to versions of Pris-
oner's Dilemma game).
For a discussion of an implicit "social contract" underlying mock jurors' assessments
of responsibility for accidents, see Tetlock, supra note 49, at 361-62. Tetlock discusses ex-
periments in which subjects awarded greater compensation when the harm resulted from a
failure of the expected routine (see infra note 150). He contends that these subjects, rather
than being guided by a cognitive "bias" such as that described by simulation or norm the-
ory (see infra notes 141-54 and accompanying text), were
trying to restore the original social contract between the victim and perpetrator.
That contract specified that, in return for paying the fare, the owners of the train
would transport the passengers to point X and would do so as safely as current
technology and nature permit. When either the engineer or electromechanical
device fails to do the assigned job, that contract has been violated.
Thus, in Revere, Butler's agreement to do something not required under the contract cre-
ated an implicit social contract under which Revere's employees were to help Butler with
the task. By not helping him, they violated that contract.
111. Whether jurors will accept the "normal scenario" Butler's attorney implies, and
hence will make the judgments that conformance to or divergence from that norm suggest,
depends on many factors, including their personal experiences and values. Someone who
regards the workplace norm as not doing anything beyond the absolute minimum required
to keep one's job, including not proceeding in the face of risk unless specifically ordered to
do so, might find Butler's conduct less explicable and Brockway's more justifiable. Cf.
BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 76, at 66-90 (finding credibility of story inversely corre-
lated with number of ambiguities and gaps at crucial junctures in story; ambiguities and
gaps are defined in relation to background expectations about how stories ought to
proceed).
112. Butler's attorney also tells several "mini-stories," some no more than a transcript
line or two in length, designed to convey to the jurors the severity of his client's injuries
and suffering and the appropriate measure of damages. E.g., B. 20.16-20, 21.20, 21.24-25,
22.2-4, 23.1-3, 28.14-17, 29.15-20.
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Revere's attorney tells but a single, brief story. The story is not
about the accident itself; rather, it is an analogy intended to counter
Butler's attorney's narrative of normality and deviance. The analogy
seeks to reconcile Brockway's behavior with social norms. It does this
by trying to persuade the jurors that Revere owed no duty to Butler to
secure the load.113 Revere's lawyer asks each juror to imagine that a
repairman needs to take a heavy piece of equipment, a refrigerator-
freezer, from the juror's home to the shop. The homeowner might
help the repairman put the equipment on the truck, and then walk
away. The lawyer then rhetorically asks the jurors if they should be
held liable if the repairman, while the truck is still parked in the drive-
way, falls for an unknown reason and is injured. "Certainly not. It
would be ridiculous. 1" 4 If jurors apply this prototypical scenario of
reasonable behavior to Brockway, they should conclude that failing to
help the struggling Butler is not, under the circumstances, deviant or
blameworthy; Brockway simply had no obligation to help.
A different pattern of argument structures and narratives may be
found in the summations in Giulietti v. Providence & Worcester Co.15
John Giulietti, a young railroad worker, was trying to hook up cars in
a rail yard. He was crushed to death when the rear of the car on which
he was riding backed over an incorrectly aligned cross-over switch and
into a line of cars sitting on another track. The plaintiff's lawyer
charged that the railroad was -negligent in many respects: it did not
properly train John Giulietti to be a conductor, yet compelled him to
conduct a crew at night in an unfamiliar yard; Giulietti's fellow and
senior crew member, Ed Hines, planned an unnecessarily dangerous
hitching maneuver and did not comply with railroad rules when back-
ing the train up; and the railroad yard lacked various safety devices, in
particular a flag marking the crucial cross-over switch. The railroad's
attorney countered that Giulietti's own carelessness-in allowing the
train to back up too quickly and not looking where he was going-
caused his death.
113. B. 33.22-34.13 (see supra note 29 for full text of this analogy).
114. B. 34.12.
115. Giulieti supra note 88. The administrator of John Giulietti's estate sued the rail-
road under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. In FELA cases, the
plaintiff must prove both that the defendant railroad was negligent and that the railroad's
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries (or the decedent's death).
The plaintiff's burden of proof on causation, however, is "low and liberal": the defendant
railroad should be found liable if its negligence "played any part, even the slightest" in
contributing to the plaintiffs injury. Smith v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 856 F.2d 467,
469 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Any award to the plaintiff must be reduced by the
percentage the plaintiff's (decedent's) contributory negligence contributed to the harm.
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While the arguments in Giulietti differ from each other in signifi-
cant respects, both consist, very broadly, of rule-element presenta-
tions. 116 Giulietti's lawyer does tell a story about the accident, but it is
explicitly subordinated to a rule-oriented argument about the defend-
ant railroad's fault and causal responsibility. The narrative first fo-
cuses on the claim that the defendant was negligent because Giulietti
was not qualified to be a conductor on that crew that night," 7 and
116. Both counsel, on the surface, appear to employ some of the received wisdom on
forensic technique. See supra note 95 (traditional principles of closing argument rhetoric).
Each begins with the proem, in which they praise the jurors for their time and attention,
thus securing the audience's good will by appealing to the audience's worthy values (see G.
487.2-4 (Giulietti's attorney); G. 508.24-509.1 (railroad's attorney); the railroad's attorney
also praises the jurors by describing them as people of "common sense" (G. 509.21-510.3))
and establishing a sympathetic, favorable ethos (the railroad's attorney establishes a sym-
pathetic relationship with the jury, adverting to his absence the previous week, delaying
the trial (G. 509.4), and pointing out that the case is "very difficult for a defense lawyer"
(G. 509.6)). Each then summarizes testimony (see G. 487.11-495.15, 504.13-506.11 (Giu-
lietti's attorney); G. 512.21-517.1 (railroad's attorney)). Each attorney proceeds to the ar-
gument, identifying issues and presenting contentions on each issue (see G. 495.16-504.8
(Giulietti's attorney); G. 510.11-524.25 (railroad's attorney)). Each then concludes by
stressing his most important point: for Giulietti's attorney, the thinly veiled appeal to sym-
pathy, in the name of justice (G. 508.7-16); for the railroad's attorney, John Giulietti's
negligence and its consequence for the verdict (G. 525.21-526.10).
To be sure, neither attorney systematically identifies and discusses all important issues.
Leading writers on closing argument technique encourage advocates to discuss all issues.
See, e.g., TANFORD, TRIAL PROCESS, supra note 15, at 392-99; see also id. at 401 for a
second recommended organizational pattern. Counsel for John Giulietti's estate does not
even mention the decedent's conduct.
117. G. 487.7-495.15. Some excerpts from this argument follow:
I think what I told you in my opening statement, although how brief it was
and sketchy it was, I believe that the evidence has borne up all the claims of
negligence that we made from the beginning. As you will recall the testimony
from Train Master David Fitzgerald, who was the one who was responsible for
qualifying John [Giulietti] as a Conductor, was that he was not sure whether or
not John was qualified as a Conductor. It is a rather unusual approach to qualify-
ing men as a Conductor, when you think how the other railroads take great care
and pains and make sure that a man meets a standard. The standard is that he is
not only qualified on the book of rules, but familiar with the physical characteris-
tics wherever he is sent out to work. To be familiar with the physical characteris-
tics, you must know where the switches are, curves in the track, how many tracks
there are.
Well, this crew was called by Train Master Fitzgerald and they were assigned
to go down to a place called Midway. Through Train Master Fitzgerald's own
testimony, he said John didn't meet the qualifications to be a conductor at Mid-
way, which is located on Amtrak property. He took the Amtrak book of rules like
he took the [defendant Providence & Worcester's] book of rules, but he did not
qualify on the physical characteristics of Amtrak, where the switches are and
tracks are. For that reason he was not even qualified as a Conductor to work on
Amtrak property at a place called Midway.
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then divides into nine segments, each corresponding to a reason for
finding the defendant negligent.118 Giulietti's attorney does not relate
Now, Train Master Fitzgerald put together his crew and he sent them out at
night into the dark for some on-the-job training. No one will deny that on-the-job
training is essential to training a Conductor, but it is our contention that you don't
throw men out to learn for themselves in the middle of the night....
Well, Johnny was sent out that night and he was working in the capacity of a
Conductor. [Counsel then discusses conflicting evidence concerning Giulietti's
prior experience at the Norwich Yard, where the accident occurred.]
... [E]ven if everything that [one witness] has to say [concerning Giulietti's
experience] is true and that what [a second witness] said, which is borne out by
the records, is incorrect, one night that [Giulietti] could have been in Norwich
Yard at night would not qualify him on the physical characteristics of Norwich
Yard ....
... No records indicate [Giulietti] was qualified as a Conductor and, in fact,
the General Train Master doesn't even recall whether or not he was qualified as a
Conductor. He was a third body to be put on this train crew, and that's all the
Train Master was concerned with at the time.
... Now, the train proceeded north and was going by Norwich Yard or just
the beginning of it where a place called King Seeley was [where the car to be
hitched up was located]. Both Eddy Hines and Danny Crawford [the brakeman
on the crew] testified that Eddy had to show Johnny where King Seeley even was.
He had no idea where King Seeley was .... So Johnny had no idea what this
Norwich Yard looked like....
G. 487.7-24, 488.9-489.3, 489.15-491.17, 492.10-15, 492.20-493.1, 493.7-8.
118. G. 495.16-504.8. Excerpts from each component of this argument follow:
(1) The first reason why we claim that Johnny is gone now through the negli-
gence of the railroad is the fact that the railroad never bothered to train Johnny
on the physical characteristics of the Norwich Yard. They never brought him
down ....
Now, it is our belief that the railroad has an obligation to Johnny Giulietti
and to Brakemen that before they work as a Conductor on any property where
they have never been before, to instruct them as to the physical characteristics of
where they are about to go so that they know where the switches are and they
know the curves of the track and how many tracks there are. If you are familiar
with the characteristics of a yard, well, then when you perch on top of a boxcar
looking for switches, you will have an idea of what you are looking for.
G. 495.25-496.4, 496.24-497.10.
(2) The second claim of negligence is the fact that Eddy [Hines] observed
this switch being in a reversed position. He knew that the switching move that
they were going to perform that night had to transverse [sic] that switch.... I
think a reasonably prudent person would have told his crew members, "Be care-
ful of the cross-over switch, it is reversed." For some reason, Eddy decided that
Johnny's a big boy and Johnny will find it himself. So he never told Johnny.
G. 497.11-15, 497.18-22.
(3) The third claim of negligence is the fact that the move that Eddy sug-
gested was to bring this whole train of eleven cars onto track three [in order to
hitch up with the cars at King Seeley]. Well, it is my claim that a reasonably pru-
dent Conductor in that situation would have taken the engine without any cars
and tied onto the two cars and would have been able to more safely handle his
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train .... The fact is, if you have two cars, you can stop a two-car train a lot
quicker than an eleven-car train, especially when you are going someplace where
a man is supposed to be a Conductor and is supposed to know the physical char-
acteristics and doesn't know where he is going.
G. 497.23-498.5, 498.11-16.
(4) Now, we also claim that there was negligence when Johnny radioed Eddy
Hines, "Okay to back up." We believe that Eddy never should have moved the
train. Other railroads.., would not permit the Engineer to move the train. Gen-
eral Train Master David Fitzgerald testified that he should not have moved the
train .... The instructions, "Okay to back up" in railroad meaning is not the
complete radio instruction, because you don't know where you are going or how
far you have to back up. The question is, why didn't Johnny tell Ed how far he
was going to back up? The obvious reason is, which Eddy very well knew, is that
Johnny didn't know where he was going.
G. 498.17-24, 499.2-9.
(5) Another act of negligence on the part of an agent of the railroad, being
Engineer Hines, is that he should have at some point inquired, "Johnny, where
are you going? What are you doing, Johnny? Do you know about that reversed
cross-over switch?" But there is no inquiry. If Eddy knew that switch was re-
versed, then under his rules he is supposed to stop one-half the distance to that
cross-over switch. He never stopped and continued to shove his train.
G.499.17-500.2.
(6) As he continued to shove the train, Danny Crawford testified that he
heard at least a couple of seconds of scratching or scraping noise being transmit-
ted over the radio. Ed Hines testified that he heard these scratching and scraping
noises being transmitted and he immediately put the independent brake on the
locomotive ....
... There are two brakes on the locomotive. One brake is your emergency
brake. When you have a problem, you put the train into emergency, and ... every
single brake on that train is applied on every one of the eleven cars and two
locomotives. This was not done. When Eddy heard the scratching and scraping
noise . . . , he put the independent brake on, and the independent brake does
nothing. All that does is put the brakes on the two locomotives and those cars,
eleven cars, will continue to go in a southerly direction ....
It is our belief that Eddy should have put the train into emergency....
G. 500.3-9, 500.20-501.5, 501.8-9.
(7) Now, we also believe that when you [are] perched on top of a rail car and
are looking to see if there is a switch ahead of you .... [i]t is our belief that ... it
is prudent for a railroad to have a light, one light, which would indicate where the
switches are. When you look at the exhibits ... you will note that the switches are
black and the background is a big black rock behind the two switches. It is some-
thing very difficult to ascertain in the middle of the night when you have a lantern
that.., you would be able to see, I believe it was, twenty-five feet in front of you.
If you are on top of a boxcar ten or fifteen feet high, it is even more difficult ....
If you had some lights there, that would benefit the switching crew, because they
would be able to see the area and would not be in the dark of night.
G. 501.20-22, 502.9-22, 502.24-503.2.
(8) Also, we believe that the Providence & Worcester Railroad should have
a standard rule that is on all other railroads .... This rule is that when you have a
cross-over switch, that cross-over switch has to always be lined straight and you
put a padlock on this cross-over switch to make sure that no one is going to throw
it or let anything happen.
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a gripping, concrete story of the fatal evening until pressed for time by
the judge's interruption, at which point he can spend only two tran-
script pages on it before the judge cuts him off again to urge him on to
his discussion of damages. 119 The railroad's counsel, on the other
hand, does not tell any sustained story about the accident. He argues
the issues of duty, breach, and causation, dwelling almost entirely on
Giulietti's responsibility and not his client's.
Thus, each lawyer in Giulietti explicitly argues a rule-element ver-
sion of the case, mentioning damages briefly at the end.120 Prototype
theory does not help to explain these argument structures. Instead,
each attorney organizes his argument to inculpate the other party, ap-
G. 5033-11.
(9) In addition, it is a practice on other railroads that they do have
targets.... Now, a target is a reflective, metal sign on the top of the switch. If you
have a lantern and you are traveling on the back of a boxcar at night, that reflec-
tive target is going to pick up the light from your lantern and you are going to
know, first of all, that there is a switch there and, second of all, you are going to
know the position of that switch .... We submit [this] should have been a practice
in the Providence & Worcester Railroad.
G. 503.14-504.3.
119. Now, what happened on July 28, 1980, was that John was perched on top of
the lead car trying to ascertain a position of the switch, which he never even knew
existed. He has a lantern and we are not saying with a lantern you can't tell the
position of the switch. Of course you can, but it is a difficult thing to do. You have
to know where the switches are, and you have to know exactly where to point the
lantern.
When John was coming down that lead track, he knows that track one switch
is going to be in front of him and he will put on the switch at the point of the track
one switch, but what he did not expect was right behind that track one switch,
there was a cross-over switch. John was on the side ladder... and he began to
make this cross-over move towards the main line. The clearance between his car
as it was on track one and the cars on the main line is very close. He does not
have room to ride between the cars. ... Once you begin that cross-over move,
that gap begins to narrow on you.
If you look at the autopsy report, it will clearly show that John died from a
crush injury of his lower abdomen and chest, but also will indicate that as far as
his lower extremities were concerned, that he had a compound fracture and dislo-
cation of his left ankle.
... When the car that he was riding.., side-scraped the car ahead, he was
actually crushed into the-he side-scraped it for about thirty feet, and this is pos-
sibly what they heard with the transmission of scraping and scratching noise. As
John was trying to cross over, he had to know that his life was over, unless Ed,
hearing the scratching and scraping noise on the radio, applied the emergency
brake and stopped the train instantly. He scraped that car for approximately
thirty feet ....
G. 504.11-506.6.
120. G. 506.17-508.5 (Giulietti's attorney); G. 523.9-524.19 (railroad's attorney).
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parently believing that the evidence of the other's carelessness was
strong enough to warrant a rule-element approach. 121
(b) The Prototypical Reasonable Person
The railroad's lawyer in Giulietti uses analogies and metaphors to
build person-situation prototypes of reasonable behavior under the
circumstances, and contrasts to them Giulietti's actual conduct on the
night of the accident. 122 The analogies are designed to appeal to the
jurors' common experience. To help make the somewhat difficult ar-
gument that if Giulietti wasn't capable of acting as conductor, he was
careless to accept the job and its attendant risks, counsel for the rail-
road argues: "You people in your daily lives, if you go somewhere and
someone says, well, what are we going to do tonight and says we will
do this, if you don't think you are capable of doing it, you don't do it.
If you do it, then I submit you would be negligent."'123 Along the same
lines, the lawyer tries to persuade the jury to infer from Giulietti's lack
of familiarity with the yard, not that the railroad was negligent in as-
signing an inexperienced man to conduct the crew at night, but rather
that Giulietti himself should have used greater caution in conducting
the crew. The lawyer explains:
We talk about driving a car, and maybe it is not a fair analogy to
say, but we will say in driving a car, for instance .... there are inter-
sections that have lights and stop lights and there are intersections
that have neither. Our caution is different at different intersections
and is governed by what our experience is as drivers. That doesn't
mean we have to qualify in physical characteristics every time we go
to a strange place, but we have to exercise more caution. If we don't
know where we are going, we have to stop and ask directions.124
While we might expect prototypes of reasonable behavior to take
analogic form, 125 not every analogy is effective. The railroad's lawyer's
analogies are flawed in two ways. First, neither seems obviously apt, as
a good analogy must be. For instance, some jurors may imagine that
121. Other heuristics, however, may be relevant; e.g., the fundamental attribution error
(see infra notes 182-257 and accompanying text) (by focusing so disproportionately on the
other party's conduct, each attorney makes the other party's behavior more salient, and
thus a more likely candidate for the cause of the accident).
122. In Butler, the most important prototypical construction is implicit. It is discussed
infra notes 218-30 and accompanying text.
123. G. 515.8-13.
124. G. 517.13-25. According to the leading torts treatise, this should have been a
promising argument, because "[a] person may be found negligent in proceeding in the face
of known ignorance." KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 32, at 185.
125. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (analogies or other constructions are
needed to depict model or standard of reasonableness in absence of evidence of custom).
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conducting a train is like driving-but with one person on the floor
controlling the brakes and the gas pedal, another steering blindfolded,
and a third on the roof giving directions. 126 And second, the analogy
of "declining to participate in an activity the jurors feel incapable of
doing" is too abstract: it is not drawn at the more concrete "basic
level" at which prototypes are most accessible. 127
The railroad's lawyer also uses metaphor to invoke a prototypical
reasonable person, and simultaneously argues that the jurors them-
selves fit the prototype but that Giulietti did not, and therefore acted
unreasonably. To make this argument, the attorney characterizes the
jurors as "people of common sense,"'128 and seeks to distinguish the
exercise of common sense from "20/20 hindsight" and "after-the-fact
guesswork" about what someone should have known or should have
done.129 The attorney's aim is to both persuade the jurors not to en-
gage in "after-the-fact guesswork" when they evaluate how his client,
the railroad, behaved, yet to encourage them to evaluate John Giu-
lietti's conduct "after the fact" and find that it was careless. This effort
to distinguish the jurors' evaluation of Giulietti's conduct from their
evaluation of the railroad's conduct depends on a metaphoric depic-
tion of the person who uses common sense, which the jurors fit but
which Giulietti does not.
126. I owe this observation to the students in my jurisprudence course, fall 1993 (notes
on file with author). The relevance of the first analogy would also be limited for any juror
who thought that Giulietti, as a junior employee of the railroad, was constrained to follow
orders in a way that the juror, in selecting among possible leisure-time activities, would not
be. By analogy to Bennett and Feldman's studies of the credibility of stories (see supra note
76 and accompanying text), jurors may find these analogies implausible because they do
not conform unproblematically to jurors' background knowledge of how the "conducting a
train" and "following orders at work" stories ought to proceed.
127. See LAKOFF, supra note 14, at 31-42,46-54 (discussing work of Rosch and others);
Cantor et al., supra note 75, at 56.
The analogies may also fail to persuade as arguments about causation. See infra notes
141-54 and accompanying text (simulation heuristic generally). First, the behavior of John
Giulietti that the driving simulation targets is a generalized lack of caution or attention to
his work, not the sort of specific antecedent of the accident with respect to which the
simulation heuristic seems most likely to work. Second, the driving simulation alone might
be unlikely to persuade jurors that Giulietti's behavior was a sufficient condition for the
accident, in the face of so many other allegedly careless acts by the railroad and its other
employees that intervened between Giulietti's generalized lack of caution and the moment
of impact. See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN TlE LAW 41-44 (2d ed.
1985) (arguing that intervening volitional acts break causal chain).
128. G. 509.22-25 (a metaphor that builds on the common metaphor understanding is
seeing and, by extension, a perceptual sense).
129. G. 510.1-2, 514.21-22.
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First, the lawyer argues that when Giulietti was riding the train
that night, he "wasn't paying attention" to where he was going.130 This
figure of speech understands thought as an object, and more particu-
larly, as currency. Attention is something that can be paid. 131
Next, the attorney explains that Giulietti's failure to pay attention
to what he was doing is "the bottom line of what this case is. ' 132 Here
the attorney metaphorically asks the jurors to think of the case as be-
ing like a balance sheet, with one feature-the bottom line-more im-
portant than any other. Again, the attorney uses a fiscal metaphor;
perhaps he thinks that people of "common sense" (i.e., the jurors) can
understand a balance sheet, or at least imagine that they can balance a
checkbook. 33 And again, the jurors, who use common sense, are dis-
tinguished from the plaintiff, who did not.
Finally, the railroad's lawyer argues: "If [Giulietti], . . . by not
paying attention caused his death, then everything washes, ladies and
gentlemen.' 34 The metaphor here, once again, is complicated trial as
simple financial transaction. While the popular understanding of "it's
a wash" may not include the technical, financial meaning of the
term,135 the phrase is widely understood to mean a balanced ex-
change: "it's a wash" means one thing cancels out the other. The law-
yer thus concludes by telling the jurors that if they give due weight to
Giulietti's inattention, their understanding of the lengthy trial and
complicated evidence will be balanced. More importantly, the trial
and the jurors' understanding of it will be complete, with no loose
ends ("everything washes"): Giulietti's negligence caused his own
death. The lawyer has used a sustained set of fiscal metaphors to dis-
tinguish the jury's task in evaluating Giulietti from its task in evaluat-
ing the railroad and its other employees: the latter involves
130. G. 516.13, 518.6-7, 520.9, 522.5, 522.22, 525.11.
131. Cf. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By 47-48 (1981)
(ideas can be objects, resources, commodities, or money).
132. G. 520.8-10; see also G. 517.2.
133. The use of an "economic man" prototype is also suggested, and thus perhaps
made both more salient and plausible, by the standard jury instruction on "ordinary care,"
which refers to how a person of reasonable prudence would manage his or her own prop-
erty. See supra note 86 (negligence instructions).
It may also be that defense counsel's stress on the "bottom line" is a way of telling the
jurors: This case is really just about money, and if you're tempted to find the railroad
negligent, don't forget that Giulietti was also negligent and that his negligence should re-
duce his estate's recovery. (I owe this observation to Neil Rogan, a student in my Jurispru-
dence course, spring 1993; notes on file with author.)
134. G. 525.10-12.
135. See JERRY M. ROSENBERG, DIcTIONARY OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT 471
(1978); WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1130 (1984).
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"guesswork" or "judgment calls" that can go either way, but the for-
mer is a straightforward, simple matter of the "bottom line. '136
For at least two reasons, this metaphoric construction of the de-
sired prototype of reasonableness may not be persuasive.137 First, the
lawyer may be drawing the prototype too abstractly.138 Second, the
cues for the prototype are relatively obscure. Research indicates that
the accessibility of a schema for making social judgments (like how to
evaluate a party to a lawsuit) increases with the number of behavioral
concepts relating to that schema that have been activated, but de-
creases with the length of time between activation and judgment. 139
By failing to activate the schema early, late, and often, the lawyer may
not adequately "prime" the jurors to use his "economic man"
prototype.
D. The Simulation Heuristic: Identifying the Cause of the Accident
The law typically instructs jurors to identify as the cause of an
accident a prior event that was a "substantial factor" in bringing about
the accident. 40 Cognitive psychology indicates that jurors are likely to
choose as the cause the prior event they perceive as most surprising or
deviant, the one that they most readily think "could have been other-
wise." We will examine lawyers' rhetoric to see how, by making salient
any arguably deviant conduct of the other party, they encourage ju-
rors to use their common sense causal attributions to fill in the very
broad and vague legal definition of causation.
136. Of course, the metaphor "everything washes" is ambiguous; the source could be
not financial affairs, but liquids. The railroad's lawyer might be suggesting that the jurors,
by understanding that Giulietti's negligence caused his own death, can award the plaintiff
nothing and still feel clean, as if they have "washed their hands" of the trial. (This also
neatly responds to Giulietti's attorney's liquid metaphor for justice-the "full cup of jus-
tice"-and to his reference to "look[ing] anyone in the eye" as a metaphor for being satis-
fied with their decision.)
137. Reactions from students who have examined the two transcripts confirm my im-
pression that the Giulietti defense counsel's metaphoric construction of the "economic
man" is far less successful than the Butler plaintiff's counsel's metaphoric construction of
his client as Rocky Balboa (notes on file with author). Cf infra notes 218-30 and accompa-
nying text.
138. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (prototypes most accessible at "basic
level").
139. Srull & Wyer, supra note 91.
140. For the substantial factor definition of cause-in-fact, see KETON ET AL., supra
note 1, § 41, at 267-68. In Connecticut law, the substantial factor test has been adopted to
define the proximate cause component of legal causation. See Doe v. Manheimer, 563 A.2d
699, 703-04 (Conn. 1989); Mahoney v. Beatman, 147 A. 762, 766-67 (Conn. 1929);
DouGLAss B. WRiGHT Er AL., CoNmarrcu LAW OF ToRTrs, § 32, at 56-57 (3d ed. 1991).
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(1) Causal Attribution as Counterfactual Analysis
Attribution theory offers explanations of how people determine
the causes of events.141 Research indicates that the analysis of causa-
tion is always implicitly, if not explicitly, counterfactual. All leading
models of causal attribution give answers to variations on the ques-
tion: Why did this event occur rather than that? And because explana-
tions ordinarily are sought only when what happens is contrary to
expectations or to the normal state of affairs, causal analysis can be
understood to answer the question: Why did this event occur rather
than the normal one?142 Thus, the question of causation in the acci-
dent case involves a comparison between what actually happened and
a contrasting, "normal" case in which the result to be explained-the
accident-did not occur.
When jurors decide a negligence case, how do they formulate the
hypothetical, counterfactual scenario with which they will compare
what actually happened? The simulation heuristic, an instance of the
availability heuristic, is particularly relevant to this task. Using the
simulation heuristic, people who must identify the cause(s) of some
outcome construct scenarios other than the one that actually occurred
by "undoing" one or more of the events that preceded the outcome.
They imagine: "If only x had been different, the outcome would have
been different." The more readily they can construct an alternative
141. See generally FisKE & TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 22-95; NISBETr & Ross, supra
note 13, at 30-32, 120-26; Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution
Process: On the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 38, at 129 (discussing how attribution biases cloud at-
tempts to predict, control, and understand events). Attribution theory also studies assign-
ments of responsibility. For distinctions and sometimes confusions between attributions of
causation and attributions of responsibility, see infra note 193. For a brief and very general
application of attribution theory to closing arguments, see Donald E. Vinson & Philip K.
Anthony, The Closing Argument: Applications of Attribution Theory, 7 TRIAL DIPL. J.,
Spring 1984, at 33 (1984) (explaining importance of offering jurors causal explanations of
events, including mention of internal versus external attributions (related to findamental
attribution error; see infra notes 182-88 and accompanying text); apparently misconstruing
role of "consensus" information (cf. infra note 192)).
142. Denis J. Hilton, Conversational Processes and Causal Explanation, 107 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 65, 70-71 (1990); Denis J. Hilton & Ben R. Slugoski, Knowledge-Based Causal Attri-
bution: The Abnormal Conditions Focus Model, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 75 (1986); see also
FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 63-66; Lloyd-Bostock. The Ordinary Man, supra note
15, at 146-47 (how causal attributions called for by events that are puzzling or violate a
norm). Hilton explains that causal explanations are sought against a background of what is
already known, which includes the presumed "ordinary" state of affairs. Hilton, supra, at
66; see generally CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE AND NATURAL EXPLANATION 5-6, 11-93 (Denis
J. Hilton ed., 1988) [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE] (collection of essays developing
various aspects of the contrastive view of causal explanation).
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scenario (Le., the easier it is to imagine a particular change in the
events preceding the outcome), the more probable they judge that al-
ternative, and the more likely they are to think that the actual out-
come need not have occurred and should have been avoided. 143 The
cause of the actual event is the prior occurrence that is changed in the
alternative story. "A cause must be an event that could easily have
been otherwise."' 44
In an early experiment, some subjects read a story about a man
who left his office at the usual time but drove home by an unusual
route; other subjects read a version in which he left early but took the
usual route. In both stories, the man braked hard to stop at a yellow
light, although he could easily have gone through. When the light
changed, he started through the intersection, only to be rammed and
instantly killed by a teenaged truck driver under the influence of
drugs. Subjects who read the "unusual route" version most often re-
sponded that if only the man had taken his usual route, the accident
would not have occurred. They did not tend to "undo" the stopping at
the yellow light or the presence of the teenager. Subjects who read the
143. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 38, at 201; Sherman & Corty, supra note 43, at 218-24.
Simulation may be employed not only post hoc to make judgments of causation, but also
ante hoc to make predictions or judge conditional probabilities. Kahneman & Tversky,
supra, at 202, 206-08.
For more recent research confirming people's use of the simulation heuristic, see, e.g.,
Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives,
93 PSYCHOL. REv. 136 (1986); C. Neil Macrae, A Tale of Two Curries: Counterfactual
Thinking and Accident-Related Judgments, 18 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 84
(1992); Dale T. Miller et al., Counterfactual Thinking and Social Perception: Thinking
About What Might Have Been, in 23 ADVANCEs IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
305 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1990); Dale T. Miller & Cathy McFarland, Counterfactual Think-
ing and Victim Compensation: A Test of Norm Theory, 12 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL 513 (1986); Gary L. Wells et al., The Undoing of Scenarios, 53 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 421 (1987); Gary L. Wells & Igor Gavanski, Mental Simulation of Causality,
56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 161 (1989); Wiener, Social Analytic Jurisprudence,
supra note 15.
Note the connection between the simulation heuristic and the "discounting principle,"
according to which an observer discounts any one candidate as a potential cause for an
event if other plausible causes are also present. Harold H. Kelley, Attribution in Social
Interaction, in ATTRIUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 1, 8-11 (Edward E.
Jones et al. eds., 1972); see also FisE & TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 38-39 (discussing the
work of Kelley). The attorney who prompts the simulation of a particular alternative sce-
nario and thus highlights one antecedent of the accident as a potential cause would thereby
reduce the chance that the jurors would attribute causal force to other antecedents.
144. Kahneman & Miller, supra note 143, at 149.
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"unusual time" version most often responded that undoing the time of
departure from the office would have avoided the accident. 145
This and other research show that people tend to imagine the al-
ternative scenario that changes or "normalizes" (and thus locates as
the actual cause) some surprising, "deviant" event in the actual
story.146 In the "unusual route" story, the man's choice of route is
deviant; in the "unusual time" version, the deviance is his decision to
leave the office early. The experiment also shows that people tend to
imagine a counterfactual scenario that changes some feature of the
main object of attention or concern: the behavior of the protago-
nist.147 Relatively few subjects sought to undo the accident by chang-
ing what one might have imagined they would identify as the cause-
the teenager's behavior.148 The main object of attention in the typical
accident case is likely to be the precautions taken (or omitted) to
avoid the risk of accident. 49 Thus, the cause of an accident is likely to
be perceived to be the act (or omission) that a protagonist could easily
have chosen to do otherwise. It follows that the more readily jurors
145. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 143, at 204-06. Kahneman and Tversky asked
their subjects to imagine how the man's family would complete the thought, "If only ....
[the accident would not have happened]." Id. at 206. This is substantially equivalent to a
judgment of what caused the accident; see infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing sufficiency versus necessity senses of causation).
146. Kahneman & Miller, supra note 143, at 142-45 (observing that events are more
"mutable," i.e., more likely to be changed to yield simulations, to the extent they are ex-
ceptions to routines, violations of ideals, or involve focal rather than background actors);
Miller et al., supra note 143, at 307-15 (adding that commissions are more likely to be
undone than omissions, and that acts are more likely to be undone if actor had a range of
options for acting); Wells et al., supra note 143, at 428-29 (adding that exceptions are more
likely to be mentally coded as occurrences, norms as nonoccurrences; thus, perceived cor-
relation between exceptions and outcomes may be stronger than that between norms and
outcomes); cf. Wells & Gavanski,,supra note 143, at 167 (qualifying norm theory to extent
that people trying to understand a normal, as opposed to an exceptional, outcome, tend to
mutate events toward the exceptional instead of toward the normal).
147. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 143, at 205-06; see also Kahneman & Miller,
supra note 143, at 144-45 ("the mutability of any aspect of a situation increases when atten-
tion is directed to it"; hence, the availability of a simulation that alters that aspect, and thus
points to that aspect as the cause of what actually happened, increases when the aspect is
the focus of attention).
148. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 143, at 204-06.
149. Cf. Karlovac & Darley, supra note 2, at 314-15; accord Green, supra note 15, at
245-48 (observing that major determinant on whether defendant was judged to have acted
reasonably was nature of defendant's precautions). Cf. Kahneman & Miller, supra note
143, at 145 (finding commissions more available than omissions, and thus more likely to be
identified as causes); Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989)
(arguing that notwithstanding treatises' focus on general standard of reasonable care,
courts decide negligence cases by analyzing whether accident was caused by one or more
precautions that plaintiff proposes defendant could have taken but did not).
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can imagine a person acting differently and thus avoiding the accident,
the more likely they are to find that the person's conduct caused the
accident, and that the person is at fault for not having acted
otherwise.' 50
Use of the simulation heuristic often yields accurate causal attri-
butions. 51 As with other instances of the availability heuristic, the
most accessible information may in fact be the most valid basis for the
inference to be made.' 52 And the use of the simulation heuristic ap-
pears to be consistent with how the law typically defines a legally suffi-
cient cause: one that is a "substantial factor" in bringing about the
result. 53 But simulation can bias causal judgments because people do
150. For research indicating that use of the simulation heuristic affects judgments of
fault and responsibility, and not merely causation, see Macrae, supra note 143, at 86 (find-
ing that when counterfactual simulations were readily available, e.g., when conduct preced-
ing accident was abnormal, subjects compensated accident victims more and found
perpetrators more negligent); Miller & McFarland, supra note 143, at 517 (reviewing two
experiments in which abnormal outcomes led to higher compensation awards than normal
outcomes; severity and probability of outcomes held constant); Ilana Ritov & Jonathan
Baron, Judgments of Compensation for Misfortune: The Role of Expectation, 24 EUR. J.
Soc. PSYCHOL. 525 (1994) (finding higher compensation awarded when accident occurred
as result of exception to routine; e.g., greater compensation when train engineer chose not
to stop train than when he unsuccessfully tried to stop it); Wiener, Social Analytic Jurispru-
dence; supra note 15, at 534-41 (noting that the availability of mutations of defendant's
conduct correlated with defendant's perceived fault). For related research that is consistent
with norm theory, see, eg., Jonathan Baron, Heuristics and Biases in Equity Judgments: A
Utilitarian Approach, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECrIVES ON JUsTIcE, supra note 49, at 109,
124-28 (reporting experiments in which subjects awarded greater compensation when harm
was caused by act than when caused by omission, and greater compensation when harm
was caused by person than when caused by nature). For research finding no effect of the
abnormality of an accident on mock jurors' damage awards, see Jane Goodman et al., Run-
away Verdicts or Reasoned Determinations: Mock Juror Strategies in Awarding Damages, 29
Juitumrmcs J. 285, 297 (1989) (finding that mean damage award in "exceptional" condi-
tion was not statistically different than mean damage award in typical condition).
Note that the use of the simulation heuristic may lead to results inconsistent with
those found by Karlovac & Darey, supra note 2 (noting that lay attributions of responsibil-
ity correspond to Learned Hand test of foreseeability and severity). For example, in
Macrae's research, supra note 143, subjects found a woman who got food poisoning after
eating at a restaurant she had not previously patronized (the abnormal or exceptional
event) less responsible and awarded her greater compensation than they did a woman who
got food poisoning at her usual restaurant. But if these subjects based their judgments on
foreseeability, they might very well have found the first woman more responsible for her
fate-she took the chance on an unusual restaurant. See Katherine Mary Demitrakis, How
Thinking About Alternatives May Influence Social Perception: The Role of Counterfactual
Thinking in People's Judgments of Sympathy, Blame, and Compensation 27 (1993) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, New Mexico State University).
151. See Wells & Gavanski, supra note 143, at 167.
152. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (availability heuristic).
153. See supra note 140. The simulation heuristic, moreover, closely tracks Hart and
Honore's classic conception of causation in law as a contingency, usually a human interven-
November 1995] THE RHETORIC OF TORTS
not necessarily change the prior event that was least likely to happen
and thus most likely to have "made the difference" between what hap-
pened and what could have happened. 154
In cases in which both the plaintiff and the defendant arguably
contributed to the accident, we might expect both attorneys to evoke
simulations favorable to their clients by characterizing some aspect of
the other party's behavior as unexpected or out of the ordinary, be-
cause that would make it easier for jurors to conceive of an alternative
scenario, minus the deviant conduct, in which the accident did not oc-
tion, that changes what would otherwise have occurred. See HART & HONORE, supra note
127, at 32-44. Several students of attribution theory have observed this similarity. See, e.g.,
Fincham & Jaspars, supra note 15, at 98-100; Hilton, supra note 142, at 67, 70-71; Lloyd-
Bostock, The Ordinary Man, supra note 15, at 146-47; Thomas R. Schultz & Michael
Schleifer, Towards a Refinement of Attribution Concepts, in ATrriBUTrION THEORY AND
RESEARCH, supra note 15, at 37, 47-48.
154. For instance, in the experiment described in the text, no subjects chose to undo
the event with the lowest prior probability: the man's reaching the intersection precisely
when he did, instead of a few seconds sooner (in which case he would have gone through).
Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 143, at 205. The authors observe: "The finding is typical:
Events are not mentally undone by arbitrary alterations in the values of continuous vari-
ables." Id. But see Wells et al., supra note 143, at 422 (creating a simulation by substituting
one arbitrary value of a continuous variable for another is not uncommon).
It can readily be seen that causal analysis using the simulation heuristic may diverge
from the scientific norm, because the heuristic yields judgments similar to those promoted
by the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, with the abnormal event identified as
"hoc." For example, consider the Bendectin products liability litigation. Despite over-
whelming scientific evidence showing no statistically significant correlation between prena-
tal exposure to Bendectin and the birth defects complained of, some juries continued to
find for plaintiffs. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799
(D.D.C. 1986) (granting j.n.o.v. to defendant upon finding that no reasonable jury could
conclude based on scientific evidence that Bendectin more likely than not caused birth
defects); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2799
(1993) (vacating and remanding affirmance of grant of summary judgment to defendant,
Supreme Court rules that trial judge, applying Federal Rule of Evidence 702, has duty to
ensure that expert testimony is relevant and rests on a "reliable foundation," which means
that it is based on "scientifically valid principles"); Cecil et al., supra note 8, at 740-42
(discussing how courts limit range of juries' decision-making by requiring that expert testi-
mony in Bendectin and other toxic tort cases be based on epidemiological evidence). Ju-
ries' reasoning on causation in these cases is explicable in terms of the simulation heuristic.
The actual scenario, in which the pregnant woman took Bendectin and her infant suffered
birth defects, could be contrasted with a "normal," background simulation in which she did
not take Bendectin and in which the infant was born healthy. Consequently, the taking of
Bendectin could be found to be the (necessary and sufficient) cause of the birth defects.
The same method of causal reasoning by post hoc, ergo propter hoc applies to positive
outcomes (and not only to negative ones, like injury-producing accidents), and leads many
laypeople to attribute causal efficacy, e.g., to any medical intervention, however worthless.
GILOVICH, supra note 59, at 127-29. "When an intervention is followed by improvement,
the intervention's effectiveness stands out as an irresistible product of the person's experi-
ence," even though the body's own healing processes are likely to yield the improvement
without any intervention at all. Id. at 128.
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cur. The attorneys might be expected to rely on stock scripts for situa-
tions like the one that led to the accident, in terms of which the
client's actual behavior appears normal and the opposing party's ap-
pears deviant.1 55
We might also expect counsel to describe what happened in a way
that matches laypeople's general schemas for causation. One of these
schemas is that causes resemble their effects, and hence a mishap that
had a big effect, e.g., a severe injury, must have a big cause, namely,
serious misconduct.'5 6 Another is that causes are linked to their
effects by short, simple chains-the two are close in space and
time.'5 7
155. See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text (discussing stock scripts in connec-
tion with narrative prototypes); see also Kahneman & Miller, supra note 143, at 149 (show-
ing how making client's behavior appear normal eliminates it as an apparent cause of the
event because the cause cannot be normal or "default" value among the conditions from
which event to be explained arose).
156. This is, of course, an instance of the representativeness heuristic. NiSBErr & Ross,
supra note 13, at 115-18, point out that lay causal schemas tend to attribute big effects to
big causes. Therefore, jurors might be expected to attribute the cause of a severe injury, a
big effect, to some major departure from ordinary behavior-not just a mere variation in
normal conduct but negligence, if not worse. See, e.g., Keith Scheider, Jury Finds Exxon
Acted Recklessly in Valdez Oil Spill N.Y. TiMws, June 14, 1994, at Al, A18 (according to
defendant's attorney, "[p]eople have an understandable tendency to equate the seriousness
of the consequences with the conduct that led up to it .... If a minor mistake has very
serious consequences, people will see the mistake as being greater than it was.").
For evidence of the influence of the representativeness heuristic on causal predictions
and explanation, see Stephen J. Read, Once Is Enough: Causal Reasoning from a Single
Instance, 45 J. PERSONALr=" & SOC. PSYCHOL. 323 (1983) (finding that subjects relied on
similarity of target person to previously experienced person rather than on rule to predict
target person's behavior). Cf. Joel T. Johnson & Jerome Drobny, Happening Soon and
Happening Later: Temporal Cues and Attributions of Liability, 8 BASIC & APPLIED SoC.
PSYc HOL. 209, 231 (1987) [hereinafter Johnson & Drobny, Happening Soon], in which the
authors try to explain their experimental observation that subjects held defendants less
responsible for effects temporally distant from the acts causing them (see infra note 157
and accompanying text). Johnson and Drobny speculate that subjects possess a prototype
for causation that includes actor and outcome as part of same unit; within this unit, the
representativeness heuristic leads subjects to ascribe to the actor the (negative) characteris-
tics of the outcome. Delay between act and out.come may sever the unit, leading subjects
not to taint the actor by the outcome.
157. FlsKE & TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 58-59; Joel T. Johnson & Jerome Drobny,
Proximity Biases in the Attribution of Civil Liability, 48 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
283, 292-94 (1985) [hereinafter Johnson & Drobny, Proximity Biases] (finding "causal
proximity bias": when negligent act that is but-for cause of injury has been identified, sub-
jects viewed effect as more foreseeable and actor as more clearly liable the fewer the
number of intervening events, Le., the simpler the causal chain; subjects also viewed actor
as more clearly liable the closer in time his negligent act was to the injury, though this
temporal proximity effect varied with type of case); see also Philip Brickman et al., Causal
Chains: Attribution of Responsibility as a Function of Immediate and Prior Causes, 32 J.
PERsONALTrrY & Soc. PSYcOL. 1060, 1066 (1975) (pointing out that the longer the per-
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The general structure of causal explanations suggests a further
hypothesis about strategic uses of the simulation heuristic. Both the
necessity and the sufficiency of a condition are relevant to lay judg-
ments of its causal force, although it is unclear which is more impor-
tant. 58 By invoking the simulation heuristic, the plaintiff's lawyer may
attempt to show that the defendant's behavior was both necessary and
ceived causal chain, the less the perceived responsibility of human actors). Johnson &
Drobny, Proximity Biases, supra, at 295, specifically comment that plaintiffs' attorneys
should take advantage of these proximity biases in causal attribution by making "the chain
from act to injury appear as simple and succinct as possible," while defendants' attorneys
should argue the opposite. They also suggest that plaintiffs' attorneys who have to argue
for a long cause-effect delay should try to counteract the proximity biases by invoking the
long latency periods associated with cancer, heart disease, or other such well-known phe-
nomena. See also Johnson & Drobny, Happening Soon at 230-33 (finding that defendants
but not plaintiffs were perceived as less liable when injury occurred an unexpectedly long
time after acts causing injury; this seems to be due to a perceived weakening of the cause-
effect link and not to increased attributions to alternative causes). But cf. Amiram Vinokur
& Icek Ajzen, Relative Importance of Prior and Immediate Events: A Causal Primacy Ef-
fect, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 820, 827-28 (1982) (observing "causal primacy"
phenomenon: when two causes have equal weight in bringing about an effect when viewed
independently, first cause in two-cause chain is perceived to have greater causal impact).
For an attempt to synthesize the research on these sorts of "causal cues" with other
research on various aspects of causal judgment, see Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth,
Judging Probable Cause, 99 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (1986).
Laypeople may also have content-specific intuitions about causation. In one experi-
ment, subjects read one of three versions of a scenario in which a woman contracted ova-
rian cancer: in one, she alleged that her cancer was due to chemicals from a nearby dump
which contaminated the water supply; in a second, to the ink she used in calligraphy; in a
third, to birth control pills. Bornstein & Rajki, supra note 21, at 132-33. The scientific
evidence presented exactly the same causal information in all three versions. Id Yet more
subjects attributed the victim's cancer to the chemicals in the dump than to either of the
other possible causes. Id. at 142. Thus, subjects appeared to judge causation in accordance
with prior, implicit theories about what causes what: specifically, that cancer is more likely
to be caused by chemicals (or environmental toxins generally) than by the other sources.
Id
158. A prior event that is perceived to be both a necessary and sufficient condition of a
later event presents the strongest case for causation; a condition that is neither necessary
nor sufficient presents the weakest. Kathleen M. McGraw, Conditions for Assigning Blame:
The Impact of Necessity and Sufficiency, 26 BRIT. J. Soc. PsYcH. 109, 110 (1987); see also
Schultz & Schleifer, supra note 153, at 47-48 (analyzing causal attributions in terms of
necessity and sufficiency). McGraw summarizes reasons why sufficiency might be expected
to have a greater impact than necessity on causal judgments, but her own research did not
confirm this. McGraw, supra, at 115. Indeed, other research has indicated that people use
necessity but not sufficiency information in making causal judgments. See Schultz &
Schleifer, supra note 153, at 48-52 (discussing and suggesting explanations for earlier re-
search results). But cf. Patricia W. Cheng & Richard E. Nisbett, Pragmatic Constraints on
Causal Deduction, in RuLEs FOR REASONING, supra note 49, at 207-27 (necessity and suffi-
ciency do not explain lay use of causal concepts; experimental subjects employ what au-
thors call "pragmatic reasoning schemas" to augment their understanding of necessity and
sufficiency).
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sufficient to bring about the accident: necessary, because the simula-
tion shows that without that behavior, the accident would not have
occurred; sufficient, in that the simulation highlights the defendant's
actual behavior among the accident's antecedents. 5 9 The defendant's
lawyer, meanwhile, can use simulation to show that his client's behav-
ior was not necessary to bring about the accident, if the simulation
lacks that behavior but does include the accident. Thus, we might ex-
pect to see two simulation strategies in cases in which both parties'
behavior arguably contributed to the accident: the offensive strategy
of showing that the other party's behavior was necessary and sufficient
to bring about the accident, and the defensive strategy of showing that
the client's behavior was not necessary for the accident. 160
(2) The Simulation Heuristic in the Arguments
The simulation heuristic helps us make sense of many causation
arguments in accident cases. In Roe v. Hocon Gas,'6' the attorneys'
uses of the simulation heuristic lead to what appear to be correct
causal attributions. 62 Hocon periodically delivered propane gas to the
Roes. One afternoon Alexander Roe, resting in his living room, heard
a hissing and smelled gas coming from the kitchen. After getting a
telephone repairman who happened to be working outside his house
The legal definitions corresponding to these two senses of causation are, respectively,
the "but for" test, see KEETON Er AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 265-67), and the "substantial
factor" test, see id. at 267-69.
159. This analysis is based on the logical definitions of sufficiency (if p, then q) and
necessity (q only if p, and thus, if notp, then not q). Note that Kahneman & Tversky asked
their subjects to complete a line of thought beginning with "If only ... " which appears to
solicit a judgment about the necessity, not the sufficiency, of the target condition. See supra
notes 143-150 and accompanying text (simulation heuristic experiment). As a purely logical
matter, the plaintiff's lawyer cannot use the simulation heuristic to prove that the defend-
ant's behavior was necessary for the accident, because that would require an indefinitely
large number of scenarios, in each of which the absence of the target behavior is followed
by no accident.
160. Note that the remaining strategic possibility, showing that the client's behavior
was not sufficient to bring about the accident, is accomplished not through the simulation
heuristic per se but through counterfactual reasoning using evidence of customary behav-
ior. Evidence that the client's behavior conforms to custom amounts to a contrast between
the actual events and one or more scenarios in which the target behavior does occur but
the accident does not. In standard tort doctrine, evidence that a party's behavior conforms
to custom is probative but not conclusive of due care. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 1,
§ 33, at 193-96.
161. CV-91-0117822S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jud. Dist. of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford
1994). All citations are to the trial transcript of January 14, 1994 unless otherwise specified.
162. The attributions of the causes of the explosion and Roe's injury, respectively, are
"correct" in the sense that the simulations change the prior events with the lowest objec-
tive ex ante probabilities.
November 1995] THE RBETORIC OF TORTS
to come inside and confirm his suspicions, Roe went out into his front
yard, together with his wife and the repairman. Roe then walked back
in, and the house blew up. Roe died of his injuries a month later.
Both lawyers offer the jurors simulations to identify the cause of
Roe's fatal injuries. Roe's attorney focuses much of his argument on
Hocon's duty to replace the regulator on the Roes' propane tank,
which was at least 30 years old at the time of the accident. He thus
contrasts Hocon's failure to replace the regulator with the implicit
"normal" simulation: if Hocon had replaced the old regulator with a
new one, the explosion would not have occurred.163 Hocon's lawyer
counters with an explicit, obvious simulation: "If Mr. Roe had not
gone back into the house, he wouldn't have been hurt .... Mrs. Roe
and Mr. Perillo [the telephone company repairman] didn't go back
into the house and they weren't hurt."' 64
In Butler, the plaintiff's attorney uses the simulation heuristic to
persuade jurors to adopt a more problematic causal attribution.
Neither the law165 nor the evidence 166 in Butler dictates the "normal"
scenario for loading machinery onto trucks and covering it with a tar-
paulin, leaving the attorneys free to suggest simulations that favor
their respective clients. Only Butler's attorney argues as if jurors will
163. Roe's attorney's argument that the explosion must have been caused by the age of
the regulator implicitly depends on the simulation heuristic for the following reason. There
is some evidence that regulators more than 15 years old should be replaced, regardless of
condition (R. 71.20-72.2, 82.5-8, 82.12, 85.9-10, 94.17-21 (Jan. 11, 1994); R. 156.9-22 (Jan. 12,
1994)), and when Hocon learned of this sometime in 1989, it began a program to replace
them (R. 158.6-163.17 (Jan. 12, 1994)). But most regulators don't fail. Presumably many
older regulators were still in use as of the date of the Roes' accident, yet theirs was the only
one involved in an explosion. That is, it could be argued that the defendant's alleged negli-
gence in allowing the use of an older regulator was not sufficient to cause the accident. For
the argument to make sense, then, jurors must imagine an alternative scenario: new regula-
tors don't fail, so that if Hocon had replaced the Roe's old regulator with a new one, the
explosion would not have occurred.
164. R. 69.13-14, 69.18-19. The "normal" counterfactual scenario-Roe stays outside
with his wife and Perillo instead of going back inside-is so readily constructed that Roe's
attorney does not try to contest the causal argument it implies. Instead, he argues at great
length that Roe did not act unreasonably in going back inside because he should not have
foreseen the explosion, and that to hold him responsible would be unfairly to blame the
victim (R. 38.25-41.9). See infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text (describing fundamen-
tal attribution error and anti-plaintiff bias).
165. Revere's attorney correctly observes that it is the driver's duty to secure the load
(B. 32.12-33.2); Butler's attorney acknowledges this and counters that this duty does not
mean that the driver has to do the whole job himself (3. 36.14-37.11). The judge agrees (B.
54.1-12; see also B. 58.26-59.8 (Apr. 25, 1990) (same)). But ef supra note 110 (contract
norm of reciprocity may govern Butler's and Brockway's behavior).
166. See supra note 109 (evidence about "normal scenario" for loading and tarping
machinery).
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use the simulation heuristic to determine causation, 167 but these argu-
ments are central to his only sustained narrative of the accident. 168 He
evokes simulation in four ways. First, he introduces the idea of think-
ing in terms of alternative scenarios by saying: "On January 20, 1986
[Butler's] life changed and it didn't have to be changed this way."'1 69
Second, he argues that Revere changed the work order detailing what
machinery Butler was to load onto the truck.170 It is unclear how this
change, if indeed it occurred, 171 could have made it any more likely
that Butler would hurt himself; the lawyer's strategy, apparently, is
merely to prompt the jurors to think "what if."1 72 Third, Butler's at-
torney questions why Revere wanted the machinery covered with a
tarpaulin at all.173 By questioning the rationality of this demand, the
lawyer indicates that Revere's conduct was deviant and, of course,
leads the jurors to infer that if Butler had not been required to cover
the load, he would not have fallen and hurt himself.174
Fourth and most importantly, Butler's lawyer argues that Re-
vere's employees, especially Brockway, "didn't lift a finger" to help
Butler cover the load; instead, they went on their coffee break. 75 It
"[w]ouldn't have taken very much," but Brockway let Butler struggle
alone with the tarpaulin "for the sake of a cup of coffee."' 76 Thus the
attorney prompts the jurors to imagine a scenario in which the defend-
ant's employees help their fellow laborer for a few moments, putting
off their coffee break for that long. In contrast, the "cup of coffee"-
167. Perhaps this is to be expected. Revere's counsel's basic argument is not so much
that Butler caused the accident-recall that there is no evidence about how Butler fell-as
that Revere owed no duty to help Butler, and thus was not culpable for not helping him.
But see infra text following note 196 (suggesting how lawyers for defendants in general
might be expected to counter the implicit "someone's to blame" schema).
168. B. 25.4-27.24; see supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of
this story.
169. B. 24.5-6.
170. B. 24.12-25.3; see also B. 37.12-38.3 (rebuttal).
171. Whether the work order was changed is the only significant dispute of fact in the
summations. See B. 35.12-24.
172. Butler's attorney may also be trying to enhance the image of his client as a good
soldier who did what he was asked. See; eg., B. 24.12-24.
173. B. 25.4-12.
174. Requiring the load to be tarped was not "unreasonable" in the legal sense that it
unreasonably increased the risk of harm to Butler or others. See, e.g., KEETON Er AL,
supra note 1, § 31, at 169-70 (defining negligence as the creation of unreasonable risk).
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the failure to help-becomes the salient, deviant behavior, and hence
the leading causal candidate for Butler's fall.177
To appreciate how this use of the simulation heuristic departs
from other plausible causal attributions,178 recall that there is no evi-
dence at all of how Butler fell, and thus no way to determine whether
Revere's employees' failure to help really had anything to do with the
fall. For all we know, it is at least as likely that Butler fell because he
simply lost his footing, without any carelessness on anyone's part. But
such a slip-like the lapse in concentration or attention that probably
caused John Giulietti's death179-does not stand out as a distinct
event that can be contrasted to a no-accident simulation (which may
be one reason why Revere's attorney does not use this heuristic to
argue that Butler caused the accident). A misstep is like arriving at the
intersection a few seconds earlier, rather than leaving the office at an
unusual time or travelling by an unusual route.180 The conduct of the
defendant's employees, as Butler's attorney describes it, does stand
out.'8 '
E. The Fundamental Attribution Error: Assigning Blame
Social psychological research strongly suggests that jurors are
prone to assume that if an accident has occurred, someone deserves
blame for it, and to allocate that blame based on the sorts of people
they perceive the parties to be. Both habits of thought flatly contradict
the law of negligence, which requires proof of fault and makes rele-
vant to fault only the parties' behavior under the circumstances, not
the types of people they are. Negligence lawyers, therefore, argue
about fault implicitly as well as explicitly, using a variety of rhetorical
techniques to invoke jurors' common sense attributions while out-
wardly conforming to the law.
177. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text (normal scenario and deviance in
Butler).
178. See, e.g., supra note 158 (scientific model of cause as necessary and sufficient
condition).
179. See supra text following note 115 (describing facts of Giulietti); supra notes 123-24
and accompanying text (noting railroad's attorney's effort to define John Giulietti's lack of
attention as culpable carelessness).
180. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text (describing simulation heuristic
experiment).
181. Cf. Ritov & Baron, supra note 150, at 529-30, 537 (finding that with causation and
harm held constant, experimental subjects awarded greater compensation when harm was
caused by train engineer's deliberate refusal to stop train than by his unsuccessful attempt
to stop it).
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(1) Attribution Theory and Judgments of Legal Responsibility
(a) The Fundamental Error Generally
Psychologists have identified as the "fundamental attribution er-
ror" the tendency inappropriately to attribute the behavior of another
person to her corresponding dispositions or traits (i.e., "the sort of
person she is") rather than to the circumstances in which she finds
herself, including role demands.182 In one experiment, listeners as-
sumed that speakers' pro-Castro remarks corresponded to the speak-
ers' private opinions even though the listeners knew that the speakers
were obeying the experimenter's explicit request to make those re-
marks.183 In another, subjects were arbitrarily assigned to play the role
of either questioner or contestant in a general-knowledge quiz game.
Questioners were able to display esoteric knowledge and to avoid top-
ics of which they were ignorant; contestants, obviously, lacked these
role-defined advantages. Both contestants and uninvolved observers
familiar with the experimental roles rated the questioners as generally
more well-informed, even though the questioners' superior display of
knowledge plainly depended on their role in the experiment.' 84 As
these examples illustrate, attributions of behavior to the actor's traits
rather than to the circumstances are likely to be erroneous because,
and to the extent that, there is little correlation between dispositions
and behavior across different situations. 8 5
182. See Ross & Anderson, supra note 141, at 135-40.
183. Id. at 136 (citing research of Jones and Harris).
184. Id. at 136-38 (citing research of Ross et al.).
185. See Thomas C. Monson, Implications of the Traits v. Situations Controversy for
Differences in the Attributions of Actors and Observers, in ATrRmBUTON THEORY AND RE-
SEARCH, supra note 15, at 293, 295-97. Normatively, the observer's knowledge that the
actor's behavior conforms to social role ought to lead the observer to conclude that the
behavior does not tell her much about the actor's dispositions. See FisKE & TAYLOR, supra
note 40, at 26-28 (summarizing work of Jones and Davis; also noting that to the extent an
actor's behavior is perceived not to be the result of choice or to be socially desirable, the
behavior ought not to be considered informative about the actor's dispositions).
Some social psychologists have questioned the cogency and even the existence of the
fundamental attribution error, arguing that more recent research has not established that
people display a general predilection to attribute causes to dispositions rather than circum-
stances, has failed to substantiate the systematic differences between actor and observer
attributions on which the fundamental attribution error is partly based, and has failed to
demonstrate that attributions to the person are any more likely to be erroneous than attri-
butions to the circumstances. Se4 eg., Icek Ajzen & Martin Fishbein, Relevance and Avail-
ability in the Attribution Process, in ATrRmuTiON THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 15,
at 63, 80-83; John H. Harvey et al., How Fundamental is "The Fundamental Attribution
Error"?, 40 J. PERSONALrry & Soc. PSYCHOL 346 (1981) (arguing that imputation of en-
during dispositions to persons may be tenable); John H. Harvey & Richard P. McGlynn,
Matching Words to Phenomena: The Case of the Fundamental Attribution Error, 43 J. PER-
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The fundamental attribution error reflects both the availability
and representativeness heuristics. It derives from the availability heu-
ristic because, in social settings, actors tend to appear more salient,
and hence are more available, than situational elements, and are thus
more likely to be seen as causal agents. 186 It also derives from overre-
liance on the representativeness heuristic because it treats behavior as
representative of a dispositional state it resembles. 187
This cognitive habit suggests two implications for jurors' decisions
in accident cases. First, jurors are likely to assume that accidents don't
happen unless someone was negligent. Second, they are likely to attri-
bute causation (and, hence, fault and responsibility) on the basis of
the parties' personal dispositions. 188 I will explain each of these impli-
cations in turn.
SONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 345 (1982) (questioning "fundamental" status of fundamental
attribution error); Monson, supra at 297-313 (criticizing and elaborating on fundamental
attribution error explanation for actor/observer differences in attributions); William
Turnbull & Ben R. Slugoski, Conversational and Linguistic Processes in Causal Attribution,
in CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE, supra note 142, at 72-74 (suggesting that attribution of causes
is shaped by conversational and informational needs rather than by any inherent bias to-
ward personal attribution). For a review of this research, see FisKE & TAYLOR, supra note
40, at 69-72, 74-75.
For cross-cultural research indicating that attributions to the person may result from
broader cultural meaning systems rather than (solely) from innate cognitive processes, see
Joan G. Miller, Culture and the Development of Everyday Social Explanation, 46 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 961, 973 (1984) (finding that American adults attribute behav-
ior to general dispositions rather than to contextual factors to a greater extent than do
Hindu adults or American children and arguing that differences may be due to contrasting
cultural conceptions of the person, in particular the Western emphasis on individualism);
see also V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE 119 (1992) (finding
that Americans tend to view the responsible actor as an isolated individual, equal in status
to others, whereas Japanese tend to determine responsibility by viewing the actor contextu-
ally, as a person with close, hierarchical ties with others).
186. Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 38, at 192-94; see also NIsBE-rr & Ross,
supra note 13, at 122-27 (describing research showing that people tend to attribute more
causal force to actors they can perceive than to those they cannot); infra note 206 (research
on actor-observer effect).
187. NISBETT & Ross, supra note 13, at 120; Sherman & Corty, supra note 43, at 203-
04. That is, the fundamental attribution error reflects the representativeness heuristic in
that people believe that causes resemble their effects, and therefore, that an effect (e.g.,
selfish behavior) must be due to a cause it resembles (a selfish disposition) rather than one
it does not (e.g., the circumstances). Cf. supra note 156 and accompanying text (representa-
tiveness heuristic and causal reasoning).
188. This discussion highlights the role of attribution error, but is not meant to suggest
that it is the only factor in jurors' causal attributions. For instance, according to the "locus
of control" theory, jurors' causal attributions may vary depending on whether they are
"externals," who tend to perceive reinforcing events for behaviors (e.g., promotions or
demotions at work, good or bad grades at school, etc.) as driven by causes external to
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(b) "Someone's to Blame"
The fundamental attribution error should dispose jurors to find
that accidents are due to someone's negligence-that "someone's to
blame"-because jurors are asked to determine the reasonableness of
a party's behavior by comparing it to the conduct of the "reasonably
prudent person" or "ordinarily prudent person" in similar circum-
stances.189 If the reasonably prudent person would have acted differ-
ently, the party is negligent.190 The fundamental attribution error
answers essentially the same question: Would others have acted differ-
ently?191 Recall that the fundamental attribution error is to attribute
the actor's behavior to his personality, to something "in" him, rather
than to the circumstances. This is tantamount to saying that some sub-
stantial percentage of others would have acted differently under the
circumstances. If most others would have acted the same way as the
actor did, then the attribution, logically, would have to be to the cir-
cumstances, because nothing "in" the actor led him to act differently
from the norm. Hence, the tendency to commit the fundamental attri-
bution error would lead jurors to differentiate the actor's behavior
from the norm, and thus to hold him responsible for acting as he
did.i'2
themselves, or "internals," who believe that they themselves are responsible for bringing
about reinforcing events. See FisKE & TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 86-91 (discussing work of
Rotter and others).
189. See supra note 86 (standard negligence instructions).
190. Unless, of course, the party exercised greater care than the reasonably prudent
person would have under the circumstances. This possibility is not at issue in many cases,
including those studied in the present research, and thus can be ignored for purposes of
this Article.
191. According to textbook law, behavior in accordance with custom is usually proba-
tive but not dispositive of due care. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 33 at 193-96.
Compliance with customary behavior does not absolve a business entity from responsibility
if the custom of the entire industry is careless. Id. at 194-95 (citing The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d
737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932)). Conversely, a divergence from custom does not conclusively es-
tablish carelessness. KEETON ET AL., supra at 195. But generally speaking, the "reasonably
prudent person" corresponds to how (the jurors think) people other than the actor (Le., an
idealized version of themselves) would have behaved in similar circumstances (see supra
note 92 and accompanying text); at the very least, the hornbook law of negligence allows
jurors great latitude to equate the two.
192. Why a comparison between the party's behavior and that of the reasonably or
ordinarily prudent person in similar circumstances should yield attribution error may be
explained in terms of Harold Kelley's highly influential covariational model of attribution.
Harold H. Kelley, The Processes of Causal Attribution, 28 AM. PSYCHOL. 107, 108-13
(1973). According to Kelley, observers making causal attributions need not only "consen-
sus" information (how do other people behave in this type of situation?), but also "distinc-
tiveness" information (how does the actor behave in other types of situations?) and
"consistency" information (how does this actor behave in this type of situation on other
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This point can be made another way. Assume that no one is re-
sponsible for the accident, in the sense that no one is at fault. The
accident "just happened." This amounts to saying, of each party, that
there is no good reason to expect that party to have acted differently
in order to avoid the accident. Under the circumstances, anyone else
would have behaved the same way. But this conflicts with the funda-
mental attribution error, which posits that under the circumstances,
others would not have behaved the same way. The commission of the
fundamental attribution error, therefore, is inconsistent with the as-
sumption that no one is responsible for the accident. 193
occasions?). At the poles, low consensus (others don't act this way in similar circum-
stances) and low distinctiveness (the actor behaves this way in other circumstances) lead to
an attribution of causation to the person; high consensus (others act this way in similar
circumstances) and high distinctiveness (the actor doesn't behave this way in other circum-
stances) lead to an attribution of causation to the circumstances. See, e.g., FiSKE & TAY-
LOR, supra note 40, at 33-36 (summarizing Kelley's covariational theory); Hilton, supra
note 142, at 68-69 (same). The standard instruction, at best, asks only about the consensus
dimension. The highly important distinctiveness dimension remains implicit. To the extent
to which jurors attribute in conformance with the standard covariational model, they must
address the distinctiveness dimension by constructing a personality profile for the actor: Is
he or isn't he the sort of person who acts this way in other situations, in the presence of
other stimuli? Thus, the instruction implicitly allows for the fundamental attribution error.
Note that Kelley's covariational model may be applicable to jurors' determinations of
reasonableness only by analogy. First, it is a model for attributing causation, not responsi-
bility (but see infra note 193 on close relation between the two concepts; see also Judith A.
Howard & Randy Levinson, The Overdue Courtship of Attribution and Labelling, 48 Soc.
PSYCHOL. Q. 191 (1985) (applying Kelley's model to mock criminal jury deliberations; find-
ing, inter alia, that jurors tended to find defendants who behaved abnormally in normal
situations guilty, and to find defendants who behaved normally in very abnormal situations
not guilty)). Second, the covariational model requires data of multiple instances of the
relevant behaviors, varying for actor, stimulus, and circumstances. Third, jurors may judge
causation by using some other, counterfactual model. For discussions and critiques of Kel-
ley, see, e.g., Charles Abraham, Seeing the Connections in Lay Causal Comprehension: A
Return to Heider, in CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE, supra note 142, at 145; Hilton, supra note
142, at 69-71.
193. The fundamental attribution error concerns judgments about the causes of behav-
ior, not about responsibility for outcomes, which is the question jurors must decide. It is
nevertheless appropriate to conflate, as does my argument in the text, the attribution of
causation (of the behavior) with the attribution of responsibility (for the outcome) in the
present context.
In the psychological research, people commit the fundamental attribution error when
asked the question: Why did the person act that way-was it the circumstances or his per-
sonal disposition? Jurors deciding accident cases confront what appears to be a very differ-
ent question: Is the actor responsible for the accident? And this latter question ought to
break down into two further distinct inquiries: whether the act caused the accident, and
whether the person acted as she did because she was careless. The hypothesis that the
fundamental attribution error yields the presumption that "someone's to blame" thus
seems to confuse the attribution of causation (of the behavior) with the attribution of re-
sponsibility (for the outcome).
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Many social psychologists are careful to observe that attributions of causation and
responsibility are different matters. See, e.g., FIsKE & TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 83-86;
SHAVER, supra note 15, at 63-113; Fincham & Jaspars, supra note 15, at 81, 82-85; McGraw,
supra note 158, at 109-17 (distinguishing between causation and blame); Kelly G. Shaver &
Debra Drown, On Causality, Responsibility, and Self-Blame: A Theoretical Note, 50 J. PER-
sONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 697, 700-01 (1986) (same).
Specifically, an attribution of causation is ordinarily necessary but not sufficient for an
attribution of responsibility. On causation as necessary for responsibility, see, e.g., Fincham
& Jaspars, supra note 15, at 125-27 (discussing variations on possible relationship of entail-
ment among attributions of causation, responsibility, and blame). Responsibility without
causation may arise when a person in a certain relationship to one who causes harm is held
answerable, e.g., vicarious liability of an employer for acts by employees within the scope
of employment. An attribution of causation, however, is ordinarily not sufficient for an
attribution of responsibility. The latter involves other dimensions, such as the extent to
which the actor was free to act and whether he should have foreseen the likely conse-
quences. See, e.g., FIsKE & TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 83-84; SHAVER, supra note 15, at 84-
86. A third factor that might arguably lead to an attribution of causation but not responsi-
bility for an accident is the presence of an intervening cause.
The usual relationship between attributions of causation and responsibility was cap-
tured in FRrrz HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1958). In this
classic work, which provided a structure and research program for much subsequent work
in the field, Heider analyzed the attribution of responsibility into five levels. The first level
is an attribution based on the mere association of the target with the effect; the second,
causation of the effect by the target; the third, causation with foreknowledge that the effect
was likely to occur; fourth, causation with intention to bring about the effect; and fifth,
intentional causation of the effect but with a justification. Id. at 112-14. See Fincham &
Jaspars, supra note 15, at 91 (discussing Heider's levels of attribution of responsibility); see
also FisKE & TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 25-26 (same). It can readily be seen from this
typology that a judgment of responsibility ordinarily requires something in addition to an
attribution of causation.
Legal doctrine, of course, recognizes some of these distinctions. For instance, tort law
absolves from responsibility persons who were physically unable to control their harmful
behavior. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 29, at 163 (describing the doctrine of
unavoidable accident; see Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B.1616)). On the other
hand, for various policy reasons, the law permits the attribution of responsibility in some
circumstances upon a mere showing that the actor caused the injury, without requiring an
attribution of responsibility in any other sense. This is strict liability. See KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 1, §§ 75-81, at 534-83.
Notwithstanding these distinctions between attributions of causation and responsibil-
ity, the fundamental attribution error is relevant to attributions of responsibility for acci-
dents for two reasons. First, the distinction between behavior and outcomes diminishes in
jurors' minds because, based on the simulation heuristic, jurors should already be likely to
attribute the cause of the accident to one or more acts or omissions of a party, especially
precautions taken or foregone. Thus, an inquiry into the cause of the behavior in question
will appear to jurors to be an inquiry into a possible cause of the accident.
Second, the two requirements beyond causation for attributing responsibility for out-
comes, control and foreseeability, are also implicitly satisfied in the context of the accident
case. The law regards the actor as free to act in the absence of evidence of mental incapac-
ity, compulsion, or unavoidable accident. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 32, at 176-79
(mental capacity); id. § 29, at 162-64 (compulsion, unavoidable accident). Furthermore, the
"hindsight bias" implicitly furnishes the foreseeability dimension of responsibility. Accord-
ing to the hindsight bias, knowing that an outcome has occurred increases its perceived
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likelihood. Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Bi-
ases in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 38, at 335, 341-43 [here-
inafter Fischhoff, Heuristics]; Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight # Foresight. The Effect of
Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM.
PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288-99 (1975) [hereinafter Fischhoff, Outcome Knowledge];
Hawkins & Hastie, supra note 49 (surveying research on hindsight bias and explaining the
causes of bias). People judge what actually happened as having been more foreseeable
than it was, and therefore judge the actor as more responsible for not predicting and avoid-
ing it. Taken together, the assumptions that the actor could have behaved differently and
should have foreseen the consequences of his behavior lead under hombook negligence
law to the conclusion that the actor is at fault for not acting differently. See Loftus &
Beach, supra note 49, at 949 (speculating that jurors, knowing the unfortunate outcome,
should be readier to find conduct unreasonable because actor should have foreseen risks);
see also Casper et al., supra note 74, at 308-09 (finding that hindsight bias may account for
criminal jurors' inability to obey instructions to disregard pretrial publicity and inadmissi-
ble testimony and suggesting application of hindsight bias to analysis of juror decision-
making in tort cases). Thus, the fundamental attribution error should bias jurors' attribu-
tions of responsibility for accidents, and not merely their attributions of the causes of
behavior.
Empirical justification for conflating attributions of causation and responsibility, appli-
cable generally and not just to accident cases, is provided by research showing that in terms
of Heider's levels of responsibility (see HEIDER, supra, at 112-14), the greatest marginal
increase in attribution of responsibility occurs when causation, and not merely association,
is present. See SHAVER, supra note 15, at 103-04; F. Fincham & J. Jaspars, Attribution of
Responsibility to the Self and Other in Children and Adults, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1589 (1979). Further support for this conflation of causation and fault may be
inferred from Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
368 (1992) (concluding that test subjects tend to select most blameworthy conduct as most
important causal factor). Still more support is provided by interview research showing that
accident victims strongly associate the two. Whether the victims identify themselves or
others as the cause of the accident, more than 85% attribute fault to the person identified
as the cause. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 92, at 153-54.
An additional theoretical justification for conflating attributions of causation and re-
sponsibility is that the social context may make the causal attribution tantamount to an
attribution of responsibility. That is, jurors are likely to make causal attributions with the
socially governed consequences-a judgment of responsibility and liability-in mind. See
Lloyd-Bostock, Attributions, supra note 15, at 272-73, 275; see also Shultz & Schleifer,
supra note 153, at 56-57 (discussing close connection between judgments of causation and
responsibility).
A particularly interesting discussion for the present purposes of the distinction be-
tween attributions of causation and responsibility is V. Lee Hamilton, Intuitive Psycholo-
gist or Intuitive Lawyer? Alternative Models of the Attribution Process, 39 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 767 (1980). Hamilton argues that subjects in the classic experiments cited
to support the attribution error phenomenon (see supra notes 183-84 and accompanying
text) can be considered to have committed error only in terms of the model of scientific
reasoning about causes. These subjects, however, may have been acting not as "intuitive
psychologists" but instead as "intuitive lawyers," and thus have understood the experimen-
tal question to require the attribution of responsibility instead of the explanation of causa-
tion. Attributions to the person rather than to the circumstances in these cases are "fully
plausible as assessments of responsibility," Hamilton argues, because the actors in the ex-
periments could have acted otherwise. Hamilton, supra, at 770; cf Tetlock, supra note 49,
at 360-61 (arguing that overestimating dispositional attributions makes sense if people are
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Thus, the fundamental attribution error should lead jurors to at-
tribute both the cause of and the responsibility for an accident to
someone's fault rather than to the circumstances: accidents don't hap-
pen unless someone is negligent.194 The question jurors in a negli-
gence case are actually asked to confront is: Who, if anyone, is
responsible for the accidental injury? But given the fundamental attri-
bution error, jurors may reformulate this question as: Who among the
"intuitive politicians who have incentives to hold others strictly accountable for their
conduct").
Hamilton's analysis may be sound with respect to intentional behavior, which was the
context of the experiments referred to, and to the "correspondent inference" theory of
attribution on which she draws. Hamilton, supra, at 769-70; see also FjsKE & TAYLOR,
supra note 40, at 26-32 (discussing work of Jones and Davis on correspondent inferences).
According to Heider, at the fourth level of responsibility, people are held responsible for
the consequences they voluntarily bring about unless there is a sufficient external justifica-
tion. Hamilton, supra, at 770. But Hamilton's critique of the fundamental attribution error
does not apply to the negligence case, in which the test is not solely whether the actor
could have acted otherwise, but whether he should have. Thus, Hamilton's observation
that "[t]he fact that everyone else acted the same way in response to the experimenter's
instructions [in an early attribution error experiment] is... useful causal information but is
less relevant morally or legally," id., is not germane, because in the negligence case, distin-
guishing a party's behavior from what others would have done is very important, if not
dispositive, for a finding of responsibility. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text
(discussing jury's task of comparing a party's behavior to that of a "reasonable person").
194. Negligence law recognizes a class of cases in which the defendant's fault may be
implied from the mere fact of an accident: res ipsa loquitur. The first element of res ipsa
requires that the accident be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur without negligence.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 39, at 244-48. (The other elements, that the instrumentality
of the accident be within the defendant's exclusive control and that the plaintiff not con-
tribute to the accident, do not concern us here.) But what distinguishes the cases that meet
this criterion from those that do not? None of the usual doctrinal interpretations of "does
not ordinarily occur without negligence" accurately captures the only valid basis in
probability theory for inferring negligence from the fact of the injury: that the probability
of negligence, given the injury, be greater than half. See David Kaye, Probability Theory
Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MicH. L. REv. 1456, 1460-67 (1979). The verbal vagueness and
statistical incoherence of this element of res ipsa doctrine suggests that what divides the
cases satisfying the element from the cases that do not is merely a rough distinction be-
tween the accidents people are expected to put up with in the absence of proof that the
defendant is negligent (eg., falling while getting on a bus), and those, on the other hand,
that stand out from the ordinary run of events (e.g., the falling sack of flour, the exploding
boiler). But cf Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L.
REv. 887, 894-925 (1994) (using economic theory to explain why it is sometimes efficient
for potential injurers not to comply perfectly with generally cost-effective standards of pre-
caution; where rate of precaution needed to avoid accidents is especially high, likelihood of
such "compliance errors" is also high, and hence it is likely that any accident resulted from
negligence, making res ipsa appropriate). In any event, the cases studied in this Article do
not appear to meet the standard definition of res ipsa. Res ipsa was not argued in the case
of the gas explosion in Hocon; in Butler, the judge did not instruct jurors on res ipsa even
though he speculated that res ipsa might be necessary to send the case to the jury without
any evidence of how Butler fell (B. 64.4-22 (Apr.25,1990)).
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parties before the court is responsible? Because the accident must
have been caused by someone's carelessness, the jurors' task is simply
to determine whose. 195 In contrast to jurors' use of the simulation heu-
ristic, which is largely consistent with tort doctrine, and to the use of
prototype theory, which is consistent to some extent with appellate
law if not with the law given in instructions, this presumption that
"someone's to blame" plainly conflicts with formal negligence law,
which requires proof of fault. 196
195. An argument that this schema may derive from the implicit context and purpose
of juror decision-making, and not from cognitive bias or error, is suggested by CALABRESI
& BOBnrrr, supra note 7, at 53-79. They argue that as a society, we make a de facto "tragic
choice" to let a certain large number of ourselves be maimed or killed in typical industrial
and transportation accidents, because some such large number of injuries and deaths is
inevitable as a statistical matter, given our methods of manufacture and transportation. In
order to avoid confronting this choice collectively and explicitly, we (among other things)
assign to juries the task of allocating the costs of, and thus responsibility for, these acci-
dents. Because different groups of citizens sit on different juries, each ordinarily deciding
responsibility for a single accident, the tragic choice is decentralized; and because we do
not ordinarily require juries to give reasons for their decisions, the tragic choice is made
aresponsibly. Both the decentralization and the aresponsibility allow us not to consider the
cumulative tragedy as collectively chosen.
The fault standard for gauging liability facilitates this avoidance function because it
makes the award of compensation hinge on an "absolute standard of worthiness" instead
of a comparative judgment across cases. Id at 62-63, 72-79. A victim recovers only if he can
show that the defendant's conduct (but not his own, to an extent depending on the compar-
ative negligence law of the jurisdiction) falls short of the standard. The victim deserves
compensation only because the defendant acted wrongfully-not because our industry and
transportation systems are designed, quite beyond the control of the individual parties, in a
way that is bound to cause some great number of injuries. The fault standard is a "perfect-
ible" standard because in each individual case, its application allows us to believe that if
only no one had been at fault, no one would have been hurt; it is individual fault that
brings about injuries, not the fact that society collectively has set up the game to injure
large numbers of people, however carefully they act. CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 7 & n.33.
And the proposition that if no one had been at fault, no one would have been hurt, logi-
cally implies that if someone was hurt, someone must have been at fault.
Thus, jurors' predilection to find someone at fault may be due not to the fundamental
attribution error, but rather to the implicit context of their decision-making, which directs
their attention to one sort of explanation for the accident rather than another. See Stephen
W. Draper, What's Going On in Everyday Explanation?, in ANALYZING EVERYDAY Ex-
PLANATION, supra note 17, at 15, 19 (the particular causal explanation expected depends on
social context and purpose of question, which are not unambiguously conveyed by literal
question itself). For a short, general discussion of the importance of purpose and context
for attributions of responsibility, see Lloyd-Bostock, The Ordinary Man, supra note 15, at
160-65.
196. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 30, at 164-65 (describing elements of
negligence cause of action). For classic statements in Connecticut law of the principle that
negligence is not to be inferred from the mere fact of an accident, see O'Brien v. Cordova,
370 A.2d 933, 934-35 (Conn. 1976) (holding that trial court erred in not granting judgment
notwithstanding the verdict to defendant because jury should not have been permitted to
infer solely from occurrence of rear-end collision that defendant, the second driver, was
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Both attorneys might be expected to take the "someone's to
blame" schema into account when structuring their arguments. For ex-
ample, the plaintiff's attorney might be expected to present a version
of events in which the plausible causal candidates would be (1) the
defendant and (2) the circumstances (i.e., no one), so that the funda-
mental attribution error would bias attribution of responsibility to-
ward the defendant. The plaintiff's attorney need not dwell on the
defendant's breach of duty. Conversely, the defendant's attorney
would not be inclined to rest with a purely defensive argument that
her client's breach of duty had not been proven-that plaintiff's inju-
ries were simply due to an unforeseeable accident. Instead, she might
be expected to argue aggressively that her client behaved reasonably,
in order to counter any attributional bias against her client.
(c) "He's That Kind of Guy"
Since jurors are prone to commit attribution error, who are they
likely to hold responsible for an accident? The second and more obvi-
ous implication of the fundamental attribution error for juror deci-
sion-making in negligence cases is that jurors would be expected to
attribute responsibility for the accident based on the perceived "sort
of person" a party is.197 The fundamental attribution error links be-
negligent); Senderoff v. Housatonic Public Service Co., 156 A.2d 517, 519 (Conn. 1959)
(holding that trial court erred in not granting directed verdict to defendant where plaintiff
showed only that his electricity was shut off but presented no evidence that interruption in
service was due to any fault of defendant's). It is somewhat ironic that the Connecticut
Supreme Court in O'Brien chose to base its rule on the assertion that "[c]ommon experi-
ence shows that motor vehicle accidents are not all due to driver negligence." O'Brien, 370
A.2d at 934-35. The argument from cognitive psychology in this Article, and the very prac-
tical assumptions of automobile insurance claims adjusters, are to the contrary. See H.
LAURENCE Ross, SETrLED Our oF COURT 98-99 (1970) (contrasting formal law of negli-
gence with settlement practices of insurance claims adjusters, author observes that for ad-justers, "if Car A strikes Car B from the rear, the driver of A is assumed to be liable and B
is not").
197. The standard negligence instruction encourages jurors to ask whether each party
is "the kind of person (who would act negligently)," because the instruction is phrased in
terms of how the reasonable "person" would act. Cf. supra note 192 (how form of instruc-
tion as a comparison encourages fundamental attribution error). By also referring to the
circumstances, the instruction (and other instructions on the relative nature of "ordinary
care" and "quantum of care," see DEvn-r ET AL., supra note 86, §§ 80.05-06, at 136, 138; see
also supra note 28 (Butler negligence instructions)), might appear to avoid the fundamental
attribution error. But the focus on the "reasonable person" (as opposed to, say, reasonable
behavior) directs jurors' attention to the individual rather than the circumstances. Cf.
Adrian Furnham et al., Professional and Naive Psychology: Two Approaches to the Expla-
nation of Social Behaviour, in AITRmmuToN THEoRY AND RESEARCH, supra note 15, at
315, 320-21 (suggesting that attribution theorists may induce attribution error by asking
subjects to infer the causes of other people's actions rather than the extent to which the
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havior and traits. Although psychological research subjects infer traits
from behavior, lawyers can exploit the connection in the other direc-
tion: A is a good (careful, deserving) person, and therefore could not
be responsible for a bad outcome (the accident). This habit of
thought, like the "someone's to blame" schema, is inconsistent with
textbook negligence law, which focuses on the party's behavior under
the circumstances, not on the party's enduring personality traits.
Attribution theory suggests that jurors may believe that the plain-
tiff, because he started the suit, is more aggressive and demanding,
and that this aggressive stance is due to negative traits (hostility to-
ward the defendant or greed) rather than to the demands of role (su-
ing is how you get things done in the legal system); consequently,
jurors may be biased against plaintiffs. 98 A similar anti-plaintiff bias
situation is causally relevant). Moreover, the instruction posits a stable personality, that of
the reasonable person, which would exacerbate the tendency to attribute causation (and
responsibility; see supra note 193) to enduring dispositions of the actor-to personality and
attitude-rather than to the circumstances. Thus, the instruction may lead jurors to define
fault differently than does standard tort doctrine, according to which negligence should be
understood purely in terms of conduct, as the creation of unreasonable risks, and not as a
state of mind. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 31, at 169 (citing Henry W. Edgerton, Negli-
gence, Inadvertance and Indifference: The Relation of Mental States to Negligence, 39 HARV.
L. REv. 849 (1926); Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1915)).
198. See, e.g., Michael Lupfer et al., An Attributional Analysis of Jurors' Judgments in
Civil Cases, 125 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 743, 743-45 (1985) (finding limited anti-plaintiff attribu-
tional bias in mock juror judgments of two civil suit scenarios: each actor's behavior more
often attributed to his hostile intentions and subjects' negative stereotypes when actor was
plaintiff than when actor was defendant).
Hans and Lofquist have also found some anti-plaintiff bias. Hans & Lofquist, supra
note 9, at 94-95. Their interviews with jurors indicated that jurors are suspicious of tort
claimants against business defendants; the prominent attitude is that plaintiffs don't de-
serve compensation, but are instead just greedy examples of a "litigation explosion." Id.
This suspicion that plaintiffs suing business defendants in tort are simply greedy attributes
jurors' behavior (suing) to an internal, enduring disposition (greed) rather than to circum-
stances (getting hurt as a result of the defendant's conduct), a good illustration of funda-
mental attribution error.
Hans and Lofquist pursue the question why jurors might believe in a litigation explo-
sion that statistical research refutes. They argue:
Litigation explosion rhetoric captured the public's (and jurors') attention because
it resonated strongly with preexisting cultural standards of responsibility. Notions
of the individual responsibility of the plaintiff and concerns about equity, particu-
larly in comparisons between the juror and the plaintiff.... contributed to the
proclivity of jurors to scrutinize the legitimacy of plaintiff claims.
Id. at 109-10; see also Hayden, supra note 9, at 108-09 (suggesting a popular, pejorative
belief in contemporary litigiousness as an explanation for supposed "litigation explosion"
of the mid-1980s, a belief that draws on three cultural norms: individualism, violated when
plaintiffs seek unearned damage "rewards"; equality, violated when plaintiffs seek to team
up with the state against defendants; and distributive justice, violated when plaintiffs seek
to get state to redistribute wealth).
[Vol. 47
may result from "just world" theory: plaintiffs, by virtue of their role,
must claim to be victimized, and jurors may need to protect a belief
that bad things happen only to "bad" people, 199 obviously a case of
fundamental attribution error.
More generally, jurors' tendency to commit attribution error
would lead us to expect each lawyer to seek to persuade the jury that
the other party is the sort of person who would be responsible for the
accident, while his client is not. This strategy is well recognized in the
literature of the psychology of legal argument and in the profession.200
For research on the effects on jurors' damage awards of their perceptions of a litiga-
tion explosion-in particular, that plaintiffs generally were receiving high damage
awards-see Edith Greene et al., Jurors' Attitudes About Civil Litigation and the Size of
Damage Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 805, 816-17 (1991) (finding that mock jurors who
believed damage awards in general were excessive tended to give lower awards, but also
used information about large awards in other cases as a benchmark in calculating
damages).
For evidence showing the absence of any pro-plaintiff bias among jurors (though not
necessarily indicating an anti-plaintiff bias), see Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 8, at
1137 (finding that, in federal trials, product liability and medical malpractice plaintiffs fare
much better before judges than before juries; in other personal injury cases, plaintiffs win
at about the same rate before both judges and juries).
199. Lupfer et al., supra note 198, at 744; see also Melvin J. Lerner, The Desire for
Justice and Reactions to Victims, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR 205 (J. Macaulay
& L. Berkowitz eds., 1970) (explaining "belief in a just world": observers of apparently
undeserved suffering will try to alleviate it, but if they cannot, they will either "defensively"
blame victim for causing suffering or derogate her character, concluding that suffering was
deserved after all); but see infra notes 264-66 and accompanying text (criticizing defensive
attribution theory).
200. Saks & Kidd, supra note 15, at 136, make exactly this point. From the representa-
tiveness heuristic comes the "illusion of validity" that results from internal consistency
among inputs. The more the inputs (e.g., aspects of defendant's character) seem "of a
piece," the more confidence the naive judge will have in the accuracy of the inference from
those inputs. In fact, "consistency" equals redundancy, which reduces the validity of the
inference even as it increases subjective confidence in the inference. Hence, "[t]he skillful
attorney may trade on this defect of intuition by trying to paint a consistent personality
picture of a party to a case .... ." Id
For a recognition of this strategy in the case law, see Visser v. Packer Eng'g Ass'n, 924
F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) (affirming district court's grant of summary judg-
ment and exclusion of affidavits of plaintiff's co-employees in age discrimination case):
This part of the affidavits [proffered by Visser] is amateur psychoanalysis....
They do not report primary facts from which a reasonable person in [affiants']
position would infer that one of Packer's motives was to deprive Visser of most of
his pension. They construct a psychological model of Packer and deduce from it
that he must have wanted to do Visser out of a pension. He was that kind of guy.
This is the kind of argumentation one expects in a closing argument.
For analogous evidence of jurors' commission of the fundamental attribution error in
criminal cases, see Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting
Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM.
BEHAv. 37, 45-46 (1985) (discussing how evidence of criminal defendant's prior crimes
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First, each lawyer would be expected to deemphasize his client's con-
tribution to the outcome and to emphasize the contribution of every-
thing else, including the other party's behavior. Following the
availability heuristic, the less salient the client's contribution, the more
salient the other causal candidates will be.2 0 '
Second, we would expect the lawyers to construct suitable per-
sonality profiles for the parties. This is similar to constructing person-
situation prototypes to show reasonableness under the circumstances
and fitting the evidence to those prototypes; the difference here is that
the profile extends to the person in general, and not only to her con-
duct in circumstances like those leading up to the accident. Attorneys
would be expected to develop stock characters and scripts of reasona-
bleness or its opposite, and to try to fit what the jurors know of the
client (or the opposing party) into those characters and scripts.2 2
Evidence and strategy partially constrain the arguments lawyers
can make about the kind of person a party is. Information about how
a party has behaved in other, unrelated circumstances ought to be ir-
relevant to responsibility for the incident at bar.20 3 The evidence in
the trial may also not supply enough, or perhaps any, data from which
jurors can formulate the prototype of due care in similar situations to
which the parties will be compared.20 4 It may also be a risky strategy
for defense counsel to blame the victim explicitly, because of jurors'
tendency to sympathize with the injured party.20 5
So, as with other cognitive devices, we would expect to find ef-
forts to evoke attribution error implicitly. Through metaphoric con-
struction of a prototype, the attorney can depict the "reasonable
leads jurors to generalize about defendant's negative characteristics, and therefore, in-
creases likelihood of guilty verdict).
201. Note the potential conflict between a defense strategy shifting focus away from
the defendant as protagonist to make the defendant less salient and thus to minimize the
adverse effects of attribution error, and one emphasizing the defendant's reasonableness,
to counteract the implicit fault schema. Defense counsel in Giulietti, for instance, recon-
ciles the two by stressing the decedent's lack of care. See supra notes 123-24 and accompa-
nying text.
202. See CANTOR & KIHLSTROM, supra note 44, at 100-07.
203. The actor's own past conduct, however, may indicate his knowledge of the risk
and of appropriate precautions. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 33, at 195-96.
204. Evidence of custom may, of course, be introduced, as it is in Giulietti to show the
railroad's lack of care.
205. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 8, at 136 (observing that jurors in civil trials are
commonly believed to be sympathetic to accident victims). But cf. id. at 134-35 (noting that
role of sympathy may be overstated, citing Kalven and Zeisel's research that only about
4% of criminal juries differed in their verdicts from judges because of sympathy for defend-
ant); supra note 198 (evidence concerning "blame the victim" attitude).
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person." The more striking and apt the metaphors and analogies, the
more available they will be to the jurors.
Third, to reduce the client's perceived responsibility for the acci-
dent, the lawyer might be expected to induce jurors to identify with
the client. Research suggests two reasons why identification with the
client would tend to counteract unfavorable attribution effects. First,
getting the observer to adopt the actor's perspective enhances the sali-
ence of circumstances and other people's conduct as opposed to that
of the actor, making an attribution to someone or something other
than the actor more likely.206 Second, to the extent jurors identify with
a party, they are less likely to attribute negative dispositions to the
party, perhaps because of empathy.20 7 Identification may also pro-
mote jurors' sympathy for the plaintiff, while avoiding both the rules
against and the strategic risks of an explicit appeal to sympathy.208
Plaintiffs' attorneys in particular might be expected to try to get jurors
to identify with their clients in order to counteract any propensity to
206. The "actor-observer effect" is the tendency to ascribe our own behavior to situa-
tional factors but the behavior of others to their enduring dispositions. For the original
research, see Edward E. Jones & Richard E. Nisbett, The Actor and the Observer Diver-
gent Perceptions of the Causes of Behavior, in ArnuBrtIoN: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF
BEHAVIOR, supra note 143, at 79; see also FisKE & TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 72-75; Nis-
m-rr & Ross, supra note 13, at 122-27; Holyoak & Gordon, supra note 44, at 53; Sherman
& Corty, supra note 43, at 216. But cf. Shelley E. Taylor & Susan T. Fiske, Point of View
and Perceptions of Causality, 32 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 439 (1975) (explaining
that causes are often attributed to most salient source of information; observers attributed
causation to actors, but did not extend attribution to actors' dispositions).
See also Lind & Ke, supra note 21, at 239-40 (by getting jurors to adopt perspective of
client, attorney makes it more likely that jurors will recall details available to that party).
But cf Susan T. Fiske et al., Imaging, Empathy, and Causal Attribution, 15 J. EXPERIMEN-
TAL Soc. PsYcHOL. 356 (1979) (noting that observers who are induced to empathize with
actor and to adopt actor's perspective on events are biased in their recall of details toward
those available to actor, but are not significantly biased in their attributions of causality).
207. See DAViD L. HERBERT & ROGER K. BARRETT, ATORNEY'S MASTER GUIDE TO
COURTROOM PSYCHOLOGY 1028-29 (1980) (identification with litigants is associated with
capacity to empathize, which is facilitated by people's ability to understand other persons
by projecting their understanding of and acquaintance with their own behavior onto
others); Ostrom, supra note 42, at 11; Green, supra note 15, at 254-55 & n.16 ("To the
extent that the respondent enacts roles which subject him potentially to the same loss as
the plaintiff, he is likely to identify with the plaintiff and to award him the verdict.") (citing
research showing that, of subjects responding to mock negligence scenario in which four-
year-old drowned, parents, women, people aged 30-44, and those in child-centered occupa-
tions tended to favor plaintiff).
208. An explicit appeal to sympathy is legal error, often reversible. TANFoRD, TRIAL
PROCESS, supra note 15, at 381-82; J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Closing Argu-
ment Procedure, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 47, 128-31 (1986) (inviting jurors' sympathy is an
error of intermediate seriousness, sometimes requiring reversal). Too overt an appeal to
sympathy might also be poor strategy, because jurors might think: "If that's all the plaintiff
has to go on, the legal case must be very weak."
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blame the victim. Conversely, to increase the other party's perceived
responsibility, a lawyer might try to get the jurors to identify with the
prototype to which the lawyer unfavorably compares that other
party.209
(2) Fundamental Attribution Error in the Arguments
(a) Argument Structure
In Butler, the organization and emphasis of the argument for the
plaintiff makes sense only in terms of the "someone's to blame"
schema, because Butler's attorney spends very little time on either
causation or breach.210 Such an argument could persuade jurors of the
defendant's liability only if they were ready to "fill in the blanks" with
an implicit schema that included both causation and breach. The de-
fense attorney's argument also reflects an awareness of this schema.
After pointing out that the plaintiff is required to prove duty, breach,
and causation,211 Revere's lawyer does not rest with a merely defen-
sive argument that the plaintiff did not satisfy his burden, but also
argues that it was Butler's duty, not Revere's, to secure the load on
the truck.212
(b) Attributing Responsibility to Dispositions
Sometimes lawyers rather blatantly show that they expect jurors
to hold a person responsible for an accident because "he's that kind of
guy." In Fleming v. International Transport,213 Eileen Fleming was
killed when she drove her car into a tractor-trailer that was pulling out
from a loading dock onto the highway. Evidence showed that Fleming
had been drinking alcohol, but it was unclear whether this affected her
ability to stop her car in time to avoid the truck. Defense counsel,
stressing Fleming's regular drinking habits and alluding to an affair
she had had with a co-worker, said: "[D]espite her success, despite her
achievements, Mrs. Fleming took chances in her personal life, with her
209. By getting jurors to identify with the standard to which the other party will be
unfavorably compared, the attorney may take advantage of another attributional bias, the
"false consensus" effect: people's tendency to see their own behavior and judgments as
common and normal, and alternative conduct and judgments as uncommon and deviant.
See Lee Ross et al., The "False Consensus Effect": An Egocentric Bias in Social-Perception
and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCiOL. 279 (1977).
210. See supra notes 98-101, 107-12 and accompanying text.
211. B. 31.22-32.1.
212. B. 32.2-34.13.
213. CV-88-0345211 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jud. Dist. of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford
1993).
[Vol. 47
THE RHETORIC OF TORTS
professional life, members of her family .... And, she also took
chances, chances operating a motor vehicle after drinking alcohol. '214
In Butler, the plaintiff's lawyer both explicitly and implicitly in-
vokes the fundamental attribution error throughout his argument.
Butler "is the type of person, I think we all know now, he's going to
give his best shot and he did, '215 and "being the type of person he is,"
tries to put the tarp on the load himself.216 When the lawyer comes to
describe Brockway, the Revere employee who did not help Butler
tarp the load, he says that "that kind of attitude... resulted in this
injury. '2 17
Perhaps more important is Butler's lawyer's implicit, metaphoric
argument that "a guy like this couldn't have caused this accident; it's
more likely that a guy like Brockway did." According to Butler's at-
torney, Butler is the protagonist on a difficult journey, with the jury
and its favorable judgment as his destination.
This implicit argument consists of an interweaving of two meta-
phoric themes. The first is the difficult journey. The attorney repeat-
edly says that Butler has "gone through" severe difficulties in
overcoming the physical and mental effects of the accident.218 This
214. F. 792.17-22. Attorneys may also display their awareness of the fundamental attri-
bution error by explicitly trying to counter their opponents' proffered attributions. In Giu-
liett, for instance, the railroad's attorney twice does this by separating the railroad as an
entity with a general "disposition" from what may have happened in this particular inci-
dent. First, Giulietti's attorney had argued that fellow employee Ed Hines, and hence the
railroad, was negligent for not putting on the emergency brake:
[I]t was just training, the way he had been trained as a locomotive engineer, which
is the Providence & Worcester Railroad will put you behind the seat and doesn't
give you any formal instructions of how to run an engine and what to do in an
emergency situation, so maybe you won't have the reflexes required to operate a
train.
G. 500.3-501.19. This amounts to saying that jurors should consider the railroad negligent
for this specific act because "that's the sort of company it is." The railroad's attorney ex-
plicitly calls the jurors' attention to his opponent's tactic: "[W]hat counsel is trying to do
for the Plaintiff is to say that well, the whole railroad is on trial. The whole railroad is no
good and that's why John is dead today." G. 518.10-13. Second, the railroad's attorney
argues: "If the railroad has exercised reasonable diligence in the training of its employ-
ees ... the fact that one man on that given night was not qualified, does not then mean that
the railroad is negligent." G. 512.2-7.
215. B. 24.21-22.
216. B. 25.14-15; see also B. 28.23-24.
217. B. 27.21-22. Revere's lawyer, by contrast, does not explicitly play to the funda-
mental attribution error. A rule-oriented argument shapes his strategy: on carelessness, his
argument is not that his client's employees did not breach their duty of care to help Butler
but that they had no such duty; on causation, his argument is just that the plaintiff has no
proof of how or why he fell.
218. B. 17.24, 20.2, 20.5, 21.7, 23.4, 23.5, 23.10, 29.6, 29.7, 29.18.
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might sound like a mere clich6; but when combined with other images
counsel evokes, its significance emerges. The attorney recalls Butler's
own metaphor, from his direct examination, of striving "to reach a
higher plateau. ' 219 This introduces an explicitly spatial image to the
idea of "going through," suggesting not merely physical movement,
but also movement toward a goal.220 Finally, the attorney addresses
the jurors: "Now, you hold his only chance. This is the last place, the
only place he can come."'221 Indeed, the jurors themselves have
"come" to this same place2 22 and now must calculate compensation
for Butler, a "very difficult" task paralleling Butler's own difficul-
ties.223 The metaphor of the jurors' decision at the end of the trial as a
spatial location neatly unifies Butler's metaphoric journey, through his
impediments and frustrations, with the jurors' decision in his favor as
the destination of the journey.
The second theme is Butler as a fighter. The lawyer says that But-
ler "continues to fight"224 and describes him as a "fighter.'"225 The law-
yer also notes that Butler will give a job "his best shot. '226 Also, "he's
worked as hard as he can to get to this point," referring to the mental
and physical skills he partially recovered under rehabilitation after the
accident.227 And, like an underdog pugilist, Butler has "beaten all the
odds." 228
Put together the fighter with the difficult journey and the result is
Rocky: Sylvester Stallone running up the museum steps.2 29 One can
almost hear the theme song from the movie in the background.230 The
219. B. 17.25-18.2, 23.13.
220. See also B. 21.5 ("he's gotten to the point").
221. B. 30.6-7.
222. The jurors' own metaphoric journey to their final decision is strongly suggested in
one passage in which Butler's lawyer contrasts Butler's faulty memory since the accident
with "our" ability to "remember about what happened to us and where our history is and
where we come from as people." B. 20.9-11. I thank Richard Sherwin for the observation
that the metaphor of journeying may be overdetermined, with many target domains.
223. Compare B. 30.5 (jurors' task) with, e.g., B. 18.13-15 (Butler's difficulties).
224. B. 17.25.
225. B. 22.13, 23.15.
226. B. 24.22.
227. B. 29.14-15.
228. B. 17.24. The fighter metaphor would also tend to counteract any anti-plaintiff
bias derived from the perception of plaintiff as demanding and complaining. See supra note
198 and accompanying text.
229. RocKy (United Artists 1976).
230. Note how even such details as the lawyer's description of Butler's morning rou-
tine, explicitly relating how Butler's memory has been impaired by the accident (e.g., B.
20.7-24), implicitly recall the beginning of a similar scene from Rocky, in which the hero
wakes up before dawn and goes through his routine, drinks the raw eggs, and so on.
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implicit reasoning in Butler is that the plaintiff is an underdog hero
who deserves to be compensated for his unfortunate injury because of
the sort of person he is. Metaphor merges Butler with the prototype,
effacing the actual classification process required for the implicit argu-
ment to succeed.231
(c) Modulating Attribution Error Through Juror Identification
One indication that advocates seek to induce jurors to identify
with the client is the advocate's manipulation of point of view: in par-
ticular, the use of the second person and the inclusive first person plu-
ral. George Butler's attorney uses the second and first person plural to
some extent to take advantage of the fundamental attribution error.
When he greets the jurors by saying, "George Frederick Butler, he
should be an inspiration for all of us.... [His effort is] something we
should all aspire to and ... we hope we all do . . ,"232 he seeks to
establish a general commonality among the jurors, Butler, and him-
self. When he describes Butler's headaches as "[n]ot the typical kind
of headache where you and I can take two aspirins," he again invites
the jurors to identify with Butler in order to understand Butler's inju-
ries.233 Butler's lawyer also equates the jurors' "difficult task" in de-
ciding the case with Butler's own difficulties in overcoming the effects
of the accident,2 34 and just as Butler "give[s] his best shot," so he tells
the jurors that "I have full confidence you'll make your best effort" to
calculate damages. 235
Revere's attorney uses the second person and first person plural
in his one sustained narrative, the story of the refrigerator-freezer
231. Butler's attorney uses many other metaphors, although none are as sustained or
significant as the Rocky theme. For instance, Brockway, the defendant's employee, "didn't
lift a finger" to help Butler with the canvas (B. 2620-21), a cliche that contrasts nicely with
Butler's struggle to manipulate the heavy tarpaulin.
Not all of Butler's attorney's metaphors are felicitous. One that rings hollow is his
description of Butler as formerly a "free spirit" who had "white line fever" (B. 22.21-22), in
contrast to his present debilitated state. This doesn't work because we know that Butler
didn't just drive his rig wherever he pleased, but was always instructed to go "from Point A
to Point B," as the lawyer now calls it. B. 22.23. Indeed, the lawyer elsewhere praises
Butler for always following instructions and doing his job. E.g., B. 24.21-22. The reference
to "free spirit" also seems to conflict with the lawyer's description of Butler as "the mar-
rying kind." B. 29.24.
232. B. 17.14-24.
233. B. 21.24-25.
234. See supra note 97 (attorney identifying jurors with his client).
235. Compare B. 24.22 (Butler) with B. 30.23 (jurors). Although Butler's attorney uses
the second and first person plural extensively when describing Butler's injuries and the
jurors' tasks, he does not do so when describing the accident itself.
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mover, designed to establish Revere's lack of duty.2 36 "We call a re-
pair person.... [He puts the freezer on his truck] and then you walk
away. You go back about your business. It isn't your job to secure or
do anything further with respect to that load. '237 This story features
the attorney's most concentrated use of the second and first person
plural in his entire argument,238 and the only occasion on which he
associates mostly active verbs with the second person.239 This may be
understood as a way of encouraging jurors to identify with Revere,
and thus to think in attributional terms: Revere's employees aren't
such bad fellows; they acted just as I would have if someone came to
take my refrigerator in for repairs. I wouldn't be responsible if the
driver of the truck, after I helped him carry the refrigerator out and
load it onto the truck and after I went back about my business, hap-
pened to fall from the truck for an unknown reason; so why should the
defendant?240
The Giulietti arguments reveal a more complex, multi-level use of
language to enhance jurors' tendency to allocate responsibility by
making the fundamental attribution error. John Giulietti's lawyer uses
the second person and first person plural points of view, verb tense,
and metaphor to lead the jurors to identify with John Giulietti as the
passive victim of the railroad. On more than a third of the occasions
on which Giulietti's lawyer addresses the jurors as "you" (or includes
himself and the jurors as "we"), 241 including the most sustained in-
stances (multiple instances in consecutive lines of transcript), he
236. B. 33.22-34.13; see supra notes 29, 113-14 and accompanying text.
237. B. 33.25-34.8.
238. Thirteen instances in 17 lines, or 19 per page, as opposed to 3.2 per page in the
rest of the argument.
239. In this passage, 67% (6 of 9) of the verbs associated with the second person or first
person plural are active, as opposed to 50% concerning the jurors' consideration of evi-
dence and 11% (at most) concerning their decision-making task.
240. The second person also engages the jury in imagining the story. This analogy, after
all, is not evidence; it's not the testimony on which, as counsel has commanded, the jurors
,'must... wholly and solely" base their verdict (see supra note 106 and accompanying text
for Revere's attorney's exhortations to the jurors to construct a verdict from the evidence).
So the strategy of engaging the juror in the story does not conflict with Revere's attorney's
general strategy of not encouraging the jury to participate actively in evaluating the case.
It may be noted that the sexism of Revere's attorney's analogy (B. 34.2-4: "I wouldn't
expect one of you ladies to help him, but one of the gentlemen being at home might will-
ingly assist that driver ....") may have undercut the intended effect of the analogy on
women jurors. (I owe this observation to students in my jurisprudence course, fall 1993;
notes on file with author.) In fact, all six jurors were women. (Interviews with Butler's
attorney on Nov. 18, 1993; notes on file with author.)
241. These constitute 36 of 94 total instances, or about 38%. This is counsel's most
common use of the second person and first person plural.
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places the jury in John Giulietti's shoes as the events unfold.242 In all
of these cases, counsel uses the present tense with the second or first
person plural point of view, heightening jurors' sense of participation
in the events.243 Counsel then combines the second person and pres-
ent tense with metaphoric reconstructions of the events. The railroad,
Giulietti's attorney argues, "will put you behind the seat" without ade-
quate training.244 The gap between track one and the main line "be-
gins to narrow on you."245 Here the attorney attributes agency to an
inanimate, fixed physical fact (the space between the two tracks), em-
phasizing that Giulietti was victimized by forces beyond his control,
and at the same time placing the jurors in Giulietti's shoes.246
Giulietti's lawyer also uses the second and first person plural to
invite jurors to identify with particular standards of reasonable care
which Hines (Giulietti's fellow employee) and the railroad did not
meet.247 For instance, arguing that the railroad did not train Giulietti
adequately to assume the conductor's job that night, counsel contends
that "you don't throw men out to learn for themselves in the middle of
the night. You should instruct a conductor .... ,2  Or, arguing that
Ed Hines and hence the railroad imprudently planned the move of the
cars, he says: "[I]f you have two cars, you can stop a two-car train a lot
quicker than an eleven-car train." 249
The railroad's attorney, similarly, uses the second and inclusive
first person plural to get the jurors to identify with prototypes of rea-
sonable care that John Giulietti did not meet. This takes two forms.
First, the railroad's lawyer uses the second person when constructing
analogies aimed at helping jurors understand the standard of care
242. E.g., G. 501.15-25, 502.1-8, 502.17-24, 504.17-21, 505.9-11.
243. It is noteworthy that aside from these two uses of the present tense, Giulietti's
attorney uses the past tense almost exclusively. See infra notes 288-89 and accompanying
text (referring to Amsterdam and Hertz's discussion of verb tense).
244. G. 501.15.
245. G. 505.10-11.
246. Meanwhile, the railroad acts impulsively, not carefully: The trainmaster "thr[e]w"
the men onto the job (G. 489.2); cf. "assigned" (G. 488.10, 489.7, 493.10); "sent out" (G.
489.15, 496.6). Ed Hines "shove[d]" the train (G. 500.1, 500.3). Cf. Elizabeth F. Loftus &
John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Deconstruction: An Example of the Interac-
tion Between Language and Memory, 13 J. LEARNiNG & VERBAL BEHAV. 585 (1974) (use
of more concrete, vivid words such as "smashed" to describe auto collision led subjects to
estimate cars' speed at point of collision as greater than when accident described using
verbs "collided," "bumped," "contacted," or "hit").
247. G. 487.23, 489.2-7, 497.7-10, 498.11-13, 500.21, 503.7-11. These total 17 occasions,
or 18% of all instances of counsel's use of the second or inclusive first person.
248. G. 489.2-7.
249. G. 498.11-13.
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which Giulietti did not meet.250 He argues that "[y]ou people in your
daily lives" wouldn't undertake something the jurors knew they
weren't capable of doing, as John allegedly did.25 ' And he introduces
another explanation by saying, "[w]e talk about driving a car," to
make the point that jurors know to exercise greater caution at uncon-
trolled intersections and in strange places.252
The railroad's lawyer also uses the second person to equate the
jurors' present responsibility to decide the case with Giulietti's past
responsibility to decide to be the conductor. "The responsibility is
yours, ladies and gentlemen. In this country, the responsibility of peo-
ple for their own negligent acts ... lies with that person. ' 253 In this
striking passage, echoed later,254 the railroad's attorney explicitly em-
powers the jurors to decide the case 255 (instructing them to use "judg-
ment" rather than "innuendo" and "hindsight"25 6). And by using the
same word, "responsibility," to describe Giulietti's situation, he impli-
cates the proposition: you can decide responsibly; therefore, so could
have Giulietti (and he didn't).257 The attorney thus implicitly encour-
ages the jurors to attribute fault and responsibility for the accident by
250. These amount to 38 out of 179 total occurrences of the second or first person
plural in the railroad's counsel's argument, or about 21% (compare 18% figure for Giu-
lietti's counsel's uses of second or first person plural to describe standard of care which
railroad did not meet).
251. G. 515.8-13. The railroad's attorney makes the same point later by putting the
jurors in Giulietti's place. G. 522.11-16.
252. G. 517.11-25.
253. G. 511.6-17.
254. G. 519.2-4 ("responsibility" used three times in three lines of transcript), 521.21-
22.
255. See infra notes 285-313 and accompanying text (noting how attorneys may engage
jurors as active decision-makers).
256. G. 511.17-18.
257. The flip side of this strategy is that the railroad's attorney uses the second or first
person plural to equate the jurors' own imperfect conduct in everyday life with Ed Hines's
imperfect performance on the fatal night. "Someone can say Ed should have done this, Ed
should have done that. There are a lot of things we should have done." G. 514.20-22. This
device builds on counsel's initial attribution of "common sense" to the jurors and his in-
junction that they use common sense as opposed to "20/20 hindsight" and the like. G.
509.21-510.3. Such hindsight occurs when one second-guesses "judgment calls." G. 518.18-
19, 518.23-25, 522.25-523.7.
But this is a risky rhetorical strategy. The railroad's attorney is trying to persuade the
jury that when they analyze the defendant's conduct, they're "second-guessing," using "20/
20 hindsight"; that when the decision could have gone either way, that's a "judgment call,"
not negligence. G. 523.7. Yet at the same time, the attorney wants the jury to do precisely
this with respect to Giulietti's behavior. It is unclear whether he avoids this apparent con-
tradiction through his attempted metaphoric distinction. See supra notes 128-36 and ac-
companying text.
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identifying themselves with a standard of behavior and contrasting
themselves with the behavior of the decedent, John Giulietti.
F. The Severity Effect: The Seriously Injured Deserve Compensation
Jurors are likely to believe that one who accidentally causes seri-
ous harm is more at fault, and not just liable for greater damages, than
one who causes less serious harm. Thus, by emphasizing the severity
of the plaintiff's injuries, the plaintiff's attorney bolsters her argument
that jurors should find the defendant responsible in the first place.
(1) Research on the Severity Effect
Cognitive psychological research shows that information about
the extent of an accident victim's injuries may affect judgments about
causality and responsibility. In an early, often-cited experiment,
Elaine Walster presented two groups of subjects with nearly identical
scenarios. In both, a man left his car parked on a hill, and after he left,
the car rolled down the hill. One group was told that the car hit a tree
stump; the other was told that the car struck and injured a person. The
second group found the car owner more responsible for the accident
than did the first group.25 8
Data concerning the severity of the consequences cannot affect
the overall judgment of responsibility if the decision-makers observe
the demarcations between the doctrinal categories of breach, causa-
tion, and injury. Strictly speaking, the extent of the injury should be
irrelevant to the determinations of fault and causation, although rele-
vant to the measure of damages.259 Yet Walster's subjects "bent" their
258. Elaine Walster, Assignment of Responsibility for an Accident, 3 J. PER SONALrry &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 73, 77 (1966); see also Loftus & Beach, supra note 49, at 946. Nisbett and
Ross cite Walster's research as an instance of the "vividness criterion": how people weigh
vivid information more heavily than relatively pallid information in making inferential
judgments. In Walster's study, the second scenario is more vivid than the first due to the
observer's emotional interest in its consequence, an injured person. Therefore, experimen-
tal subjects weighted that consequence differently in judging responsibility. The vividness
criterion is partly explicable by means of the availability heuristic: vivid information is
more likely to be recalled and hence more likely to be used in inferences. See NISBETr &
Ross, supra note 13, at 43-62. FxsK. & TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 254-57, question the
empirical support for the "vividness criterion."
259. Marylie Karlovac and John Darley have shown that mock jurors use the Learned
Hand calculus of risk in judging responsibility: the more serious the possible accident, the
more irresponsible the person who risked it by his actions. Karlovac & Darley, supra note
2, at 313-14. But possible outcome is not necessarily the same thing as actual outcome. The
Learned Hand calculus uses the former to set a standard for responsibility; the severity
effect, by contrast, concerns the impact of the latter on judgments of responsibility. For the
most part, Karlovac and Darley did not investigate the effect of severity of outcome on
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judgments toward a more global conception of responsibility for the
accident, a prototype in which responsibility increases as the conse-
quences become more serious.260 This may be called the "severity ef-
fect."' 261 And because a judgment of responsibility by jurors in an
accident case leads to a decision that the tortfeasor must compensate
the victim, the severity effect should mean in practice that the very
seriously injured are more likely to receive compensation.262
The severity effect has been the subject of considerable psycho-
logical research. Most of this work has been done to test one explana-
tion for the effect, the "defensive attribution" hypothesis. The logic of
defensive attribution is that attributing the cause of an accident to
mere chance, i.e., to the circumstances, is threatening to the observer
because such an accident could just as well befall the observer herself.
In contrast, "[s]eeing the [more serious] accident as avoidable and
blaming someone for its occurrence makes the action more predict-
able and hence avoidable by the self. ' 263 Hence, blame is attributed
"defensively." If the victim injures himself, the tendency is to blame
the victim. But if the injurer is someone other than the victim, as
would be the claim in any lawsuit, the judgment is that one who in-
flicts serious injuries is more responsible than one who inflicts minor
damage.
responsibility judgments. Id. at 315-16. Note that according to the hindsight bias (see
Fischhoff, Heuristics, supra note 193; Fischhoff, Outcome Knowledge, supra note 193), the
occurrence of a severe injury may lead individuals to think that the actor should have
foreseen the severe injury. Thus the severity of the injury enters the calculus of risk post
hoc: the more serious the (expected) injury, the greater the precautions the actor should
have taken.
260. Walster, supra note 258. Note that Walster's subjects were not given the standard
negligence instructions, and therefore could not have been expected to analyze the prob-
lem in rule-element fashion. Instead, they were asked to evaluate the actor's degree of
carelessness and their own moral strictness in evaluating what the actor did. Id. at 75-76.
261. At least in some circumstances, the severity of the injury may correlate with ex-
pert judgments of responsibility. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 20-
22 (1985) (reporting findings of 1974 California Medical Association and California Hospi-
tal Association study, in which four experts in legal medicine investigated 970 instances of
iatrogenic injuries in the health care system and determined that the more severe the injury
(not including fatalities), the greater the likelihood of the attribution of the injury to
negligence).
262. Cf. CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 13, at 42-43 ("deep pocket effect" found only
when plaintiffs seriously injured); Lop'rus & BEACH, supra note 49, at 946-47. But cf. Sally
M. Lloyd-Bostock, Common Sense Morality and Accident Compensation, in PsYCH-OLOGY,
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES 93 (David P. Farrington et al. eds., 1979) [hereinafter Lloyd-
Bostock, Common Sense Morality] (accident victims do not equate fault and duty to com-
pensate; moreover, even when fault and compensation correlate, victims may first perceive
a right to compensation and then attribute fault to justify it).
263. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 85.
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The severity effect is the least robust of the cognitive psychologi-
cal principles discussed in this Article. It has thus far received only
limited support from mock juror research.264 Two studies have failed
to replicate Walster's results, finding no significant correlation be-
tween the severity of the plaintiff's injuries and the level of the de-
fendant's perceived responsibility.265 And numerous researchers have
debated both the empirical support for and the conceptual coherence
of defensive attribution.266
Assuming, however, that the severity effect is real (regardless of
whether the defensive attribution account of it is valid), we would ex-
pect to see victims' or plaintiffs' lawyers seeking to invoke it in order
to trigger an attribution of greater responsibility for the accident.
Plaintiffs' lawyers would be expected to use argument structure, de-
scriptiveness, metaphor, and other rhetorical techniques to make their
clients' injuries as conspicuous for the jurors as possible, and defend-
ants' lawyers would be expected to attempt the opposite.
264. "Jury research provides mixed evidence for an association between the severity of
an injury and liability." MACCOUN, GETTING INSIDE, supra note 11, at 29-36.
265. See Green, supra note 15, at 246-47 (noting that the seriousness of injury does not
affect outcome when defendant's precautions are arguably inadequate); Ewart A.C.
Thomas & Mary Parpal, Liability as a Function of Plaintiff and Defendant Fault, 53 J. PER-
SONALrry & SOC. PSYCHOL. 843, 851-52 (1987) (showing that defendant's responsibility is
unrelated to severity when defendant did not intend to harm plaintiff or could not have
foreseen the harm). Note, however, that this situation does not appear to reach cases such
as those examined in this Article, in which the defendant's conduct is at least arguably
negligent.
266. See eg., Fincham & Jaspars, supra note 15, at 85-90 (criticizing the theory on both
grounds); Glenda Y. Nogami & Siegfried Streufert, The Dimensionality of Attributions of
Causality and Responsibility for an Accident, 14 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 433 (1983)
(describing how causality attribution increases with severity of outcome but responsibility
attribution decreases); E. Jerry Phares & Kenneth G. Wilson, Responsibility Attribution:
Role of Outcome Severity, Situational Ambiguity, and Internal-External Control, 40 J. PER-
SONALrry 392,400-01 (1972) (observing that responsibility attribution increases with sever-
ity of outcome only in "high structure" scenarios in which it is clear who is responsible;
when conditions are ambiguous, there is "virtually no relationship" between responsibility
attribution and outcome severity); Neil Vidmar & Linda D. Crinklaw, Attributing Respon-
sibility for an Accident A Methodological and Conceptual Critique, 6 CANADIAN J. BEHAV.
SCL 112 (1974) (criticizing research that supports defense attribution theory).
In support of defensive attribution theory, see, eg., Fxsia & TAYLOR, supra note 40, at
84-86 (noting "equivocal" empirical support for the theory but acknowledging its impor-
tance); SHAVER, supra note 15, at 133-36 (general defense of theory); Jerry M. Burger,
Motivational Biases in the Attribution of Responsibility for an Accident A Meta-Analysis of
the Defensive-Attribution Hypothesis, 90 PSYCHOL. BULL. 496 (1981) (supporting defensive
attribution and explaining apparent conflict in experimental results as due to varying de-
grees of observer identification or similarity to perpetrators or victims, and in terms of
varying subject involvement).
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Observe that utilizing the severity effect also allows the plaintiff's
attorney to appeal to jurors' sympathy implicitly, through the descrip-
tion of the evidence and the client.267 Conversely, the defendant's law-
yer cannot too blatantly minimize the plaintiffs suffering, because this
would undermine the image of the reasonable and sympathetic lawyer
that she is attempting to invoke.268 But the defendant's attorney can
try to minimize the severity of the injury through less obvious means.
(2) The Severity Effect in the Arguments
In Butler, George Butler's lawyer makes his client's suffering con-
spicuous for the jury through argument structure and, to a lesser de-
gree, by use of the second person and first person plural. The
organization of the argument seems designed to take advantage of the
severity effect.269 The description of Butler's medical treatment and
his injuries begins right after the introduction and occupies, together
with the damages discussion, well over half the entire argument. Re-
vere's attorney, by contrast, spends as little time as possible on injury,
quickly admitting that the medical evidence is not disputed. Instead,
he argues duty, causation, and a controverted point of evidence.
Butler's lawyer also uses the second person and first person plu-
ral specifically to get the jury to understand George's suffering.270 In
the introduction, for example, he encourages jurors to identify them-
selves generally with him and with the plaintiff.271 More specifically, in
explaining that Butler's loss of work deprives him of friendships, the
lawyer argues: "you meet people [at work] and you form associations
with people you work with and that's [how] you get friends. '272 Fi-
nally, the lawyer's description of the jurors' task in measuring dam-
ages as "difficult" 273 parallels Butler's own difficult struggles.274 All
these rhetorical devices help make Butler's suffering more vivid for
the jurors.
267. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (implicit appeal to sympathy).
268. See, e.g., B. 31.15-16 ("I agree, Mr. Butler is a fine and admirable person. He
deserves sympathy."); G. 509.19-20 ("[Y]ou feel sorry and indeed should feel sorry for this
very tragic event.").
269. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (organization of Butler's attorney's
argument).
270. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text (Butler's attorney's use of second
and first person plural to identify jurors with client).
271. B. 17.15-23.
272. B. 28.15-17.
273. B. 28.5-6, 30.5.
274. See B. 29.2-30.5.
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In the Giulietti arguments, the severity effect helps explain an-
other rhetorical device: Giulietti's attorney uses much more concrete
language to describe the victim and the accident than does the rail-
road's attorney.275 The plaintiff's lawyer refers to the decedent as
"Johnny" or "John" throughout the argument. He says that Giulietti
was "killed."276 He observes that just before the accident, Giulietti
had been "perched" on top of the train car.277 Then Ed Hines heard
"scratching and scraping noises" over the radio,2 78 and Giulietti was
"crushed."279 "John died from a crush injury of his lower abdomen
and chest. 280 The railroad's counsel, by contrast, eschews concrete
description. He refers to decedent as "John Giulietti" or "Mr. Giu-
lietti," occasionally as "John," but never as "Johnny." And he men-
tions "death" only once-to say that it was instantaneous and
therefore that no pain and suffering damages should be awarded. 28' It
should be noted that neither lawyer argues optimally in this regard;
Giulietti's attorney occasionally neglects to describe events concretely
and vividly, and the railroad's lawyer once lapses into vivid descrip-
tion of the decedent's body.Z2
Giulietti's lawyer also uses the second person and first person
plural to invite jurors to identify with the plaintiff,2s3 thus making the
decedent's suffering more vivid. In contrast, the railroad's counsel's
use of the second person leads the jurors not to identify with Giulietti,
but instead to distinguish themselves from him.284
275. See Loftus & Palmer, supra note 246. For more extensive excerpts from Giulietti's
lawyer's argument, see supra notes 117-19.
276. G. 490.3, 495.22, 495.24.
277. G. 501.21, 504.14.
278. G. 500.5, 500.7, 500.13, 505.25-506.5.
279. G. 505.23, 508.1.
280. G. 505.12-14; see also "massive crush injuries to his chest and lower abdomen." G.
507.19-20.
281. G. 523.24.
282. For instance, in Giulietti's lawyer's first narrative summary of the events, he
misses the opportunity to describe the accident more graphically (G. 495.13-15). In his
second narrative summary, he undercuts the graphic description of John's injuries by the
legalese locution "as far as his lower extremities were concerned" (G. 505.15-16). And
third, not until late in the closing argument (G. 505.23-506.6) does he explicitly state that
the "scraping noise" Ed Hines heard was Giulietti being scraped against the trains on the
main track. The railroad's lawyer, meanwhile, refers to "gruesome photographs" (G.
519.17) of Giulietti's body.
283. See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 250-57 and accompanying text.
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G. Cognitive Framing: The Performative Dimension of Juror Judgments
To understand how jurors determine responsibility for accidents,
we must consider more than the law of negligence, the facts of the
case, and the jurors' own intuitive habits of judgment. We must also
consider how the jurors may approach their task. Attorneys strategi-
cally employ a range of linguistic devices to lead jurors to frame their
role as active or passive decision-makers, and thus encourage them to
award or discourage them from awarding damages.285
(1) How Rhetoric Reflects Cognitive Framing
In An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a Jury,28 6 Anthony Am-
sterdam and Randy Hertz explore how a prosecutor and a defense
attorney argue to the jury in an ordinary criminal case. Their discus-
sion of People v. Jones focuses on whether the assailant intended to
kill the victim he shot at close range during an argument; that will
determine the choice between second-degree murder and manslaugh-
ter. Amsterdam and Hertz observe that even in a relatively simple
case, and within the constraints imposed by the evidence, the substan-
tive and the procedural law, and jurors' expectations about what clos-
ing arguments should sound like, advocates can construct very
different stories about identical events. Moreover, each story is insep-
arable from the way it is told: it is through particular linguistic devices
285. In the literature of decision theory, "cognitive framing" refers to how the descrip-
tion of possible outcomes affects people's choices among those outcomes. For instance,
describing a prospective set of outcomes in terms of gains generally leads people to be risk-
averse, i.e., to prefer a certain gain to the chance (objectively equal or greater in value) of a
larger gain; describing the mathematically identical set of options in terms of losses, on the
other hand, leads people to seek risk, i.e., to prefer a chance of no loss to a certain loss,
even at the risk of suffering a larger loss. In one famous experiment, an imminent flu
epidemic was postulated to put 600 lives at risk. Subjects confronted with a choice between
a vaccination program that would save 200 lives and one that would create a one-third
chance of saving 600 chose the first program (risk-averseness). Yet these same subjects,
confronted with a choice between a program that would result in 400 deaths and one that
would create a one-third chance of no deaths (objectively the same two options as in the
first phase of the experiment), chose the second program-a risk-seeking choice inconsis-
tent with their earlier choice. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and
Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOoIsT 341, 343 (1984); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
The cognitive framing discussed in the text is broadly similar to Kahneman and Tver-
sky's in that the attorneys' description of the jurors' task-how the job of deciding is
framed-is hypothesized to affect how the jurors decide. Cognitive framing in Kahneman
and Tversky's specific sense may also apply to juror decision-making; I have not explored
that possibility in this Article.
286. Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 20, at 55.
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that the attorneys implicitly evoke their contrasting visions for the de-
cision-makers. 8 7
The basic contrast between the prosecution and defense argu-
ments in Jones is between two distinct cognitive frames: history and
dialogue.28s The prosecutor tells a story about what happened on a
New York City street on the date of the crime, inviting the jurors to
accept those events as plain fact. She describes events in the past tense
and speaks to the jurors as if they need only register the objective
evidence of what happened "out there" in the world of fact.
The defense attorney, of course, wants to engender reasonable
doubt in the jurors' minds. He cannot, however, do this explicitly; that
would be contrary to the judge's instructions to the jury not to specu-
late. It would also play into the stereotype of defense attorney as
trickster, and would undercut his ability to take advantage of the strict
formal burden of proof. So defense counsel implicitly draws the jurors
into an imagined dialogue in which they reconstruct the events of the
crime, with the result that they implicitly understand those events not
as given facts, but merely as possible interpretations, open to reason-
able doubt. The attorney does this through a variety of techniques,
including speaking of the jurors' consideration of the evidence and
their decision-making tasks using active verbs and metaphors rather
than passive ones, describing events in the present tense, and asking
rhetorical questions. 289 Thus, defense counsel's closing argument tells
a story, not about what happened "out there," but about what is hap-
pening at the trial itself: how the jurors reach their decision.290 In sum,
Amsterdam and Hertz argue that jurors frame the evidence differ-
ently when they conceive of themselves as constructing a decision
through engaging in dialogue, as opposed to when they conceive of
themselves as passive receptors for the "data" established at trial.291
287. Id. at 58.
288. Id. at 75-77.
289. Id. at 83-104.
290. Id. at 58. Specifically, Amsterdam and Hertz argue that the defense counsel's ar-
gument structure and microlinguistic uses cast the jurors in the role of the classical mythic
hero whose efforts to decide the case constitute a quest. Defense counsel's story line is how
"[t]he jurors, faithful to their oath, acquitted the defendant although he sorely tempted
them to do otherwise by killing the victim in a dastardly fashion." This story of the trial
also displaces the defendant's killing of the victim from center stage, subordinating it to the
jurors' task. Id. at 67.
291. For research correlating microlinguistic events with outcomes in criminal trials, see
Michael Parkinson, Verbal Behavior and Courtroom Success, 30 COMM. EDUC. 22 (1981).
Some of Parkinson's specific findings support Amsterdam and Hertz's framework, e.g.,
that the indicative mood, used to express unqualified assertions of fact, is an indicator of
prosecutorial success and defense counsel failure; that defense attorneys are more success-
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Advocates in negligence trials, like those in criminal trials, might
also try to exploit jurors' capacity to understand the case using differ-
ent cognitive frames. The rhetorical patterns indicating that the law-
yers are soliciting jurors to frame the case one way or the other are
likely to differ in civil cases. Most importantly, it is not enough for
defense lawyers merely to engender reasonable doubt about the evi-
dence, because the plaintiff still wins if he can prove his case by a
preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, defense lawyers must meet
that same burden to win a contributory negligence argument, and to
that extent should be as interested as the plaintiff's attorney in having
jurors passively frame the relevant evidence as objectively real.
ful when they use abstract rather than concrete language. IL at 30. Parkinson's brief con-
clusion is also in line with Amsterdam and Hertz's: that the distribution of verbal behaviors
makes sense in light of the prosecutor's task-to present facts-and the defense attorney's
task, to sow reasonable doubt. Id. at 31-32.
For additional, albeit somewhat limited, empirical confirmation of Amsterdam and
Hertz's observations in this regard, see WALTER, supra note 21, at 157 (noting that use of
"common sense" was urged by 62% of prosecutors but only 35% of defense attorneys,
while 70% of defense attorneys but only 56% of prosecutors "placed onus on jurors").
One of Amsterdam and Hertz's major contributions is to identify the strategic dimen-
sion of jurors' different modes of cognitive processing. Cf. Linz & Penrod, supra note 20,
who do not appear to distinguish the strategic uses of triggering active information process-
ing. E.g., "The attorney's task is to facilitate this information processing. In order for jurors
to reach the fairest decision possible, both attorneys must assume some responsibility for
providing jurors with the 'cognitive skills' necessary to actively evaluate the events of the
trial." Id. at 18. And:
The more the attorney can stimulate or motivate the juror to actively process the
information at trial, the better the chances that the truth of the case and argu-
ments will be realized. The juror must be "drawn in" as a "cognitively active"
participant in the courtroom proceedings. The attorney's goal is to make the juror
a more competent information processor.
Id. at 24. Amsterdam and Hertz may diverge from Linz and Penrod's recommendations in
other ways as well, and perhaps generally in their treatment of the implicit aspects of argu-
ment. See, e.g., id. at 26-27 (contending that attorneys should draw explicit conclusions).
By characterizing the different cognitive frames Amsterdam and Hertz identify as "ac-
tive" and "passive," I do not mean to suggest any necessary relationship to what cognitive
psychologists describe as "active information processing." Many psychologists have recog-
nized that jurors, like other people who must process information, may do so actively. See
Diamond & Casper, supra note 9, at 516-17; Linz & Penrod, supra note 20, at 17-25. Con-
siderable research, led by the work of Richard Petty and John Cacioppo, has studied the
effects of listener or receiver involvement on cognition and persuasion. See, e.g., Richard
E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, Issue Involvement Can Increase or Decrease Persuasion by
Enhancing Message-Relevant Cognitive Responses, 37 J. PERSONALrry & Soc. PsYCHOL.
1915 (1979) (describing experiments that provide support for view that high involvement
leads to greater focus on content of message, and thus a strong message becomes more
persuasive and a weak message less persuasive). The relevance of this research to juror
cognition is problematic, because it is unclear whether jurors are in a high- or low-involve-
ment situation as those terms are defined in the literature. Id at 1915.
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Thus instead of a simple plaintiff-passive/defendant-active pattern
(or vice versa), we might expect to see advocates' invitations to active
cognitive framing-including the use of the second person and first
person plural, especially with active verbs, and rhetorical questions-
used for a variety of purposes. Some we have already seen: lawyers for
either side may encourage jurors to participate and identify them-
selves with the client, or with a prototype to which the opposing party
is contrasted.
In this section I offer another hypothesis: that plaintiffs' attorneys
will lead jurors to conceive of their decision-making role as active, so
that the jurors will feel empowered to award defendants' money to the
plaintiffs. This cognitive frame, in turn, may shape jurors' attributions
of responsibility. Research suggests that accident victims may first be-
lieve that they should be compensated, and only then attribute fault to
justify that belief.292 Similarly, jurors may be more inclined to find a
defendant at fault the more they feel capable of awarding damages.2 93
(2) Cognitive Framing in Negligence Arguments
The arguments in Butler support the above hypothesis. Butler's
lawyer more often engages the jurors in active decision-making
through the use of the second person and first person plural points of
view, active verbs, and rhetorical questions than does Revere's attor-
ney. He uses the second person and first person plural at about twice
the rate of Revere's attorney.2 94 And when we go beyond this rather
crude indicator to examine the sorts of verbs the attorneys use in con-
nection with the second person and first person plural, we find that
292. See Lloyd-Bostock, Common Sense Morality, supra note 262, at 99-100.
293. There is reason to believe that the less jurors feel capable of awarding damages,
the more inclined they will be to blame the plaintiff (see Miller et al., supra note 143, at 312
(noting that simulation heuristic experiments show that ease with which observers can
mentally undo victim's fate affects their reactions to victim, and that consequently, observ-
ers will compensate more those victims whose fate can be easily undone, but will derogate
those same victims more if compensation isn't possible); Mysliwiec, supra note 15, at 1036
(reasoning from equity theory that one who observes inequity will attempt to restore "ac-
tual" equity if he has power to do so, but if not, he will restore "psychological" equity by
blaming victim for the inequity)), and the greater the fault attributed to the plaintiff, the
less the fault attributed to the defendant (see Thomas & Parpal, supra note 265). The hy-
pothesis offered in the text is the converse of this proposition.
294. Considering the arguments in their entirety, Butler's and Revere's attorneys ap-
pear to use the second and first person plural at about the same rate (6.25 instances per 25-
line transcript page for Butler's attorney versus 6.3 per page for Revere's attorney). How-
ever, excluding the crucial analogy of the refrigerator repairman, during which Revere's
attorney uses the second person at a rate of 19 per page (13 instances in 17 lines), he uses it
at a rate of only 3.2 per page-about half as often as Butler's attorney overall.
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Butler's attorney more often casts the jurors as actors.295 Moreover,
while both lawyers conceive of the jurors as equally active and passive
when evaluating evidence,2 96 a striking difference emerges when the
lawyers address the jurors as decision-makers. Butler's attorney ad-
dresses them using active verbs that empower them. These jurors
"hold [plaintiff's] only chance"; they will struggle in facing the "diffi-
cult chore" of deciding, but "wi[ll] make [their] best effort. '297 When
Revere's attorney addresses the jurors, he tells them what to do, dis-
empowering them. They "must... set aside all feelings of sympathy";
they "must not speculate"; they "must bring in a verdict that is fair,
just, and impartial. 298 In all, Butler's lawyer portrays the jurors as
active decision-makers about six times as often as does Revere's
lawyer.299
The evidence from the respective attorneys' uses of rhetorical
questions 30 0 points in the same direction, though perhaps not signifi-
cantly. Butler's lawyer asks rhetorical questions at a slightly higher
rate than does Revere's. 301 But Revere's attorney answers all rhetori-
295. Butler's attorney, 62% of the time (60 out of 95 instances when second or inclu-
sive first person was used with a verb); Revere's attorney, 47% of the time (14 out of 30,
and only 27% aside from the refrigerator repairman story).
296. Butler's attorney, 23 active verbs out of 43 instances; Revere's attorney, 5 out of
10. Both counsel also treat the jurors as more active than passive when counsel are telling
stories-Butler's attorney, 14 active verbs out of 15 instances; Revere's attorney, 6 out of 9.
297. B. 30.6, 28.6 (see also 29.5); 30.22-23.
298. B. 31.7; 31.8-9 (see also 34.24); 31.9-10. The anaphora of these remarks in the
introduction emphasizes the sense of obligation and command. In the argument on causa-
tion, Revere's attorney again tells the jurors: "You cannot... speculate" (34.24-25). And in
the conclusion, he says: "[A] verdict in [plaintiff's] favor in this case would be a breach of
your oaths as jurors to bring in a verdict that is fair, just, and impartial" (36.4-6); "the law
that you must follow" (36.8-9). Indeed, the only arguably nonpassive conception of the
jurors in this respect is "[a]ll of us certainly are ... sympathetic" to Butler (36.1), a weak
copulative.
299. Butler's attorney portrays the jurors' decision-making as active 68% of the time
(15 instances out of 22 references to jurors as decision-makers), while Revere's attorney
does this only 11% of the time (1 instance out of 9).
300. It appears generally that rhetorical questions generate more intensive message
processing than do statements. Robert E. Burnkrant & Daniel J. Howard, Effects of the
Use of Introductory Rhetorical Questions Versus Statements on Information Processing, 47
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1218 (1984) (noting that strong messages become more
persuasive in low-involvement situations when introduced with rhetorical questions instead
of statements). But cf. Richard E. Petty et al., Effects of Rhetorical Questions on Persua-
sion: A Cognitive Response Analysis, 40 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 432, 438-39
(1981) (reporting that in high-involvement situation, use of rhetorical questions to summa-
rize argument disrupts thinking and makes strong messages weaker).
301. Butler's attorney, 0.765 per page (13 in just under 17 pages: B. 22.18-19, 22.19-22,
26.20, 27.16-18, 30.18-21, 37.4-5 (3 questions), 37.11, 37.14, 37.17-20, 37.25-38.1, 38.12-13);
Revere's attorney, 0.545 per page (3 in 5 pages: B. 32.20, 34.10, 32.11).
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cal questions he poses. This indicates that he is not using the device to
engage the jurors' thought processes. He doesn't want them to think
for themselves. Butler's attorney, by contrast, leaves unanswered
seven of thirteen rhetorical questions.30
In the arguments in Roe v. Hocon,303 similarly, the plaintiff's law-
yer more often engages the jurors as active decision-makers. Roe's
lawyer uses the second and first person plural slightly more often than
does the defendant's lawyer.3 4 A slightly larger portion of the total
uses describes the jurors' decision-making, 30 5 and a greater percentage
of these uses envisions the jurors as active.30 6 Roe's attorney also asks
two-and-a-half times as many rhetorical questions.30 7 Moreover, the
metaphoric images of decision-making emphasize this contrast. Domi-
nant in Roe's lawyer's argument are verbs of movement and activity:
jurors "approach" each question by "turning" to the evidence; they
"work back" through the evidence of causation.308 And when Roe's
lawyer advises jurors how to award damages to the widow, he
imagines them acting: "[Y]ou want to salute this woman.., and just
say, Well done, you," and: "[T]his is your opportunity to say in the
only way our law knows" what was lost in the accident.309 For Hocon's
attorney, by contrast, the jurors are mostly passive decision-makers:
the law, the facts, the evidence, and the proof are "given" to them,
and their decision is "control[led]" by their recollections. 310
302. And as to two others, he doesn't answer with a declarative, third-person response,
but rather with "I don't buy that" (3. 37.20) and "I think.. ." (B. 38.1-2), which sustains
the image of a conversation with the jurors. Cf supra notes 289-91 and accompanying text
(Amsterdam and Hertz's interpretation of criminal defense counsel's argument as a dia-
logue with jurors).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 161-64 for the facts of this case.
304. Roe's attorney uses the second and inclusive first person at a rate of 11.45 in-
stances per 27-line page (293 instances, or 4.3%, of an estimated 6,753 total words, given an
average of 9.77 words per line, 27 lines per page, and 25.6 pages). Hocon's attorney uses
the second and inclusive first person at a rate of 9.26 instances per 27-line page (181 in-
stances, or 3.5%, of an estimated 5,170 words (19.6 pages)).
305. Roe's attorney, 55.6% of total uses (163 out of 293); Hocon's attorney, 51.2% (94
out of 181).
306. Roe's attorney, 41.7% active verbs to describe jurors' decision-making (68 out of
163); Hocon's attorney, 30.8% (29 out of 94).
307. Roe's attorney, 1.40 per page (36 in 25.6 pages of 27 lines); Hocon's attorney, 0.56
per page (11 in 19.6 pages).
308. See, e.g., R. 29.9, 31.25-26 ("turning" to evidence); 28.21,29.1-2 ("going through"
the special verdict questionnaire); 34.14-15 ("approaching" a question); 38.12, 42.6 ("mov-
ing to" a question); 34.15, .25, 36.14 ("working backwards" through causation question).
309. R. 49.9, 49.21-23; see also 45.21 ("stamp your feet" regarding apparently outra-
geous verdicts).
310. See, e.g., R. 51.19 (evidence is given), 51.26 (law is given), 54.13 (facts are given),
58.6 (proof is given); 60.23, 65.6 (recollections control). To be sure, Hocon's attorney also
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The exception to this pattern is Giulietti, in which the railroad's
lawyer, more so than Giulietti's, actively involves the jury in the deci-
sion-making process. The railroad's attorney uses the second person
and first person plural almost two-and-a-half times as often as does
Giulietti's attorney 311 and almost four times as often (as a percentage
of each lawyer's overall uses) to engage the jurors in their decision-
making function.3 12 Moreover, the railroad's attorney asks rhetorical
questions no less than seventeen times as often as does Giulietti's. 313
Perhaps the evidence of the defendant's negligence was so strong that
its attorney, atypically, wanted jurors to conceive of their role as ac-
tive, so that they might more readily challenge the "passive take" on
the case.
If. Conclusion: The Rhetoric and the Law of Torts
I began this Article by observing that jurors' conceptions of negli-
gence may very well diverge from appellate doctrine, at least as com-
municated to the jurors through instructions, yet by and large appear
to do the justice that the doctrine is designed to produce.314 The analy-
sis of advocates' closing arguments allows us to infer some characteris-
tics of how jurors think about negligence, and to speculate about how
that thinking accommodates both the formal law and the tools of ordi-
nary judgment.
speaks of the jurors' task using verbs of movement: e.g., R. 53.1, 54.25, 59.2 (getting or
turning to questions). And both attorneys use the metaphor, ambivalent in this context, of
"following" the law or the evidence. Compare, e.g., R. 28.9 (Roe's attorney) with R.
51.11, 51.13 (Hocon's attorney). But the excerpts in the text accurately describe the overall
pattern.
311. Railroad's counsel, 10.2 instances per 25-line page (179 instances, or 4.3%, of an
estimated 5,100 total words, given an average of 9.4 words per line, 25 lines per page, and
17.6 pages); Giulietti's counsel: 4.3 per 25-line page (94 instances, or 1.8%, of an estimated
4,136 words (21.7 pages)).
312. Railroad's counsel, 60 of 179, or 34%; Giulietti's counsel, 8 of 94, or 9%. About
the same proportion of each counsel's overall uses describe the jurors' understanding of
the evidence (railroad's counsel, 63 of 179, or 35%; Giulietti's counsel, 32 of 94, or 34%).
And both equally use the second or first person plural to get the jurors to identify with a
prototype of due care which the other party did not meet (railroad's counsel, 38 of 179, or
21%; Giulietti's counsel, 17 of 94, or 18%).
313. Giulietti's counsel uses two rhetorical questions in almost 22 pages of transcript,
or 0.09 instances per page; while the railroad's counsel uses 27 rhetorical questions in
under 18 pages, or 1.53 per page.
314. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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A. The Common Sense of Negligence Implicit in Lawyers' Rhetoric
The arguments in Butler and other accident cases suggest that ju-
rors determine responsibility for accidents by comparing what hap-
pened to something else. The comparisons are of two general sorts.
According to the advocates' rhetoric, jurors compare the parties and
their conduct to prototypes of how reasonable people behave, in order
to decide whether the parties fit. Jurors also contrast what happened
to hypothetical scenarios in which the accident did not occur, in order
to identify some act or omission by one or both of the parties as the
cause of the accident. Research shows that changing the counterfac-
tual scenario to which subjects compare the facts, but not changing the
facts themselves, changes attributions of causation315 and responsibil-
ity.3'6 The prominence of person-situation prototypes in the argu-
ments suggests that they have a similar impact on these attributions.
Two features of this rhetoric are noteworthy. First, to understand
how the relevant legal notions of causation and reasonable care apply
to the evidence, we must refer not only to what happened, but also to
jurors' specific conceptions of what could and should have hap-
pened.317 One might, in theory, attempt to catalogue prototypes of
persons and events the way treatises sample appellate statements of
the facts constituting reasonable or unreasonable behavior.31 8 But the
prototypes are innumerable-as various as the popular cultural
sources on which jurors can be expected to draw. Second, the use of
prototypes, counterfactual scenarios, and cognitive frames tends to
merge the ordinarily separate elements of negligence doctrine. 31 9
The arguments in Butler illustrate these aspects of the common
sense of torts. According to Butler's lawyer, Revere is responsible for
315. See Wells & Gavanski, supra note 143, at 164 (observing that subjects attributed
greater causal significance to event if its counterfactual alternative would have resulted in
different outcome than if alternative resulted in the same outcome).
316. See Macrae, supra note 143, at 86-87 (noting that the more available a counterfac-
tual scenario in which accident did not occur, the more compensation subjects awarded
victim and the more negligent they judged injurer).
317. Cf Manzo, supra note 12, at 649-50, 662 (jurors evaluate parties' and lawyers'
conduct by comparing it to normative assertions, "whether [these assertions take the form
of] discrete narratives, aspects of folk wisdom, or elements of technical knowledge[ ],"
drawn from the jurors' "common knowledge" and their everyday experience).
318. See supra note 86 (descriptions of "reasonable person" culled from appellate
decisions).
319. This is not, of course, to say that the elements are always entirely distinct in appel-
late or hornbook law. For instance, the concepts of duty and proximate cause are often
blended. See e.g., KEETON Er AL.., supra note 1, § 42, at 274-75; see also infra note 329
(merger of causation and breach of duty in Uniform Comparative Fault Act).
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George Butler's injuries, because if Brockway and other employees
had simply helped Butler put the tarpaulin on the load instead of go-
ing on a coffee break, Butler would not have been hurt. Brockway's
behavior is deviant, because it contrasts with a normal scenario in
which people help others if they can do so with little cost or effort.
And the deviant act is the cause of the deviant outcome: Butler's fall.
Butler, moreover, deserves to be compensated because he's Rocky:
Everyman, just doing his job, and now heroically fighting to overcome
his injuries. In contrast, according to Revere's lawyer, Butler is re-
sponsible for his own, admittedly tragic injuries because Revere's em-
ployees had no duty to help him put the tarpaulin on the load. Their
behavior was normal and reasonable, not deviant; they acted just as
the jurors themselves would have acted in a similar situation. More-
over, there is no evidence that the failure to help caused the accident.
The arguments also show Butler's lawyer engaging the jurors as active
decision-makers, perhaps so that they will feel empowered to hold the
defendant responsible and to compensate Butler despite an appar-
ently daunting lack of proof of duty and causation.
Advocates' tort arguments may suggest larger cultural meanings.
For instance, the simulation heuristic and the fundamental attribution
error, both of which incline jurors to find someone culpable, may
serve a contemporary need to assign blame and thus to assert moral
control in an uncertain, socially fragmented world.320 But jurors may
use prototypes to exculpate as well as to inculpate. Thus, the overall
direction, if any, of the common sense of negligence is unclear.
B. Cognitive Heuristics and Legal Categories: How Jurors Can Follow
the Law
The closing arguments indicate that jurors will reason about acci-
dent cases by using both the elements of the formal law and various
knowledge structures and inferential heuristics. These two approaches
are often thought of as dichotomous or in tension. "A jury cannot be
said to have reached a correct verdict unless it understands the rele-
vant law. '321 Yet the legal system tolerates and even encourages jurors
to augment (and sometimes, if necessary, to nullify) legal rules by ap-
320. See MARY DOUGLAS, RISK AND BLAME 15-16 (1992) (analyzing contemporary
language of risk as part of cultural blaming practices).
321. Amiram Elwork & Bruce Sales, Jury Instructions, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVI-
DENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE, supra note 21, at 281.
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plying their own senses of justice.322 To what extent is jurors' justice
actually consistent with the law of negligence? How can it be that ju-
rors who seem not to understand the law as expressed in judges' in-
structions nevertheless decide cases in ways that strike most judges as
correct enough? 323
The tools of ordinary judgment fit comfortably within negligence
law for a number of reasons. First and most generally, the formal law
accommodates jurors' uses of many of the cognitive habits examined
in this Article, and indeed cannot help but do so. "The tort sys-
tem... purports, both at the level of general principle and at the level
of particular definitions of fault and their application, to accord with
common sense." 324 Elements of negligence law such as reasonable
care and causation provide only very broad guidelines, within which
jurors may apply tools of common sense, such as prototypes, not pre-
scribed by the instructions themselves.32 This is because, in law, rules
are inevitably applied to stories; negligence instructions, therefore,
must accommodate both the rule-element and narrative-prototypical
modes of thinking.326
322. See supra note 74 (jurors' functions). An additional reason to expect juror judg-
ments to vary from the formal law is that closing arguments and jurors' deliberations are
spoken, while the formal law is written. The use of intuitive tools to organize thought in
oral culture may very well differ from the ways in which thought is organized in written
culture. See WALTER J. ONG, ORALrrY AND LrERAcY (1982) (analyzing cognition in oral
and written cultures); Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV.
509, 533-36 (1992) (noting effects on legal system of print culture supplanting oral and
written culture).
323. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
324. Lloyd-Bostock, Attributions, supra note 15, at 263; cf. OLWER WENDELL HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 36 (Mark deWolfe Howe ed. 1963) ("The first requirement of a sound
body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the com-
munity, whether right or wrong.")
325. For the standard instruction on negligence see supra note 86. As for "proximate
cause," the standard instruction states:
An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act, or a failure to act, whenever
it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substan-
tial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the
injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence
of the act or omission.
3 DEvrrrT AL., supra note 86, § 80.18, 170. Obviously, these "rules" are quite open-
ended, leaving jurors to fill in the blanks. The proximate cause instruction, incidentally,
commits the basic error of including in the definition one of the terms to be defined
("cause").
326. Cf. BRUNER, AcruAL MINDS, supra note 78, at 11-14 (describing paradigmatic or
rule-based and narrative as distinct modes of thinking). For a famous illustration of the
tension in appellate opinions between reducing "reasonable care" to a rule and keeping it
sensitive to each new story, compare Baltimore & O.RR. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70
(1927) (Holmes, J.) (reversing judgment for plaintiff on ground that decedent violated rule
November 1995] THE RHETORIC OF TORTS
Second, the law itself to some extent merges the categories of
rule-element thinking, just as jurors are wont to do. For instance, re-
search indicates that jurors' damage awards may reflect judgments
about liability;327 jurors' assessments of how much the plaintiff's own
misconduct contributed to the accident and how much to award for
pain and suffering may conflate causation and fault.328 Yet the law of
comparative fault itself merges causation and breach of duty.329
Two other reasons help explain the perceived consistency be-
tween jurors' judgments and the law. First, in many cases, judges and
other legal professionals would themselves use the same knowledge
structures and heuristics as would jurors in applying such open-ended
rules as those governing reasonable care and causation. By using pro-
totypes to think about reasonable care, for instance, jurors make law
the same way that Levi and Llewellyn believed appellate judges
should, and do, make common law.330
Second, the very secrecy of deliberations may lead judges and
others to believe that jurors' understandings of negligence law are
largely congruent with their own. With few exceptions, the law toler-
to "stop, look, and listen" by failing to get out of his vehicle and look before traversing
grade crossing) with Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1933) (Cardozo, J.) (reversing
directed verdict for defendant and remanding on ground that Goodman rule was too in-
flexible and that such decisions should be left to jury discretion rather than commanded by
rule).
Another explanation for why rules alone cannot govern the attribution of responsibil-
ity for accidents is that moral reasoning necessarily draws on exemplars (of people and the
stories of their actions) as well as rules. It is only by these examples of something finer than
ourselves, yet not unapproachable or impossibly distant, that we ought to measure our-
selves and others. See MARTHA C. NusSBAuM, LovE's KNOWLEDGE 164-65 (1990).
327. See, e.g., A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM., supra note 9, app. 10, at 25-26 (citing evidence
of intrusion of liability issues into juror deliberations on damages); Kalven, supra note 3, at
167 (describing different beliefs about liability and how those beliefs affect damage
awards).
328. See Kalven, supra note 3, at 161 (observing that jury has great freedom to make
complex value judgments in determining pain and suffering damages); id. at 167-68
(describing how jury, when given contributory negligence instruction, may discount dam-
ages or compromise the verdict to account for its sense that someone other than defendant
was at fault).
329. See UNIF. COMPARATVE FAULT Acr § 2(b), 12 U.L.A. Supp. 50-51 (West 1995):
"In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of
the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct
and the damages claimed." Compare the judge's instructions in Roe v. Hocon: "In deter-
mining the comparative negligence of each party, you should consider the totality of the
acts and conduct on each side and the degree to which each contributed to the injury
sustained and thus arrive at a fair and just determination of how the award is to be appor-
tioned" (R. 95.18-23).
330. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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ates results that are correct enough,331 even if jurors actually reached
them for the wrong reasons. Judges and other legal professionals who
observe the results but not the process may tend to presume that if the
result is within the law (or roughly what they themselves would have
decided), that the reasoning behind it was also consistent with their
own understanding of the law.
On the other hand, some cognitive habits may lead to decisions
contrary to negligence doctrine. First, the research of Vicki Smith on
prototypes and lay decision-making and that of Reid Hastie and
others on the "story model" indicates that jurors will think in terms of
prototypes regardless of how they are instructed.332 It is certainly con-
ceivable that this way of thinking could lead jurors to attribute respon-
sibility for an accident without support by a preponderance of the
evidence on fault and causation. Butler may be just such a case.
Second, whether a party used reasonable care under the circum-
stances, for example, should not depend on the kind of person that
party is.333 Yet this is how the fundamental attribution error leads ju-
rors to think. Indeed, by asking jurors to compare a party's conduct to
that of the "reasonable person," the standard negligence instruction
invites jurors to commit this error, because it directs jurors' attention
to the person rather than to the risks posed by the behavior under the
circumstances. 334
331. See supra notes 4, 6 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (prototypes); supra notes 76, 79
(story model). But cf Smith, supra note 73 and accompanying text (jurors' use of prototyp-
ical crime definitions somewhat reduced by corrective instructions that explicitly address
features of prototype).
333. See supra text following note 197.
334. See supra note 192 (comparing party with reasonable person); supra note 197 (fo-
cusing on reasonable person). To be sure, the attribution of blame may, like other instances
of moral reasoning, properly depend on comparisons of the behavior at hand with the
behavior of exemplary persons (see supra note 326 on the dependence of moral reasoning
on exemplary particulars as well as on rules). The law's "reasonable person," however,
unlike the examples of moral excellence offered by history and literature, is devoid of
particulars. This allows the attorneys to fill in the blanks in ways that direct jurors' atten-
tion to traits (of the reasonable person and of the party) rather than to the situation-spe-
cific creation of risks, thereby encouraging jurors to commit the fundamental attribution
error.
Perhaps the efforts to improve the intelligibility of jury instructions and the manner in
which they are communicated, which have yielded some success, could help bring juror
thinking closer to doctrine. Phrasing the negligence instruction in terms of the creation of
unreasonable risks might address this problem. On the other hand, given jurors' general
inability to understand instructions, such changes might not significantly affect jurors'
thinking. See supra note 9 (jurors' comprehension of instructions).
For a discussion of the proximate cause instruction and judgmental bias, see Johnson
& Drobny, Proximity Biases, supra note 157, at 294 (observing that California's official jury
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Third, jurors' use of either the simulation heuristic or the severity
effect could lead to decisions that vary from the formal law, although
typically the absence of data about relevant comparison cases would
make it difficult to say that jurors' attributions of causation or respon-
sibility were flatly wrong.335
There is probably no simple generalization that describes the dis-
tribution of judgmental tools and legal rules in juror thinking, as re-
flected in lawyers' arguments. Both plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers
may be expected to invoke the use of judgmental tools that are gener-
ally consistent with the law: both may employ prototypes of reason-
able behavior and both may lead jurors to use the simulation heuristic
to determine causation. Yet we have seen that plaintiffs' and defend-
ants' lawyers may offer systematically divergent frameworks for evalu-
ating the case. Because the evidence is the most important
determinant of juror decisions,336 we may hypothesize that the
stronger the evidence of the defendant's negligence, the more the
plaintiff's attorney may be expected to argue in rule-element fashion
(as in Giulietti); the weaker the evidence, the greater the reliance on
habits of judgment that may conflict with those elements, such as the
fundamental attribution error and the severity effect (as in Butler).
Defense counsel, by contrast, would generally be expected to lead ju-
rors to structure their thinking in terms of the formal rule, because the
defendant should win if the plaintiff fails to establish any one element.
The jurors' interpretation of the law of negligence, as reflected in
instruction on proximate cause may bias jurors toward causal and temporal proximity
schemas, excluding more complex chains of causation).
335. In cases for which statistical evidence of causation is lacking, it would seem very
difficult to rule out almost any attribution to an event preceding the accident as insuffi-
ciently "substantial" to meet the legally required standard, because the court would not
have before it the data necessary to perform a covariational analysis. The presence of the
severity effect can be conclusively established only through a controlled comparison of the
actual case with a similar case featuring the same ex ante risk of harm but a different
outcome, and evidence of such a comparison case is not likely to be available. Moreover,
because the severity effect is a matter of degree (the greater the harm, the more responsi-
ble the actor), it would be hard to say that an attribution of fault actually based on the
severity effect (assuming we could know this) would be incorrect if there were sufficient
evidence to support some finding of fault.
336. See Visher, supra note 14.
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closing arguments, is thus a complex mix of facts, prototypes,
counterfactuals, and rules, very much dependent on both the evidence
and the advocacy in each case.337
337. On the validity of such context-specific understandings in cultural anthropology,
see, e.g., GEERTZ, supra note 21. Lawyering theory studies the contextualized nature of
legal judgment. See generally Richard K. Sherwin, Lawyering Theory: An Overview, 37
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 9, 9-53 (1992).
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